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SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
Prob lea 
At least from the time of Augustine, Christians have 
been reflecting on the question of moral conflicts. Since 
the mid-1960s this issue has become the center of attention 
for several scholars, including Norman L. Geisler, who 
developed ethical hierarchicalism in an attempt to resolve 
these conflicts. The question therefore arises: Is ethical 
hierarchicalism comprehensive, consistent, and biblically 
sound, and the only viable approach for Christians, as 
Geisler claims? Because Geisler is the most articulate and 
influential proponent of this strategy, his ethical method 
was selected for this research. 
Method 
To provide some framework, a brief survey was made 
of various methods relating to ethical dilemmas. In 
addition to observing the contrasting ways in which eminent 
early Christians, Reformation leaders, post-Reformation 
thinkers, and twentieth-century scholars have dealt with 
moral conflicts, this overview examined utilitarianism, 
situationism, non-conflicting absolutism, conflicting 
absolutism, hierarchicalism and the principle of double 
effect. Additional background traced Geisler's 
philosophical, theological, and ethical development over the 
years. 
Then, after outlining what Geisler considers the 
fundamental presuppositions of theistic morality and 
Christian ethics, hierarchicalism was delineated. Next, 
Geisler's moral methodology was critiqued, firstly against 
his own basic presuppositions, then by comparing 
contradictory concepts within hierarchicalism, and finally 
by contrasting his theories with those of other Christian 
thinkers, and with the biblical passages that Geisler uses. 
Following this, positive aspects of hierarchicalism were 
enumerated, a synopsis and recommendations made, and a final 
conclusion drafted. 
Results 
This study indicates that ethical hierarchicalism 
contradicts most of the essential characteristics of 
theistic morality and Christian ethics as specified by 
Geisler himself. careful research suggests that, while this 
theory holds to divinely-derived objective moral norms, it 
also embraces relativistic, utilitarian, situational, 
antinomian, and teleological components. Furthermore, it 
was demonstrated that hierarchicalism is based on falsely 
assumed responsibilities, inaccurately specified absolutes, 
naturalistic definitions, a descriptive approach to 
Scripture, a bifurcation in God's law, and subtle semantic 
strategies. 
conclusion 
Though hierarchicalism does grapple with difficult 
issues, emphasize personhood and individual responsibility, 
and offer relief from false guilt, this method of moral 
reasoning appears unacceptable for Christians since it is 
incoherent, inconsistent, self-contradictory, and 
unscriptural. 
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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In his important volume on the foundations of 
ethics, Helmut Thielicke notes that theological ethics 
usually makes the mistake of using the "normal cases" as its 
standard for measuring reality. The result is the illusion 
that problems are solved. The reality is that, as in 
medicine, problems do not arise with the ordinary cases, but 
rather with the borderline, abnormal cases. 1 Thus 
Thielicke posits that "the real test, even in respect of 
foundational principles, is whether an ethics has been 
proved in the crucible of the borderline situation and 
emerged with even deeper insights. 112 
This concept of testing the validity of an ethical 
approach by means of a borderline situation is not to be 
confused with the attempt to actually construct an ethical 
1Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, 
Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966), 578. 
Frankena concurs, stating that "most moral problems arise in 
situations where there is a 'conflict of duties,' that is, 
where one moral principle pulls one way and another pulls 
the other way;" William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2d ed., 
Foundations of Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), 3. 
2Thielicke, 1:578. 
1 
2 
methodology upon exceptional cases. John Macquarrie rightly 
posits that "an ethic cannot be built on exceptions. Indeed 
hard cases can be recognized only because there is already a 
tacit acceptance of norms. 111 While it is true that a 
framework of ethics should not be structured on unusual 
cases, 2 Richard Purtill is right in his assessment that the 
failure of an ethical theory to resolve dilemmas indicates 
that the theory is unsatisfactory as an ethical approach. 3 
In other words, though the practice of constructing 
an ethical method on moral conflicts4 should be avoided, it 
is not only reasonable but also imperative to keep these 
dilemmas in mind when attempting to formulate an acceptable 
method of doing ethics. 5 For it is in conflict situations 
1John Macquarrie, Three Issues in Ethics (New York, 
NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), 39-40. 
2Erwin W. Lutzer, The Necessity of Ethical 
Absolutes, Christian Free University Curriculum Series 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1981), 88. 
3Richard L. Purtill, ed., Moral Dilemmas: Readings 
in Ethics and Social Philosophy (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1985), 2. 
4In this doctoral thesis the term "moral conflicts" 
is used interchangeably with other terms such as borderline 
situations, conflicting moral obligations, ethical dilemmas, 
etc. Just as in the writings of Norman L. Geisler this 
research project makes no distinction between the words 
"ethical" and "moral." 
5Admittedly, some argue against the concept of the 
necessity of consistency in ethics, (see, for example, 
Richard H. Bube, "Of Dominoes, Slippery Slopes, Thin Edges 
of Wedges, and Camels' Noses in Tents: Pitfalls in Christian 
Ethical Consistency," Perspectives on Science and Christian 
Faith 42 [September 1990]: 162-172). These arguments, 
however, will not be considered here, since Geisler's 
3 
that one can best ascertain the workability of any ethical 
approach. 1 As Thielicke concludes: "The borderline 
situation is thus an instructive example in terms of which 
to study the fact of the fallen world and to put the problem 
of ethics in its sharpest form. 112 
As part of an attempt to investigate the issue of 
moral conflicts, this chapter of general introduction 
provides the framework and background necessary for 
investigating this matter. First, the widespread concern of 
ethicists, theologians, and philosophers is noted so as to 
briefly indicate the extent of interest in this topic. 
Next, the relevance of Norman L. Geisler in the current 
discussion on ethical dilemmas is addressed in order to 
demonstrate why his work has been selected as the focus of 
this research project. Following this, the purpose and 
method used in this study are outlined. A brief section on 
the limitations of this research then closes this chapter. 
concern for an Adequate Christian Ethic 
For several decades now an extensive discussion 
about moral conflicts has developed in the moral theological 
position is one that argues for and assumes the necessity of 
consistency in ethics. See, for example, Norman L. Geisler, 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1989), 22, 23, 130. 
1Robert V. Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for 
Non-Conflicting Absolutism," Criswell Theological Review 2 
(Spring 1988): 240-241. 
2Thielicke, 1:582. 
4 
literature. 1 This phenomenon has given rise to a great 
deal of debate in moral theory. However, this topic is not 
merely a modern concern. At least as far back as Augustine, 
thinking Christians have been deliberating over the issue of 
moral conflicts. As an example of a borderline situation, 
Augustine once discussed what to do if "a man should seek 
shelter with thee who by thy lie may be saved from death. 112 
Over two centuries ago William Paley, the noted 
Anglican priest and celebrated moralist, addressed these 
kinds of conflicts in an influential book on moral 
philosophy. 3 Perhaps more than any other, it was the 
writings of the Danish philosopher, S~ren Kierkegaard, that 
brought this concept of the moral dilemma to prominence. In 
1This point is made by Anthony J. Blasi, Moral 
Conflict and Christian Religion, American University Studies 
Series VII, Theology and Religion, vol. 35 (New York, NY: 
Peter Lang, 1988), 9. Note also the extensive listing in 
the bibliography of works dealing with moral conflicts. 
2Augustine On Lying 1.9. Blasi (p. 2) says that the 
principle of the lesser evil was formulated by Gregory the 
Great, who held that if there were no opportunity to avoid 
one of two sins, the lesser should always be chosen. 
3Paley says it is not a lie to "tell a falsehood to 
a madman, for his own advantage; to a robber to conceal your 
property; to an assassin, to defeat or to divert him from 
his purpose;" William Paley, The Principles of Moral and 
Political Philosophy, 9th ed. (Boston, MA: West and 
Richardson, 1818), 113-114. About a century after the first 
edition of Paley's book, the president of Yale College 
published a book on morality in which he too discussed 
borderline situations; see Noah Porter, The Elements of 
Moral Science: Theoretical and Practical (New York, NY: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1885). 
5 
his classic work, Fear and Trembling, 1 Kierkegaard 
discussed the story of Genesis 22 in which God commanded 
Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. In brief, Kierkegaard 
concluded that there are times when the normal canons of 
morality may be set aside in order to obey the Divine will. 
Clearly, Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of 
the ethica1112 has not been seen by several Christian 
thinkers as the final answer to ethical dilemmas. This can 
be observed from the fact that over the years many others, 
including Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 3 Karl Barth, 4 Emil 
Brunner, 5 Reinhold Niebuhr, 6 and Paul Ramsey7 have 
continued to address the issue. 
1s¢ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. 
Alastair Hannay (London, England: Penguin Books, 1985). 
2Ibid., 95. 
3Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Neville Horton 
Smith, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 
1955) ' 363-371. 
4see, for example, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 
vol. III, part 4, The Doctrine of Creation, trans. A. T. 
Mackay, T. H. L. Parker, Harold Knight, Henry A. Kennedy, 
and John Marks, ed. G. w. Bromiley, and T. F. Torrance 
(Edinburgh, Scotland: T. & T. Clark, 1961), 324-564. 
5see, for example, Emil Brunner, The Divine 
Imperative, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster 
Press, 1947), 222-224. 
6see, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and 
Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York, 
NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 257-277. 
7see, for example, Paul Ramsey, "The Case of the 
Curious Exception," in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, 
ed. Gene H. outka and Paul Ramsey (New York, NY: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1968), 67-135. 
6 
Since the mid-1960s this problem of conflicting 
ethical norms has become a focus of attention for many 
Christian ethicists and theologians. A spate of books 
specifically devoted to this topic attests to this fact. 1 
Joseph Fletcher in his popular book, Situation Ethics: The 
New Morality, posited that there are only three approaches 
to making moral decisions: the legalistic, the antinomian, 
and the situational. He opted for the third approach, which 
holds that everyone must decide according to the 
circumstances what is the most loving thing to do. 2 
Following the publication of this book of 
Fletcher's, there was a flurry of activity on the part of 
Christians, especially evangelicals. 3 Most of their 
1see the bibliography for an extensive listing of 
works dealing with moral conflicts, but note especially: 
Joseph L. Allen, Love & conflict: A covenantal Model of 
Christian Ethics (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1984); 
Michael James Almeida, "The Impossibility of Moral 
Conflicts" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1988); 
Richard Higginson, Dilemmas: A Christian Approach to Moral 
Decision Making (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox 
Press, 1988); Terrance c. Mcconnell, "Moral Dilemmas and 
Ethical Consistency" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 
1975); Richard A. McCormick, and Paul Ramsey, eds., Doing 
Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985). 
2Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality 
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1966), 17-39. 
3see, for example, John c. Bennett, et al, Storm 
over Ethics (Philadelphia, PA: United Church Press, 1967); 
Harvey Cox, ed., The Situation Ethics Debate (Philadelphia, 
PA: Westminster Press, 1968); O. Sydney Barr, The Christian 
New Morality: A Biblical Study of Situation Ethics (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969); Erwin w. Lutzer, 
The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response to Situation 
Ethics (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1972); Gordon Kainer, 
7 
concern revolved around the refutation of the theory of 
situation ethics. 
Among those who read Fletcher's book was a young 
evangelical pastor, Norman L. Geisler. Already Geisler had 
been reflecting on the various logical alternative ways of 
dealing with ethics in the contemporary Christian world. 
However, it was on reading situation Ethics: The New 
Morality that, as Geisler puts it, "I was awakened from my 
dogmatic slumbers. 111 The kinds of situations raised in 
this book confirmed Geisler in his understanding that real 
moral conflicts occur in this world. 2 Then he looked at 
the biblical illustrations and concluded that "there are a 
lot of real conflicts right in the Bible. 113 
Geisler maintains that the existence of moral 
conflicts in the real world, and its occurrence in the Bible 
stories are the two most significant factors that went into 
his thinking in the formulating of his method of ethical 
Faith. Hope and Clarity: A Look at Situation Ethics and 
Biblical Ethics (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press Publishing 
Association, 1977) . 
1Norman L. Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of 
the Greater Good Ethic," cassette (Lynchburg, VA: Quest 
Productions, 1989). Geisler was here quoting Immanuel Kant 
who reacted this way on reading David Hume. 
2since it is not the primary focus of this research 
project to determine whether genuine moral conflicts exist 
or not, this study will proceed, through the first four 
chapters, on the premise that real moral conflicts do occur 
in this world, as Geisler posits. 
3Geisler, "The origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
8 
hierarchicalism1 (also known as graded absolutism, or the 
greater good ethic). In essence, he used the "borderline 
situation" as a catalyst to develop and test his proposed 
method of moral decision making. 2 
Geisler's Relevance in the current Debate 
The clearest, most forceful statement of ethical 
hierarchicalism can be found in the writings of the 
Christian ethicist Norman Geisler. 3 His material on ethics 
is considered to be the most systematic, logical, coherent 
and comprehensive elaboration currently available on the 
perspective of a hierarchical approach to ethics. 4 
2Admittedly, the one who believes in the existence 
of borderline situations can only do so from the background 
of an already assumed basic approach to philosophy, 
theology, and ethics. These basic presuppositions, as held 
by Geisler, will be considered in this project only as they 
relate to his method of dealing with conflicting moral 
obligations. 
3Rakestraw ("Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 246) concurs with this fact by 
stating that Geisler's Ethics: Alternatives and Issues 
"contains the most significant case for hierarchicalism in 
recent years." In agreement, Luck says that Geisler is the 
"major exponent" of hierarchicalism; see William F. Luck, 
"Moral Conflicts and Evangelical Ethics: A Second Look at 
the Salvaging Operations," Grace Theological Journal 8 
(Spring 1987): 20. 
4olson supports this by saying that "Geisler has 
shown a clarity of thought and expression, and a breadth of 
knowledge which dwarfs earlier works;" see c. Gordon Olson, 
"Norman Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics Revisited," 
Evangelical Journal 4 (Spring 1986): 4. 
9 
Admittedly some contemporary ethicists dismiss the 
kind of schematization that Geisler has been involved in as 
a misplaced emphasis. They contend that the focus of 
attention should be character, or virtue, or narrative. 1 
Stanley Hauerwas holds that "arguments for the 'greater 
good' or 'lesser evil' are too abstract. 112 Nevertheless, 
these ethicists too must deal with the less than ideal 
borderline situations. 
Geisler maintains that hierarchicalism is the most 
realistic, consistent, and biblically viable method of 
ethics. 3 He considers all other ethical approaches as 
inadequate or unsound for a Christian, 4 and posits that 
1see Higginson, 113-124, where he mentions but 
disagrees with these views. 
2stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer 
in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983), 128. This emphasis on "virtue ethics" 
has been perceptively critiqued by Lucinda J. Peach, "The 
Relationship Between Virtue and Law: A Response to the 
Critics of Contemporary Morality," 1990, TMs [photocopy], a 
paper presented at the American Academy of Religion annual 
meeting, New Orleans, LA. She concludes: "What is needed in 
contemporary ethics is not an approach founded on character 
and narrative like that proposed by Macintyre and Hauerwas. 
Ethics requires methods for resolving practical moral 
problems, which require decision and action, not merely a 
virtuous character in a narrative context;" 14. 
3In his master's thesis Pack says: "It is clear that 
Norman Geisler believes that hierarchicalism is the only 
true ethical system;" Rolland w. Pack, "An Examination of 
Norman L. Geisler's Ethic of Hierarchy" (M.A. thesis, 
Harding College, 1979), 151. 
4see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1971), 137; Norman L. Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
10 
ethical hierarchicalism "seems to be the only viable 
option. 111 
His major works on ethics contain both an 
explication and an evaluation of other approaches as well as 
an extensive outline of his own theory. Thus, ethical 
hierarchicalism can be understood in contrast to competing 
views, and as a complete method on its own. 
Geisler's earliest view on ethical approaches is 
clearly outlined in his Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 2 
first published in 1971. This volume addresses itself 
primarily to the problem of ethical norms and their 
justification. Early in the discussion Geisler opts for 
"norms" rather than "ends," and considers in turn the manner 
in which a normative ethic has been treated in recent times. 
He explicates six approaches: antinomianism, generalism, 
situationism, non-conflicting absolutism, ideal absolutism, 
House, 1981), 8, 64-101. Pack (p. 151) says Geisler 
"believes that anyone accepting God's revealed ethics must 
espouse the ethic of hierarchy. Consequently, his 
exploration and defense of hierarchicalism is momentous." 
In respect of moral values, Geisler himself maintains that 
"the Bible provides an objectively knowable referent point 
for discovering the will of the immutably loving and just 
God;" Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 34. 
Apparently, the reason that not everyone agrees on these 
moral absolutes is due to the fact that the Bible "can be 
misunderstood, misapplied, and even twisted;" ibid. 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
101. 
2Admittedly Geisler had been previously producing 
articles on ethics, but this was his first published 
statement on the theory of ethical hierarchicalism. 
11 
and hierarchicalism. Building upon his conclusion derived 
from the discussion of Part I of the book--that the 
Christian ethical stance is best understood in terms of "the 
hierarchical arrangement of the many relationships of 
love, 111 Geisler seeks to suggest the appropriate attitudes 
of the Christian toward war, sex, ecology, and other social 
and personal issues. 
Just two years after the publication of his first 
text on ethics, Geisler produced a more popularized version 
of his ethical method. Called The Christian Ethic of 
Love, 2 this book was obviously an attempt to promote his 
views among Christians in general. The first half of this 
volume provides a strong biblical basis for a clearly 
defined "love" to be the norm for a Christian ethic. Then, 
after a chapter dealing with other methods, Geisler outlines 
his views together with practical examples of his ethic in 
real life situations. 
A third book, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, was produced in 1981. While some of the material of 
this volume is clearly similar to earlier works, 3 this book 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 137. 
2Norman L. Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1973). 
3For example, compare his discussion of unqualified 
(non-conflicting) absolutism, conflicting (ideal) 
absolutism, and graded absolutism (hierarchicalism) in 
Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 79-136; with Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 43-101. 
12 
was written specifically with the evangelical Christian in 
mind. It is thus an attempt to offer an adequate, 
systematic, comprehensive and consistent ethical framework 
for evangelicals. In addition to much biblical support for 
his position, Geisler discusses the implications for 
theology, psychology, society and politics, ethics, and 
biblical inspiration that arise from maintaining the view of 
ethical hierarchicalism. 
Then in 1989 Geisler produced a totally new work, 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues. While in some ways 
there is an obvious continuity with previous works, the 
structure, content, and much of the thought in this volume 
are new. 1 This work contains changes in approach to 
certain topics, an updating of material, a discussion of 
emerging new issues, and even a shift of viewpoint from 
earlier works. 2 In brief, this book is an attempt to 
contribute to a clearer understanding of the ethical 
problems facing Christians today. 3 
The very next year, at the end of 1990, a fifth 
volume on ethics, The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 13. 
2see, for instance, his move to a stronger prolife 
position concerning abortion; Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 135-155. 
3Ibid., 13, 14. 
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Our Time, 1 came off the press. This book, which Geisler 
coauthored with J. P. Moreland, is aimed at reaching secular 
university students. In order to accomplish this, the 
authors avoided the use of the Bible in establishing the 
basis for their ethical approach, but used instead natural 
law and general revelation. 2 Although this work deals 
primarily with ethical issues, the approach of ethical 
hierarchicalism is promoted both in the first and last 
chapters as well as throughout the issues dealt with in the 
book. 
While these five books stand out as the major focus 
of his elaboration of hierarchicalism Geisler has produced 
many other articles, tapes and books which disclose, develop 
and defend his ethical approach. For instance, in the taped 
lecture, "The Origins and Implications of the Greater Good 
Ethic," Geisler elaborates on "some of the factors that went 
into my thinking as I developed hierarchical ethics. 113 
1J. P. Moreland, and Norman L. Geisler, The Life and 
Death Debate: Moral Issues of our Time (New York, NY: 
Praeger, 1990). 
2In addition, they specifically chose to have the 
book published by a secular press, instead of by a Christian 
publishing company. 
3In addition to this and other audio cassettes, 
notice the following examples of works in which Geisler 
discusses ethical hierarchicalism: Norman L. Geisler, 
"Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," Bibliotheca Sacra 
131 (July-September 1974): 219-228; Norman L. Geisler, 
"Ethical Conflicts," 1977, TMs [photocopy], Center for 
Research and Scholarship, Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA; 
Norman L. Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," Bulletin of the 
Evangelical Philosophical Society 2 (1979): 1-7; Norman L. 
14 
Over the years several favorable reviews of some of 
these books have been published. For example, Harold Kuhn 
considered Ethics: Alternatives and Issues to be a valuable 
contribution to evangelical literature. 1 He believed that 
Geisler had "used scriptural texts carefully, with a due 
regard for the rightness of God's creation, and for the 
dignity of personhood. 112 While Joseph Wang felt that 
Geisler had done well in analyzing difficult problems, 3 
reviewer Louis Goldberg similarly noted that "he has treated 
in a viable manner issues on which non-Christians have so 
long had the last word. 114 
Geisler, and Paul D. Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A 
Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 
1980), 413-427; Norman L. Geisler, and Ronald M. Brooks, 
When Skeptics Ask (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1990), 273-
289; Francis J. Beckwith, and Norman L. Geisler, Matters of 
Life and Death: Calm Answers to Tough Questions about 
Abortion and Euthanasia (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 
1991), 77-79, 156-157. 
1Harold B. Kuhn, review of Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 16 (Spring 1973): 96. 
2Ibid., 95. 
3Joseph s. Wang, review of Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Asbury Seminarian 26 (July 
1972): 44. 
4Louis Goldberg, review of Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Moody 73 (September 1972): 
59. For further positive reviews, see Michael P. Andrus, 
review of Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, by Norman L. 
Geisler, in Calvary Review (Summer 1973); James M. Grier, 
review of Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, by Norman L. 
Geisler, in Grace Theological Journal 10 (Fall 1989): 257-
258; Carl Gearhart, review of Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Reformed Review 44 (Winter 
1990): 155-156; H. Wayne House, review of Christian Ethics: 
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Besides the evidence seen in the positive book 
reviews, Norman Geisler's relevance in the current debate 
concerning ethical approaches can be observed by the manner 
in which his ethical hierarchicalism is being seriously 
challenged by several Christians. For instance, in his 
mixed review of Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, Michael 
Andrus charges Geisler with failing to demonstrate from 
Scripture "not that there is a hierarchy of values, but 
exactly what that hierarchy is and how it can serve as a 
basis for moral judgment. 111 Cyril Barber, in an earlier 
edition of The Minister's Library, lumps Geisler with 
situationists Joseph Fletcher and John Robinson, and accuses 
Geisler of trying to make situation ethics acceptable to 
evangelicals by merely changing the terminology. Barber 
says: "Some of his conclusions are certain to be rejected by 
evangelicals. 112 A former colleague of Geisler's, John 
Options and Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Themelios 17 
(October-November 1991): 33. 
1Andrus, review of Ethics: Alternatives and Issues. 
2cyril J. Barber, The Minister's Library (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1974), 233-234. Note that 
Barber's disagreement with Geisler's ethical approach is so 
strong that only in this case does he make such negative 
statements about a book on "Moral Theology," thus departing 
from his normal brief and even-handed annotations. This 
critical position surfaces again when he praises Erwin 
Lutzer's The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response to 
Situation Ethics for rejecting hierarchicalism and offering 
instead a biblical discussion of morality (ibid., 233). 
Interestingly, Barber's 1985 edition of The Minister's 
Library, vol. 1 (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1985), 287, 
contains a significantly reworded and less critical 
annotation on Geisler's book. 
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Warwick Montgomery, rejects hierarchicalism on the grounds 
that it stands outside the grand tradition of the Protestant 
Reformers. 1 
Commenting on Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, ethicist David Gill states that Geisler's ethical 
approach falls short of satisfying the three criteria that 
Geisler himself affirms, i.e., biblical, comprehensive, and 
consistent. 2 Gill notes further that prayer and the Holy 
Spirit are absent from Geisler's ethics, while his work 
shows a strong emphasis on rationalism and casuistry. 3 He 
adds that "Geisler's dilemmas are often false dilemmas 
arising from his imposition of worldly definitions of truth 
on the Bible. 114 Thus Gill concludes that Geisler's theory 
will not do for evangelicals who desire an ethical framework 
that grows out of the Scriptures. 5 Similar to Gill's 
critique, Guy Greenfield, in reviewing Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, notes that Geisler's rationalistic 
1see the back page of Lutzer's The Morality Gap: An 
Evangelical Response to Situation Ethics. 
2David w. Gill, review of Options in contemporary 
Christian Ethics, by Norman L. Geisler, in Transformation 1 
(October-December 1984): 28. 
3 Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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approach is "devoid of the Holy Spirit and a community of 
faith. 111 
Voicing a different concern, Allan Bevere observes 
that Geisler's stance "allows him to neglect such crucial 
subjects as character, virtue, and most importantly 
sanctification. 112 In addition to these book reviews, 
various critiques of Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism have 
been done. Rolland Pack's 1979 master's thesis set out to 
evaluate the arguments for hierarchicalism as well as some 
of the position's definitions, similarities to other views, 
and consequences. Pack, contending that the substructure of 
hierarchicalism is faulty, concludes that "at the point of 
ethical embarkation, hierarchy may seem appealing, but as 
the voyage is extended the danger of imprecision and 
ambiguity becomes more obvious. 113 
In 1984 Gordon Olson wrote an article critiquing 
hierarchicalism. He maintained that while Geisler's method 
had moved ethical theory ahead in giving recognition to a 
valid hierarchical principle, he had seriously overextended 
this principle beyond its limited legitimate areas of 
applicability, and without adequate scriptural basis had 
1Guy Greenfield, review of Christian Ethics: Ootions 
and Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Southwestern Journal of 
Theology 33 (Summer 1991): 53-54. 
2Allan R. Bevere, review of Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Ashland 
Theological Review 22 (1990): 97. 
3Pack, 152. 
18 
universalized this principle as a basis for resolving 
supposed conflicts between absolute ethical norms. 1 
The 1987 article of William Luck concluded that 
Geisler's ethical approach is self-contradictory. 2 
Furthermore, Luck noted that since in the hierarchicalist 
method all laws lower than the highest are laws subject to 
an exempting process, only one law in this approach can be 
retained as an absolute. As such, Luck posited that 
hierarchicalism "is unacceptable to Evangelicals who find 
that Scripture teaches the plurality of absolutes. 113 
Though they were not written with the main purpose 
of critiquing Geisler's ethical theory, mention should be 
made of four other works. Erwin Lutzer's 1972 book was 
written primarily as a response to situation ethics. 4 Yet 
Lutzer devotes virtually an entire chapter to refuting 
hierarchicalism from his own position of ideal absolutism. 
Likewise, John Tape's article in support of conflicting 
absolutism contains a section evaluating hierarchicalism, 
10lson, 3, 4. Similarly, Brown, in his unpublished 
paper draws this conclusion on page 26: "Hierarchical 
ethics, even though a brilliant system originated by Norman 
L. Geisler, has been shown to be wanting in Biblical 
support;" Chris Brown, "A Brief Anaylsis of Geisler's 
Hierarchical Proof Texts," 1985, TMs [photocopy], Center for 
Research and Scholarship, Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. 
2Luck, 26. 
3Ibid., 25. 
4Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 96-113. 
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specifically in connection with the principle of double 
effect. 1 In a similar manner Robert Rakestraw critiqued 
various aspects of Geisler's approach from a perspective of 
non-conflicting absolutism. 2 Also, in his book on 
evangelical ethics, Donald G. Bloesch has made a brief but 
incisive analysis of ethical hierarchicalism. 3 
For more than two decades Geisler has been producing 
a considerable amount of both written and audio material 
concerning ethics in general, and hierarchicalism in 
particular. Now in his mid-sixties, Norman Geisler is still 
prolific. Articles, tapes, book reviews and books produced 
by him are flowing in a steady stream from several 
publishing houses. 4 Since Geisler is an eloquent and 
captivating speaker and an engaging writer, his ethical 
method is bound to have an impact on Christians in general. 
1John Tape, "A Case for Conflicting Absolutism," 
1990, TMs [photocopy], pp. 3-7, a paper presented at the 
Evangelical Theological Society annual meeting, New Orleans, 
LA. 
2Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 246-267. 
3oonald G. Bloesch, Freedom for Obedience: 
Evangelical Ethics in contemporary Times (San Francisco, CA: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987), 181-183. 
4Note that from 1990 through 1994 at least ten books 
by Geisler have come off the press. Over the years his 
books have been published by Baker Book House, Moody Press, 
Thomas Nelson Publishers, Tyndale House Publishers, 
Zondervan Publishing House and others. See the bibliography 
for further information. 
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In addition, Geisler's work is taken seriously by 
many influential Christians. 1 This can be observed by the 
scores of book reviews in dozens of journals and 
magazines, 2 by the frequent reference to the works of 
Geisler, 3 as well as by specific articles, some agreeing 
1For instance, talking about Christian Apologetics 
Pinnock says: "In its class it may be the best there is, and 
deserves to be widely read;" Clark H. Pinnock, review of 
Christian Apologetics, by Norman L. Geisler, in Christian 
Scholar's Review 8 (1979): 383. J. P. Moreland says: 
"Through his writings, Norm Geisler has been a role model of 
apologetical activism to a generation of evangelicals." 
Also, John F. Walvoord calls Geisler "a distinguished 
theologian, an effective public speaker, and an experienced 
radio personality;" see the brochure Quest Productions, 
Lynchburg, VA. Carl F. H. Henry regards Geisler's work to 
be worthy of more than casual mention in three of his five 
volumes on God, Revelation and Authority, 5 vols. (Waco, TX: 
Word Books, Publisher, 1976-1982), 2:105, 108, 113; 3:364-
365; 4:118. 
2see Asbury Seminarian, Ashland Theological Journal, 
Bibliotheca Sacra, Calvin Theological Journal, Christian 
Scholar's Review, Christianity Today, Concordia Journal, 
Concordia Theological Quarterly, Covenant Quarterly, 
Eternity, Ethics, Evangelical Journal, Fides et Historia, 
Fundamentalist Journal, Grace Theological Journal, Journal 
of Psychology and Christianity, Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society, Lutheran Theological Journal, Moody, 
Perspectives, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 
Quarterly Review, Reformed Review, Reformed Theological 
Review, Review and Expositor, Scripta Theologica, Skrif en 
Kerk, Southwestern Journal of Theology, Themelios, TSF 
Bulletin, Transformation, and Westminster Theological 
Journal. Admittedly these are mostly, but not exclusively, 
journals with an evangelical perspective. However, it 
should be noted that among others they include journals of 
Calvinists, Lutherans, Wesleyans, United Methodists, and 
Southern Baptists. 
3Here are a few recent examples of writers who cite 
Geisler in several different journals: Jack Barentsen, "The 
Validity of Human Language: A Vehicle for Divine Truth," 
Grace Theological Journal 9 (Spring 1988): 26-28; Graham A. 
Cole, "Thinking Theologically," Reformed Theological Review 
48 (May-August 1989): 57; Robert B. Fischer, "Scientific 
21 
and some disagreeing with various components of his 
theories. 1 
Moreover, since the initial publication of Geisler's 
first volume on ethics in 1971, a hierarchical view of 
ethics somewhat similar to his pref erred method appears to 
be gaining some degree of acceptance among some Christian 
ethicists. For example, even though Millard Erickson does 
not quote Geisler, he uses similar concepts such as "a 
Truth: A Case Study Within the Biblical Christian World 
View," Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 41 
(September 1989): 135; Dennis Hollinger, "Can Bioethics be 
Evangelical?" Journal of Religious Ethics 17 (Fall 1989): 
164-165; Gary R. Habermas, "Jesus' Resurrection and 
Contemporary Criticism: An Apologetic (Part II)," Criswell 
Theological Review 4 (Spring 1990): 382; Steven B. Cowan, 
"Common Misconceptions of Evangelicals Regarding Calvinism," 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 33 (June 
1990): 194; Richard R. Topping, "The Anti-Foundationalist 
Challenge to Evangelical Apologetics," Evangelical Quarterly 
63 (January 1991): 60; Joe M. Sprinkle, "The Interpretation 
of Exodus 21:22-25 (Lex Talionis) and Abortion," Westminster 
Theological Journal 55 (1993): 234; David H. Lane, "Special 
Creation or Evolution: No Middle Ground," Bibliotheca Sacra 
151 (January-March 1994): 15, 16. 
1see, for example, Robert Wennberg, "Norman Geisler 
on the Doctrine of Hell," Christian Scholar's Review 9 
(1979): 109-112; Richard A. Purdy, "Norman Geisler's Neo-
Thomistic Apologetics," Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 25 (September 1982): 351-358; Robert H. 
Gundry, "A Response to 'Methodological Unorthodoxy'," 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 26 (March 
1983): 95-100; Randall Basinger and David Basinger, 
"Inerrancy, Dictation and the Free Will Defence," The 
Evangelical Quarterly 55 (July 1983): 177-180; Stanley J. 
Grentz, "The Flight from God: Kierkegaard's Fear and 
Trembling and Universal Ethical Systems," Perspectives in 
Religious Studies 14 (Summer 1987): 157-158; Dolores E. 
Dunnett, "Evangelicals and Abortion," Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 33 (June 1990): 224-225; 
Christopher J. H. Wright, "Bibliography of Writings on 
Ethics," Transformation 10 (July/September 1993): 30. 
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hierarchy of principles," giving the ethical right-of-way to 
principle A over principle B, and that one should sense 
regret but not guilt when one acts in such a way as to most 
fully actualize the good in a conflict situation. 1 
Stephen Mott attempts to resolve the problem of 
conflicting duties by means of prima facie duties. 2 
However, he clearly shows his dependence on Geisler's method 
by repeated references to him, as well as by utilizing his 
concepts, such as the following identification of 
priorities: "persons are more valuable than things," 
"Infinite Person is more valuable than finite person(s)," 
and by suggesting that choosing to fulfill a "stronger" duty 
might produce sorrow, but "this regret is not equivalent to 
guilt. 113 It seems as though John Jefferson Davis uses the 
prima facie duty approach to help elucidate his view, which 
1Millard J. Erickson, Relativism in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1974), 
142-144, 153. Geisler himself states that Erickson "favors 
a form of hierarchicalism that considers it one's obligation 
to follow the higher command in irresolvable conflicts;" 
Norman L. Geisler, review of Relativism in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, by Millard J. Erickson, in Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 18 (Winter 1975): 55. 
2on this issue of prima f acie duties Mott repeatedly 
refers to w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press, 1930), 20, 21, 29, 38, 41; see 
Stephen Charles Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 155. While this 
view of Ross is purely a philosophical discussion which 
predates Geisler's first proposal of this position by 
several decades, it is nonetheless interesting for its 
similarity to Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism. 
3Mott, 155-159. 
23 
he calls "contextual absolutism. 111 Nevertheless, he admits 
that it is similar to the hierarchicalism of Geisler. Also, 
he uses illustrations and concepts similar to those found in 
Geisler's work. For instance, he notes that occasionally "a 
higher obligation suspends a lower one. 112 Also, he says 
Rahab's actions, "rather than being the lesser of two evils, 
were actually good. 113 
In brief then, it can be stated that for the variety 
of reasons listed above, the ethical hierarchicalism of 
Norman Geisler can be considered crucial in the current 
debate on ethical approaches and theories. This would be so 
for the large evangelical community and for all Christian 
believers who are seeking for clear ethical guidelines for 
proper Christian conduct. Thus, since no doctoral research 
project has been devoted exclusively to an evaluation of 
1Interestingly, in his survey of Christian Ethics, 
Long says that Geisler's "scheme might be called a graded 
absolutism or even a contextual absolutism;" Edward LeRoy 
Long, Jr., A Recent Survey of Christian Ethics (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 30. 
2John Jefferson Davis, Evangelical Ethics: Issues 
Facing the Church Today (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing Company, 1985), 14-15. 
3Ibid., 16. See also, Higginson, 139-146, 201-226. 
While Higginson nowhere refers to Geisler, his view of a 
"hierarchy of values" is rather similar to hierarchicalism. 
The influence of Geisler's ethical method can further be 
observed in this statement by a book reviewer: "The final 
chapter 'Do Moral Duties Ever Conflict?,' actually persuaded 
me to change a rather long-held position regarding the 
matter of responsible choice-making;" L. R. Bush, review of 
Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, by 
Norman L. Geisler, and Paul D. Feinberg, in Southwestern 
Journal of Theology 24 (Spring 1982): 87. 
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Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism, 1 it seems appropriate 
that a careful scholarly analysis of this theory can make a 
valuable contribution to the present discussion of ethical 
methods, and to knowledge in general. 
Purpose and Method 
The purpose of this study is to gain a thorough 
understanding of the ethical method of hierarchicalism as 
set forth in the works of Norman L. Geisler. An attempt 
will be made to outline hierarchicalism, to analyze and 
critique any difficulties or problems discovered, as well as 
to enumerate the positive qualities observed. The 
fundamental presuppositions and internal coherency of 
ethical hierarchicalism, together with other crucial issues 
related to Geisler's strategy will be investigated in order 
to determine its inner consistency and reliability as an 
ethical approach for committed Christians. 
To begin with, a background study will be done in 
order to better grasp the historical and contemporary 
discussions regarding conflicting moral obligations. Then, 
a general description will be made of the personal and 
1Note however, that Geisler's apologetic methodology 
has been evaluated in doctoral dissertations; see Kenneth D. 
Boa, "A Comparative Study of Four Christian Apologetic 
Systems" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1984); and, 
Richard Allan Purdy, "Carl Henry and Contemporary 
Apologetics: An Assessment of the Rational Apologetic 
Methodology of Carl F. H. Henry in the Context of the 
Current Impasse between Reformed and Evangelical 
Apologetics" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1980), 5-17, 
157-191, 206-217, 585-598. 
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ideological background from which Geisler's philosophy has 
developed. Following this, hierarchicalism will be 
described and systematically outlined. 
It is to be noted that over the years that Geisler 
has been writing and speaking on ethics his ethical approach 
has shown very little, if any, significant change or 
development. Admittedly, there has been some refinement, 
and clarification of various points, but no major shift of 
viewpoint has apparently taken place. Thus, rather than 
analyzing Geisler's work in chronological sequence, this 
study will attempt to address his ethical hierarchicalism 
according to the basic framework of the method he outlines 
in his works on ethics. 
After this descriptive outline, hierarchicalism will 
be critically analyzed. In more specific terms this 
discussion will address questions such as the following: How 
are the presuppositions that Geisler considers fundamental 
to theistic morality and Christian ethics implemented in 
ethical hierarchicalism? Is hierarchicalism an absolutist 
ethic, or is it relativistic? Is this ethical technique 
normative or utilitarian? Is Geisler's approach grounded in 
prescriptive ethics, or does it also depend partly on 
descriptive concepts? Is hierarchical ethics truly a 
deontological approach, or is it a mixture of teleological 
and deontological views? Does this ethical theory promote a 
plurality of substantive absolute moral norms or not? What 
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are the similarities and differences between the principle 
of double effect and hierarchicalism's use of it? And 
finally, is hierarchicalism genuinely biblically based, or 
does it depend partially on naturalistic premises? 
In order to be able to attain this objective of 
analyzing hierarchicalism, all accessible material pertinent 
to the topic, both published and unpublished, will be 
carefully examined. In doing this, the analyses done by 
other writers will doubtless prove to be valuable. However, 
it must be noted that the inner flow of Geisler's own 
thought in his writings and teachings will be the decisive 
factor in understanding his ethical hierarchicalism. In 
addition to all available primary sources, relevant 
secondary materials will be taken into consideration in 
order to provide the needed perspective. 
Since Geisler maintains that hierarchicalism is a 
truly biblical approach to ethics, an attempt will be made 
to meticulously scrutinize the primary scriptural passages 
utilized as support for this strategy. Though no attempt 
will be made to do an exhaustive research of Geisler's 
hermeneutical principles, the manner in which he uses the 
Bible deserves attention, since this could shed light on the 
consistency and coherency of the biblical evidence which he 
puts forth for his ethical approach. 
Finally, once Geisler's ethical methodology has been 
critically analyzed, the beneficial contributions of 
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hierarchicalism will be briefly outlined. This positive 
evaluation will be followed by a synopsis of the entire 
project, some suggested recommendations for further 
research, and a final conclusion. 
Limitations 
The data gathered for this research project 
indicates that, due to the interrelatedness of the subjects, 
a study of Geisler's position on a hierarchy of ethical 
norms1 will need to take into account his views on such 
subjects as dispensationalism, natural law, revelation and 
inspiration, free will and determinism, christology, the 
doctrine of God, and biblical authority, as they relate to 
the theme of this study. However, while including certain 
facets of Geisler's overall outlook that impinge on the 
topic under discussion, this investigation will be limited 
in that it will not provide an exhaustive coverage of the 
total scope of his theology. 
A second limitation is that this study will deal 
primarily with Geisler's ethical approach. Thus, while 
recognizing that his method of dealing with ethical matters 
is directly related to and dependent upon his theological 
1Geisler maintains that the terms "principle," 
"norm," and "rule" are "roughly synonymous, although the 
last two have more content;" Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives 
and Issues, 22. Long (p. 29) also notes that Geisler "uses 
terms like principles, norms, and rules almost 
interchangeably." Furthermore, Geisler sometimes uses the 
terms "values" and "norms" interchangeably (see Geisler, 
Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 36). 
28 
beliefs which in turn are based on his philosophical 
presuppositions, this thesis will not focus on these issues. 
However, the relationship between Geisler's ethics, 
theology, and philosophy will be discussed wherever 
necessary and relevant to the main purpose of this research. 
Third, the focus of this research will be 
specifically on Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism. Thus, 
this work is not an examination of everything that Geisler 
has produced in the area of ethics, but only those things 
related to his hierarchicalism. Along with these issues, 
concerns that are currently being discussed among Christian 
ethicists, such as the principle of double effect, will be 
dealt with only to the extent that they shed light on the 
central issue of this study. 
And finally, since Norman Geisler is still 
contributing prolifically to the ethical corpus through his 
literary works, this research project will be able to deal 
with only what he has produced up to the end of 1994. 
Brought together, these facts underline the restricted 
nature of this investigation. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND TO VIEWS ON CONFLICTING MORAL DUTIES 
In Book I of the Republic, Socrates, the famous 
Greek philosopher of the fifth century B.C., considers the 
question as to what to do if a person has promised to return 
weapons to a man who comes back for them obviously bent on 
harm. 1 Four centuries later, by the time of M. Tullius 
Cicero, the most celebrated of all Roman eclectics, 2 the 
idea of choosing the least evil when faced with conflicting 
moral obligations, had already become proverbial. 3 
Some feel that consideration as to how to deal with 
moral conflicts goes back even further, as far back as 
1The Dialogues of Plato: Republic, Book I; see also, 
William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed., Foundations of 
Philosophy Series, eds. Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), 14. 
2Frederick Copleston, s.J., A History of Philosophy, 
9 vols. (New York, NY: Image Books, 1985), 1:418. 
3cicero, de Officiis III, 28; he stated: Minima de 
malis ("Of evils choose the least"). See also, John Finnis, 
Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 1983), 90; Alan Donagan, The Theory of 
Morality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 
152; Paul Janet, The Theory of Morals, trans. Mary Chapman 
(New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1888), 242 (footnote 
#1). 
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Moses, 1 the liberator of the Israelites from Egyptian 
bondage. For the purposes of this research project, 
however, only those who deal with this matter from a 
Christian perspective and during the Christian era, will be 
taken into account as needed. 
With this delimitation in mind, this chapter first 
sets out to consider the early Christian views regarding 
ethical dilemmas. Then, the various positions of the most 
prominent Protestant Reformers on this issue are addressed. 
Following a synopsis of some important post-reformation 
perspectives, and some twentieth-century thinkers, the most 
significant modern ethical approaches of dealing with moral 
conflicts are outlined, including hierarchical ethics other 
than that of Norman L. Geisler. Next, the principle of 
double effect is appraised in relation to conflicting moral 
obligations. Finally, a short summary and conclusion ends 
the chapter. 
Early Christian Views on Moral Conflicts 
J. Philip Wogaman posits that "the problem of moral 
exceptions or necessary compromises with evil has apparently 
occupied Christians from the very beginning. 112 He notes 
that over time Christian thinkers developed arguments 
1see, for example, Robert c. Campbell, "Teachings of 
the Old Testament Concerning Divorce," Foundations 6 (April 
1963): 177; J. Philip Wogaman, Christian Moral Judgment 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), 106. 
2Wogaman, Christian Moral Judgment, 106. 
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permitting moral exceptions to perceived dangers, and 
suggests that this early Christian grappling with moral 
conflicts was parallel with and influenced by that of the 
Stoics, 1 who preceded the rise of Christianity. 
One of the most respected of the early church 
fathers, Augustine, was well aware of the problem of 
borderline situations. There is some debate, however, as to 
the actual position espoused by the famous fifth century 
Bishop of Hippo. On the one hand, it has been pointed out 
that Augustine held firmly to moral absolutes. For example, 
he stated that it is never right to deceive even in order to 
save a life. 2 Also, adultery, abortion, and infanticide 
are always wrong, irrespective of the situation. 3 On the 
other hand, it has been demonstrated that Augustine did not 
take such a moral absolutist position with respect to 
certain forms of killing. While he believed that murder was 
always wrong, he asserted that "there are some exceptions 
made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may 
not be put to death. 114 He maintained that two exceptions 
2Augustine, On Lying, 22, 23. See also, Norman L. 
Geisler, ed., What Augustine Says (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Book House, 1982), 210-211; Richard G. Jones, Groundwork of 
Christian Ethics (London, England: Epworth Press, 1984), 
227. 
3see William E. May, Moral Absolutes: Catholic 
Tradition, Current Trends, and the Truth (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press, 1989), 8-9. 
4Augustine, The City of God, I, 21. 
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have been given by God in the Old Testament--in special 
individual cases such as the command that Abraham sacrifice 
his son Isaac, and in the general case of the waging of war. 
Based on such views it has been concluded that Augustine 
treated war as a tragic evil to be indulged in so as to 
prevent greater evils.1 
While there might be some debate as to where 
Augustine stood on moral conflicts, the position taken by 
Pope Gregory the Great is clear. In his commentary on the 
book of Job he stated that if there were no opportunity for 
avoiding one of two sins, the lesser one should always be 
chosen. 2 
Of all pre-reformation Chri~tian philosophers, the 
works of the eminent thirteenth-century scholastic, st. 
Thomas Aquinas, probably contribute more than any other to 
the discussion of moral conflicts. Here, as in the case of 
Augustine, interpreters have not always agreed. Some have 
concluded that Aquinas was a moral absolutist, holding that 
"all the precepts of the Decalogue are moral absolutes--so 
much so that not even God can grant dispensations from 
1Wogaman, Christian Moral Judgment, 107. See also, 
Arthur F. Holmes, ed., war and Christian Ethics (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1975), 61-71; Richard 
Higginson, Dilemmas: A Christian Approach to Moral Decision 
Making (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1988), 
82. 
2see Anthony J. Blasi, Moral Conflict and Christian 
Religion, American University studies Series VII, Theology 
and Religion, vol. 35 (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1988), 2 
(footnote #1). 
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them. 111 Others, however, have concluded that Aquinas was 
"aware of the fact that there are conflicts among laws, 112 
and that he "abandoned that absolute position of 
Augustine. 113 This tension can presumably be resolved by a 
closer look at the writings of this prolific theologian. As 
one scholar, referring to Aquinas' view, has noted: "The 
global and imprecise formula, 'The precepts of the decalogue 
are indispensable,' could easily cause problems. 114 
In an article dealing with the ethical views of 
Aquinas, John Dedek concluded that St. Thomas took two 
approaches to the question of whether dispensations from the 
decalogue are possible. "No dispensation is possible from 
the precepts of the first tablet, because these order men 
directly to God their last end. And no dispensation is 
possible from the precepts of the second tablet, because 
these prescribe the order of justice among men, and God 
1May, Moral Absolutes, 13. See also, Christopher W. 
Gowans, "The Debate on Moral Dilemmas," in Moral Dilemmas, 
ed., Christopher W. Gowans (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 5; John O'Neill, "'The Same Thing Therefore 
Ought to Be and Ought Not to Be:' Anselm on Conflicting 
Oughts," The Heythrop Journal 35 (July 1994): 312. 
2Norman L. Geisler, Thomas Aauinas: An Evangelical 
Appraisal (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991), 168. 
3Jones, 227. 
4Franz Scholz, "Problems on Norms Raised by Ethical 
Borderline Situations: Beginnings of a Solution in Thomas 
Aquinas and Bonaventure," in Readings in Moral Theology, No. 
1, Moral Norms and catholic Tradition, ed. Charles E. 
Curran, and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1979), 169. 
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cannot go against justice because he himself is justice. 111 
Dedek went further, however, and noted that Aquinas posited 
that God can authorize by dispensation the material actions 
(e.g., homicide, adultery, and stealing) forbidden in the 
second table of the law, 2 as in His command to Abraham to 
kill Isaac. While st. Thomas maintains that, since these 
laws come from God only He can dispense from them, 3 he 
holds that God has shared this authority with human beings 
in the realm of civil responsibilities. 4 A valid caution 
has been sounded nevertheless, that this teaching of Aquinas 
should not be misused to support the view that on occasion 
acts such as adultery or abortion can be morally good. 5 
Further evidence that Aquinas wrestled with the 
concept of moral conflicts can be seen in his discussion of, 
for example, whether it is lawful to kill a person in self-
1John F. Dedek, "Intrinsically Evil Acts: An 
Historical Study of the Mind of st. Thomas," Thomist 43 
(July 1979): 409. See also, Brian Stiltner, "Who Can 
Understand Abraham? The Relation of God and Morality in 
Kierkegaard and Aquinas," Journal of Religious Ethics 21 
(Fall 1993): 236. 
2Dedek, 409-410. See also, Jean Porter, "Moral 
Rules and Moral Actions: A Comparison of Aquinas and Modern 
Theology," Journal of Religious Ethics 17 (Spring 1989): 
135. 
3see Dedek, 411. 
4John Giles Milhaven, Toward a New catholic Morality 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), 160-161. 
5William E. May, "The Natural Law and Objective 
Morality: A Thomistic Perspective," in Principles of 
catholic Moral Life, ed. William E. May (Chicago, IL: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 175. 
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defense. 1 Also, st. Thomas promulgated a view that was 
later developed into the principle of double effect, which 
will be discussed below in relation to borderline issues. 
Positions of Protestant Reformers 
The sixteenth century Protestant Reformer, Martin 
Luther attacked the casuistic ethics of the medieval 
Catholic Church as idolatry. 2 While he tried to make a 
place for the keeping of the decalogue, Luther believed that 
this was clearly subordinated to the demands of love: "'When 
the law impels one against love, it ceases and should no 
longer be a law; but where no obstacle is in the way, the 
keeping of the law is a proof of love, which lies hidden in 
the heart. 1113 Convinced of the existence of moral 
conflicts, Luther concluded that if the commandments of God 
"'cannot be kept without injury to the neighbor, God wants 
us to suspend and ignore the law. 1114 Observing the 
deceptive actions of Old Testament characters, for instance, 
Luther states that they did not sin in this for they acted 
1see, for example, the discussion by Paul Ramsey, 
War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be 
Conducted Justly? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961), 
39-40. 
2see Eric w. Gritsch, "Bold Sinning: The Lutheran 
Ethical Option," Dialog 14 (Winter 1975): 26. 
3Donald G. Bloesch, Freedom for Obedience: 
Evangelical Ethics in Contemporary Times (San Francisco, CA: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987), 111. 
4Ibid. 
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in this way to bring about God's will. Looking at the major 
emphases of the two parts of the law, he thus postulated 
that obedience to the first table of the decalogue may at 
times require the breach of the second table. 1 
John Calvin, the brilliant reformer and Bible 
commentator, embraced a different view from Luther. His 
position, in contradistinction to the more relativistic 
perspective of Luther, remained true to the more traditional 
absolutist position. 2 Therefore, he did not justify the 
illegitimate devices used by Bible characters, 3 but, for 
example, condemned every lie as evil. 4 As an absolutist, 
Calvin stressed the continuity between natural law, the 
decalogue, and the moral teachings of Jesus, 5 and thus 
apparently did not theorize concerning moral dilemmas. 
Post-Reformation Perspectives 
A search of the moral theological literature reveals 
that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there 
1see David Wright, "The Ethical Use of the Old 
Testament in Luther and Calvin: A Comparison," Scottish 
Journal of Theology 36 (December 1983): 465-466. See also, 
Jones, 228. 
2see Jones, 228. 
3see, for example, John Calvin, Commentaries on the 
First Book of Moses Called Genesis, vol. 1, trans. John King 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, reprint 1979), Gen 
27:1ff. See also, David Wright, 466-468. 
4see Jones, 228. 
5see Bloesch, 111. 
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were some thinkers addressing issues relat'ed to ethical 
approaches to moral conflicts. 1 For example, in the mid-
1780s William Paley, the prominent Anglican priest and 
acclaimed moralist, addressed ethical dilemmas in an 
influential book on moral philosophy. Paley stated that it 
is not a lie to "tell a falsehood to a madman, for his own 
advantage; to a robber to conceal your property; to an 
assassin, to defeat or to divert him from his purpose, 112 
because these people have no right to know the truth. About 
a century later theologian Charles Hodge concluded that, "if 
a mother sees a murderer in pursuit of her child, she has a 
perfect right to mislead him by any means in her power, 
because the general obligation to speak the truth is merged 
or lost, for the time being, in the higher obligation. 113 
Other Christian authors noted that killing in self-defense 
is in accord with Christianity, 4 as long as it is done 
1While it is to be ~ecognized that Utilitarianism 
was formally articulated during these two centuries, it will 
however not be discussed here but will be considered below, 
since it is one of the twentieth-century approaches still 
being used in an attempt to address moral conflicts. 
2William Paley, The Principles of Moral and 
Political Philosophy, 9th ed. (Boston, MA: West and 
Richardson, 1818), 113-114. 
3charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (United 
States of America: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company, 1872; 
reprint, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1946), 3:442. 
4Laurens P. Hickok, and Julius H. Seelye, A system 
of Moral Science, rev. ed. (Boston, MA: Ginn & Company, 
1886), 48-49. 
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solely to save oneself and not to take vengeance on the 
attacker. 1 Around the same time Noah Porter, the president 
of Yale College, produced a book in which he likewise 
discussed moral dilemmas. He concluded, for example, that 
in relation to the duty of truth, it is "not always wrong to 
convey a false impression112 when the spirit of love calls 
for it or when violent consequences are threatened. 3 
While it is obvious that moral conflicts were being 
discussed during these centuries by different thinkers, the 
most outstanding philosophical minds to address ethical 
concepts at this time were undoubtedly Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) and S~ren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Kant set out to 
construct an integrated and yet comprehensive ethical 
theory. 4 Thus, of necessity, he had to deal with the 
matter of moral conflicts. 
Basically, Kant held that the possibility of moral 
conflicts was ruled out on logical grounds. 5 "A conflict 
1This concept is similar to the principle of double 
effect, which will be discussed below. 
2Noah Porter, The Elements of Moral science: 
Theoretical and Practical (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1885), 423. 
3 Ibid., 425-426. 
4see N. H. G. Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian 
Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
company, 1971), 39. 
5see Michael James Almeida, "The Impossibility of 
Moral Conflicts" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1988), 
2. See also, Gowans, 7. 
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of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obliqationes non 
colliduntur). For ••• two conflicting rules cannot both 
be necessary at the same time. 111 In other words, "if it is 
a duty, and hence a moral necessity, that a person do A, 
then it cannot also be a duty, and hence a moral necessity, 
that the person do something incompatible with A."2 In 
practical terms this meant that Kant was an absolutist, 
admitting no exceptions under any circumstances. For 
example, he maintained that one must tell the truth about a 
possible victim's whereabouts even to someone intent on 
murder. 3 The reason that one must always tell the truth is 
that "a lie always harms another; if not some other 
particular man, still it harms mankind generally, for it 
vitiates [i.e., invalidates] the source of law itself. 114 
The Danish theologian, S¢ren Kierkegaard, reacted 
against the moral absolutism of Immanuel Kant. For 
instance, while Kant criticized Abraham's conduct in 
1Immanuel Kant, "Moral Duties," in Moral Dilemmas, 
ed. Christopher w. Gowans (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 39. 
2Gowans, 6. Gowans is here commenting on Kant's 
statement that a conflict of duties is inconceivable. 
3 Immanuel Kant, "On the supposed Right to Lie from 
Altruistic Motives," appendix, in Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral 
Choice in Public and Private Life (New York, NY: Random 
House, Inc., 1978), 286-287. 
4Kant, "On the Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic 
Motives," 286. 
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connection with his willingness to sacrifice Isaac, 1 
Kierkegaard lauded his act as that of a "knight of faith." 2 
For Kierkegaard, this story clearly illustrates a conflict 
of obligations. 3 From his study and analysis of this 
incident, he concluded that true faith in God may at times 
require one to set aside the normal canons of morality in 
order to obey the Divine will. 4 In his most famous book, 
Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard referred to this act as the 
"teleological suspension of the ethical. 115 While many 
scholars continue to debate this concept, 6 it seems clear 
1see Ronald M. Green, Religion and Moral Reason: A 
New Method for Comparative Study (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 123. 
2s¢ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. 
Alastair Hannay (London, England: Penguin Books, 1985), 95. 
3Based on their own interpretation of Kierkegaard, 
several modern scholars disagree with his view, saying that 
his explication of the Abraham-Isaac episode is clearly 
wrong. See, for example, Marvin Fox, "Kierkegaard and 
Rabbinic Judaism," Judaism 2 (April 1953): 161-169; Ronald 
M. Green, "Abraham, Isaac, and the Jewish Tradition: An 
Ethical Reappraisal," Journal of Religious Ethics 10 (Spring 
1982): 1-18; Robert Gordis, "The Faith of Abraham: A Note on 
Kierkegaard's 'Teleological suspension of the Ethical,'" 
Judaism 25 (Fall 1976): 416-419. Gordis (p. 419) notes: 
"Kierkegaard's interpretation of the text must be pronounced 
an anachronism • • . . It is a grafting of an alien concept 
upon the authentic Biblical and Jewish understanding of 
God's will which does not command or condone the violation 
of the moral law, either by God or by man." 
4see, for example, Kierkegaard, 88; Gordis, 414. 
5Kierkegaard, 95. 
6see, for example, Joseph A. Magno, "How Ethical is 
Abraham's 'Suspension of the Ethical'?" Faith and Philosophy 
(January 1985): 53-65; Edmund N. Santurri, "Kierkegaard's 
Fear and Trembling in Logical Perspective," Journal of 
41 
that Kierkegaard believed that "obedience to God's call, 
even when this entails disobedience to ethical norms, 
demands that the Christian suspend the norms for the sake of 
a higher goa1. 11 l 
Twentieth-Century Approaches 
Early in the twentieth century some well-known 
scholars grappled with questions related to ethical 
conflicts. For example, Karl Barth, a prolific theologian 
and an ethicist of the first rank, 2 discussed these issues 
at some length. For Barth, the essence of Christian ethics 
is obedience to the Divine Command. While it may at first 
seem that he held to an absolutist ethic, on the questions 
of suicide, abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, war, 
and killing in self-defense, Barth permits exceptions 
Religious Ethics 5 (Fall 1977): 225-247; Edward F. Mooney, 
"Abraham and Dilemma: Kierkegaard's Teleological Suspension 
Revisited," International Journal for Philosophy and 
Religion 19 (1986): 23-41; Ronald M. Green, "Enough Is 
Enough! Fear and Trembling Is Not about Ethics," Journal of 
Religious Ethics 21 (Fall 1993): 191-209; Gene Outka, "God 
as the Subject of Unique Veneration: A Response to Ronald M. 
Green," Journal of Religious Ethics 21 (Fall 1993): 211-215; 
Ronald M. Green, "A Response to Gene outka," Journal of 
Religious Ethics 21 (Fall 1993): 217-220; Stiltner, 221-245. 
1stanley J. Grenz, "The Flight from God: 
Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Universal Ethical 
Systems," Perspectives in Religious Studies 14 (Summer 
1987): 158. 
2see Henry Stob, Ethical Reflections: Essays on 
Moral Themes (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1978), 103. 
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wherever the loss of life involved is overriden by what he 
considers some more important obligation. 1 
A contemporary of Barth, and also a theologian of 
note, Emil Brunner however felt that "the 'conflict of 
duties' is only apparent, and does not really exist at all," 
since the only duty one has is to listen to and obey the 
Divine Command. 2 In contradistinction to Brunner, it is 
evident that Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the German theologian who 
was executed for his part in the unsuccessful plot to 
assassinate Adolf Hitler, wrestled with the concept of 
conflicting obligations. Further evidence of this struggle 
can be observed in Bonhoeffer's volume on ethics, where he 
deals with the matter of telling the truth, carefully 
defining it so as to resolve the conflict. 3 
1see Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III, part 4, 
The Doctrine of Creation, trans. A. T. Mackay, T. H. L. 
Parker, Harold Knight, Henry A. Kennedy, and John Marks, ed. 
G. W. Bromiley, and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh, Scotland: T. 
& T. Clark, 1961), 421-455; see also, Higginson, 94-97; 
Bloesch, 51, 221 (footnote #40). 
2Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, trans. Olive 
Wyon (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1947), 204. 
3Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Neville Horton 
Smith, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 
1955), 363-372. In his book The Cost of Discipleship (New 
York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1959), Bonhoeffer speaks of 
"the simple alternative of obedience or disobedience" (p. 
69), and "the absolute, direct, and unaccountable authority 
of Jesus" (p. 48), which supercedes all law. Statements 
such as these do not, however, contradict Bonhoeffer's 
position on conflicting moral obligations, as noted above in 
his Ethics, since he is not addressing that issue in these 
passages in The Cost of Discipleship. 
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In addition to these more well-known intellectuals, 
the literature on moral philosophy and ethical theory 
reveals that there are many scholars who have and are 
dealing with the issue of moral conflicts. Some have felt 
that this focus on moral conflicts is a misplaced 
emphasis. 1 Yet, they too must deal with the less than 
desirable borderline situations. Other thinkers have 
concluded that, in connection with moral dilemmas, "the 
reasonable conclusion is that they are impossible. 112 Still 
others are firmly convinced of the reality of these 
situations of conflicting moral obligations. 3 In fact, one 
1see, for example, Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable 
Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 4, 128; Richard J. 
Mouw, The God Who Commands (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990), 116-120, 128. 
2Earl Conee, "Against Moral Dilemmas," in Moral 
Dilemmas, ed. Christopher w. Gowans (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 247; see also, Bernard Williams, 
"Ethical Consistency," in Gowans, 115-137; Terrance c. 
McConnell, "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics," 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (June 1978): 269-287. 
3see, for example, Edward John Carnell, Christian 
Commitment: An Apologetic (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 
1957), 223-229; Sidney Hook, "Moral Conflicts," in Morals 
and Values: Readings in Theoretical and Practical Ethics, 
ed. Marcus G. Singer (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1977), 303-312; Joseph L. Allen, Love & Conflict: A 
Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1984), 86-87; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 
Moral Dilemmas (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 97-
107; Charles A. Baylis, Ethics: The Principles of Wise 
Choice (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), 130-
133; John Lemmon, "Moral Dilemmas," in Christian Ethics and 
Contemporary Philosophy, The Library of Philosophy and 
Theology Series, ed. John Mcintyre, and Ian T. Ramsey 
(London, England: SCM Press Ltd., 1966), 262-279; John Ladd, 
"Remarks on the Conflict of Obligations," Journal of 
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writer has posited that "fidelity to Christ seems deeper and 
more truly biblical when it acknowledges moral ambiguity, 
when it grants the need for exceptional practice in 
exceptional circumstances. 111 
This belief in the conflict of moral obligations has 
given rise to various ethical methodologies over time. 
While there may be a few areas of overlapping concepts 
between some of the approaches outlined below, in essence 
each of these theories addresses the issue of moral 
conflicts in a distinctly different manner. 
Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism, which was originally addressed to 
social policy, has been described as "probably the most 
influential ethical approach in English-speaking philosophy 
during the twentieth century. 112 The utilitarian movement, 
which was the first phase of nineteenth-century empiricism, 
Philosophy 55 (11 September 1958): 811-819; Richard H. Bube, 
"Of Dominoes, Slippery Slopes, Thin Edges of Wedges, and 
Camels' Noses in Tents: Pitfalls in Christian Ethical 
Consistency," Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 42 
(September 1990): 162-172; Helmut Weber, "Der Kompromiss in 
der Moral: Zu seiner theologischen Bestimmung und 
Bewertung," Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift 86 (1977): 99-
118. 
1charles Wayne Scriven, "The Transformation of 
Culture: Christian Social Ethics after H. Richard Niebuhr" 
(Ph.D. diss., Graduate Theological Union, 1985), 313. 
2Arthur F. Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral 
Decisions, Contours of Christian Philosophy Series, ed. c. 
Stephen Evans (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 
41. 
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may be said to have originated with Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832) .1 Bentham and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the 
classic exponents of this strategy, posited the ethical 
notion that the conduct that is right is that which will 
produce the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people. 2 
While it has been suggested that this ethical 
approach is non-transcendental, makes no appeal to religious 
considerations, and is free from Christianity, 3 the 
writings of both Bentham and Mill contradict these concepts. 
For example, both men include the threat of punishment from 
God as one of the factors which will induce people to act 
for the general happiness of all. 4 Furthermore, Mill 
states that, far from being a godless doctrine, 
utilitarianism is "more profoundly religious than any 
1Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, 
9 vols. (New York, NY: Image Books, 1985), 8:1. See also, 
Lucius Garvin, A Modern Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 277-278. 
2Jeremy Bentham, "The Principle of Utility," in 
Moral Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Jack Glickman (New 
York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 528. See also, Henry 
Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), 411; Norman L. Geisler, 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1989), 63-64; Copleston, 8:9-10. 
3Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to 
Ethics (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 90. 
4Bentham, 531-533; John Stuart Mill, 
"Utilitarianism," in Moral Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. 
Jack Glickman (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 555. 
See also, Garvin, 278-279. 
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other, 111 and is encapsulated in the golden rule of Jesus of 
Nazareth. 2 
Though this ethical method has been critically 
analyzed and been shown to contain significant and serious 
difficulties, 3 it has with some success addressed the issue 
of borderline situations. 4 Mill illustrates this in his 
discussion of the expediency of lying in order to save 
someone from great and unmerited evil. 5 He concludes: "If 
the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be 
good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one 
another and marking out the region within which one or the 
other preponderates. 116 Thus, since the goal of 
utilitarianism is the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people, in essence all moral conflicts can be resolved by 
appealing to this end. 7 Furthermore, because there are no 
unchanging moral absolutes in this ethical approach, some 
1Mill, 551 •. 
2Garvin, 281. 
3see, for example, Frankena, 36-43; Holmes, Ethics: 
Approaching Moral Decisions, 42-47; Garvin, 287-313; 
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 75-78; 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 72-81. 
4Admittedly, utilitarianism may be a useful tool for 
assessing the value of social systems in a pluralistic and 
secular society. 
5Mill, 551-552. 
6Ibid, 552. See also, Almeida, 5. 
7see Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
67 I 74 • 
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scholars have concluded that utilitarianism rejects the 
possibility of any genuine moral dilemmas. 1 As one scholar 
noted: "For utilitarianism, tragedy is impossible. 112 
Situationism 
The most articulate promoter of situationism, Joseph 
Fletcher, summarizes his method of doing ethics as follows: 
"Christian ethics or moral theology is not a scheme of 
living according to a code but a continuous effort to relate 
love to a world of relativities through a casuistry obedient 
to love; its constant task is to work out the strategy and 
tactics of love, for Christ's sake. 113 James Packer, 
looking at this approach more critically, defines the 
ethical approach of situationism as including "all views 
which reject the idea that the way to decide what to do is 
always to apply rules, positive and negative, concerning 
types of actions (e.g. keep your promises, do not steal, do 
not rape, do not torture). 114 In other words, no types of 
1see Williams, 92-93; Frankena, 35; Gowans, 7. 
Admittedly, not all scholars agree with this perspective. 
For example, based on his critique, Sinnott-Armstrong (p. 
81) concludes that "every version of utilitarianism either 
fails to exclude moral dilemmas or excludes them only by 
using implausible and unjustified stipulations." 
2williams, 93. 
3Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality 
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1966), 158. 
4James Packer, "Situations and Principles," in Law. 
Morality, and the Bible, ed. Bruce Kaye, and Gordon Wenham 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1978), 152. 
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action can be said to be immoral; only failures of love in 
specific situations can be called immoral. 1 
While it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
accurately trace the complete historical development as well 
as all the factors which led to this ethical method, 2 some 
of the major components need to be noted. One of the 
strongest influences on situationism is that of 
existentialism, 3 which holds that human beings are totally 
free and responsible for their acts. In addition, it is 
clear that situationism was largely conditioned by a revolt 
against authority and traditional morality. 4 In a response 
to further discussions on this method as elucidated in his 
1Ibid., 153. 
2For two perspectives of this information see, 
Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., "The History and Literature of 'The 
New Morality,'" in The Situation Ethics Debate, ed. Harvey 
Cox (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1968), 101-116; 
and Michael E. Allsopp, "Joseph Fletcher's Situation Ethics: 
Twenty-five Years after the Storm," Irish Theological 
Quarterly 56 (1990): 170-171. 
3Robert L. Cunningham, Situationism and the New 
Morality, Contemporary Problems in Philosophy, ed. George F. 
McLean, O.M.I. (New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1970), 6. See also, Millard J. Erickson, Relativism in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 1974), 31-33; James Sellers, Theological Ethics (New 
York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1966), 140-141. 
4see E. Clinton Gardner, "Responsibility in 
Freedom," in storm over Ethics, John c. Bennett, et al 
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1967), 38; Robert w. 
Gleason, S.J., "Situational Morality," in Storm over Ethics, 
John c. Bennett, et al (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 
1967) I 112. 
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book, Fletcher himself admits: "I must confess that the main 
thrust of Situation Ethics was against legalism. 111 
Ever since the publication of this landmark volume 
of Fletcher's, this procedure of dealing with moral issues 
has caused considerable discussion and debate among 
Christian thinkers. 2 A reading of Situation Ethics: The 
New Morality reveals that Fletcher places a great amount of 
emphasis on conflicting moral obligations. Throughout this 
book he uses a variety of borderline situations in order to 
explain the need for this type of ethical strategy. 
1Joseph Fletcher, "Reflection and Reply," in The 
Situation Ethics Debate, ed. Harvey Cox (Philadelphia, PA: 
Westminster Press, 1968), 250. 
2see, for example, The Situation Ethics Debate, and 
Storm over Ethics. See also, Allsopp, 172-190; James I. 
Packer, "Situations and Principles," in Law. Morality. and 
the Bible, ed. Bruce Kaye, and Gordon Wenham (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1978), 160-165; Erickson, 1-127; 
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 43-61; Erwin 
w. Lutzer, The Necessity of Ethical Absolutes, Christian 
Free University curriculum (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1981), 27-39; Joseph Fletcher, and John 
Warwick Montgomery, Situation Ethics: True or False 
(Minneapolis, MN: Bethany Fellowship, Inc., 1972); William 
Barclay, Christian Ethics for Today (San Francisco, CA: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), 69-91; Gordon Kainer, 
Faith. Hope and Clarity: A Look at situation Ethics and 
Biblical Ethics (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press Publishing 
Association, 1977); Eric Osborn, Ethical Patterns in Early 
Christian Thought (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), 210-213; J. Philip Wagaman, A Christian Method 
of Moral Judgment (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 
1976), 14-21; George Woods, "Situational Ethics," in 
Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ian T. 
Ramsey, The Library of Philosophy and Theology Series, ed. 
John Mcintyre, and Ian T. Ramsey (London, England: SCM Press 
Ltd., 1966), 329-339; Robertson McQuilkin, An Introduction 
to Biblical Ethics (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 
Inc., 1989), 145-162. 
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Furthermore, based on his experience as pastor, educator, 
and medical ethicist, Fletcher concludes that moral agents 
usually are decision-makers faced with conflict situations, 
having to choose between competing goods and values. 1 He 
posits: "There can be and often is a conflict between love 
and law, 112 and on these occasions one should do the most 
loving thing, for love replaces law. 3 
Based on the presuppositions of pragmatism, 
relativism, positivism, and personalism, 4 Fletcher posits 
that situationism has six propositions: (a) Only one thing 
is intrinsically good, namely, love: nothing else at all; 
(b) The ruling norm of Christian decisions is love: nothing 
else; (c) Love and justice are the same, for justice is love 
distributed, nothing else; (d) Love wills the neighbor's 
good whether we like him or not; (e) Only the end justifies 
the means; nothing else; (f) Love's decisions are made 
situationally, not prescriptively. 5 By way of summary 
then, it could be said that when faced with a moral 
conflict, "the situationist holds that whatever is the most 
loving thing in the situation is the right and good 
1Allsopp, 174. 
2Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, 71. 
3Ibid., 69. 
4Ibid., 40-56. 
5Ibid., 57-145. 
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thing. 111 Whether it be abortion, suicide, prostitution, or 
adultery, 2 as long as this is the most loving thing to do 
in the circumstance, "it is not excusably evil, it is 
positively good. 113 In this way, situationism attempts to 
resolve the conflict and tension that are part of all 
ethical dilemmas. 4 
Non-conf lictinq Absolutism 
Norman Geisler has noted that non-conflicting 
absolutism is "perhaps the most influential and widely held 
view among Christians. 115 Since this approach is "probably 
the most common position among traditional absolutists, 116 
it is difficult to clearly ascertain its major twentieth-
1Ibid., 65. 
2see ibid., 37-39, 74-75, 163-164, 164-165. 
3Ibid., 65. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 55. 
5Norman L. Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 
43. Admittedly, Geisler refers to this method as 
"unqualified absolutism" in this book. However, in an 
earlier volume he labelled it "non-conflicting absolutism;" 
Norman L. Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1971), 79. 
6Robert V. Rakestraw, ·"Ethical Choices: A Case for 
Non-conflicting Absolutism," Criswell Theological Review 2 
(Spring 1988): 244. Rakestraw (ibid., 257) adds: "The very 
fact that it is so difficult to find any writer who has 
argued from a biblical and evangelical perspective, in a 
sustained manner, for the NCA [non-conflicting absolutist] 
position as a whole, may very well be because NCA is the 
viewpoint which most naturally commends itself to most 
Christians, and is simply assumed by them." 
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century spokesperson. While various scholars, such as Leo 
Tolstoy and John Howard Yoder, 1 have been associated with 
this type of absolutism, no attempt will be made here to 
discuss the ethical view of any individual thinker. Rather, 
the major tenets of non-conflicting absolutism as outlined 
by various writers, will be considered in relation to the 
question of conflicting moral obligations. 
Non-conflicting absolutism can be defined as an 
ethical method that "maintains that there are many absolute 
moral norms, and that these norms never really conflict. 
God's absolutes are truly absolute; they admit of no 
exceptions. 112 In other words, "these universal, absolute 
1see Wogaman, Christian Moral Judgment, 108, 111. 
Others who may also be considered non-conflicting 
absolutists include Rakestraw, McQuilkin, and Murray (see 
John Murray, Principles of Conduct [Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957]). While it 
has been suggested that the prima facie duty theory of w. D. 
Ross holds out for non-conflicting absolutes (see Judith 
Wagner DeCrew, "Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism," 
Ethics 101 [October 1990]: 30 [footnote #10]), Ross himself 
indicates that promises can be broken in a conflict 
situation (W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good [Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press, 1930], 18), and that "there is a 
difference between prima f acie duty and actual or absolute 
duty;" 28. 
2Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 244-245. In speaking about ethical 
absolutism, Paul Lehmann caricatures an "absolute" as "a 
standard of conduct which can be and must be applied to all 
people in all situations in exactly the same way;" Paul L. 
Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York, NY: Harper 
& Row, Publishers, 1963), 125. Paul Ramsey critiques this 
description of Lehmann as a faulty assumption; Paul Ramsey, 
Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, Scottish Journal of 
Theology Occasional Papers, no. 11, eds. T. F. Torrance, and 
J. K. S. Reid (Edinburgh, Scotland: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), 
67. 
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moral laws should be kept at all times, regardless of the 
circumstances. 111 God will provide a way out. 2 
Furthermore, this position holds that "we are not to judge 
morality by calculating the consequences of an act. God has 
established the moral law; our responsibility is obedience. 
He must take care of the consequences. 113 Obedience to 
these absolutes should flow from an acceptable inner 
attitude, from a love for God and His moral requirements 
which are rooted in His character. 4 
Scholars who espouse this view indicate that the way 
to resolve any apparent conflict is to determine what the 
Bible says and to define each moral absolute precisely. 5 
For instance, one writer suggests that, in addition to 
several other commandments, "certainly the Fourth 
Commandment (on the rest day) and the Sixth Commandment 
(against killing) have exceptions enunciated in 
1Lutzer, The Necessity of Ethical Absolutes, 74. 
2see Kainer, 126; McQuilkin, 159; Rakestraw, 
"Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-Conflicting Absolutism," 
261. 
3Lutzer, The Necessity of Ethical Absolutes, 88. 
See also, Kainer, 104; Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case 
for Non-Conflicting Absolutism," 251, 266-267. 
4Lutzer, The Necessity of Ethical Absolutes, 75, 80, 
81, 85. See also, Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for 
Non-Conflicting Absolutism," 255. 
5see McQuilkin, 159; Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A 
Case for Non-Conflicting Absolutism," 249. 
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Scripture. 111 Thus, when close attention is paid to a more 
careful defining of a particular activity, it will be seen 
that "there will never be a situation in which obedience to 
one absolute will entail disobedience to or the setting-
aside of another absolute. 112 In brief, non-conflicting 
absolutism maintains that, when properly defined and 
understood, universal biblical moral norms cannot and will 
not conflict under any circumstances. 3 
conflicting Absolutism 
A study of current ethical thinkers indicates that 
the work of Helmut Thielicke (1908-1986) perhaps best 
illustrates the perspective of conflicting absolutism. 4 
While the views of other conflicting absolutists, such as 
John Warwick Montgomery, will be taken into account as this 
ethical method is considered, Thielicke's view will be the 
primary emphasis here. 
Fundamental to his ethical thought is his 
understanding of what he calls the "borderline situation. 115 
1McQuilkin, 435. 
2Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 248. 
3McQuilkin, 13; Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case 
for Non-Conflicting Absolutism," 244-245, 266. 
4see Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
98; Higginson, 129-134. 
5See Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, 
Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966), 578. 
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This is a predicament in which one is free to choose, but, 
because it is unavoidable, a person will "constantly fall 
into actual sin. 111 Montgomery has succinctly captured the 
essence of this ethical approach: "The individual is often 
at the point of violating a command of God, not because he 
wants to, but.because he's damned if he does and damned if 
he doesn't. 112 
This ethical dilemma is not due to any inherent 
weakness, contradiction or "lack of clarity in the divine 
commandments themselves. It is due to the mists of this 
aeon, in which a clear beam of light becomes a diffused 
cloud of light. 113 In a sinless world there would be no 
moral dilemmas. 4 However, as Thielicke notes, in these 
borderline situations, "whatever we do we incur guilt, 115 
for we are living "in a world that is saturated with sin, 116 
1Ibid., 653. See also, Higginson, 130. 
2Fletcher, and Montgomery, 64. Similarly, Lays says 
that there are times when we must fight, for "we are damned 
if we do; and we are damned if we don't;" Wayne A. R. Lays, 
Ethics and Social Policy (New York, NY: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1946), 272. 
3Thielicke, 1:611. see also, John Tape, "A case for 
Conflicting Absolutism," 1990, TMs [photocopy], p. 7, a 
paper presented at the Evangelical Theological Society 
annual meeting, New Orleans, LA. 
4see Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
99. 
5Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 3, Sex, 
trans. John w. Doberstein (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964), 242. 
6Ibid. 
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and "no one can pass through it without incurring guilt. 111 
Because of this guilt and divine condemnation, 2 the person 
needs to repent. 3 Montgomery concurs, noting that when one 
is forced to perform the lesser evil, this should drive "him 
continually to the Cross for forgiveness. 114 
By way of summary, it could be said that the central 
assumption of conflicting absolutism is that human beings 
live in a fallen world in which real moral conflicts occur. 
Because the lesser evil which must be chosen brings guilt, 
the person needs to confess and seek God's forgiveness. 5 
Hierarchical ism 
A careful reading of current ethical and 
philosophical literature reveals that, other than Norman 
Geisler, whose ethical methodology will be analyzed in 
2Tape, 12. 
3Thielicke, 1:654. Others writers agree. See, 
Elton M. Eenigenburg, Biblical Foundations and a Method for 
Doing Christian Ethics (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1994), 90; Vincent MacNamara, Love. Law and the 
Christian Life: Basic Attitudes of Christian Morality 
(Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1988), 148. 
4John Warwick Montgomery, "The Christian View of the 
Fetus," in Birth Control and the Christian, A Protestant 
Symposium on the Control of Human Reproduction, eds. Walter 
o. Spitzer, and Carlyle L. Saylor (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale 
House Publishers, 1969), 85. Montgomery makes similar 
statements in Fletcher, and Montgomery, 47, 51. Packer (p. 
164) concurs with this concept. 
5see Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 68. 
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extensive detail in succeeding chapters, there are several 
contemporary Christian scholars whose writings evidence a 
hierarchical approach to ethics. While virtually none of 
these thinkers explicitly admit to being hierarchicalists, 
their works indicate that, both before and after Geisler 
formally articulated his method, they believed in and 
promoted this type of strategy primarily in an attempt to 
resolve conflicting moral obligations. 
As far back as 1874 the French professor Paul Janet 
noted that "in case of conflict the best object should be 
chosen. 111 Around the same time period, the systematic 
theologian Charles Hodge enunciated "the principle that a 
higher obligation absolves from a lower. 112 In a practical 
sense, he indicated that a mother has the right to mislead a 
murderer so as to save her child. In this moral dilemma, 
the obligation to speak the truth is superseded by the 
higher obligation. 3 
Besides Geisler, of those twentieth-century scholars 
who address moral conflicts in a hierarchical fashion, one 
of the clearest expositions can be found in Richard 
Higginson's Dilemmas: A Christian Approach to Moral Decision 
1Janet, 245. 
2Hodge, 3:442. 
3Ibid. It is worthy of note that in his book 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (pp. 114-116), Geisler 
includes Hodge as one who "def ends a form of graded 
absolutism [or hierarchicalism)," 114. 
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Making. While he argues against the "lesser of two evils" 
perspective of conflicting absolutism, 1 he explicitly 
promotes a "hierarchy of duties. 112 Like Geisler he 
believes that in this present world Christians face 
conflicts of moral obligations. 3 In these situations, one 
needs to make choices based on hierarchical thinking. For 
example, when the duty to tell the truth comes into conflict 
with the duty to preserve life, "the latter duty overrides 
the former," because "the preservation of life comes higher 
up on the hierarchical scale. 114 Millard Erickson similarly 
posits a "hierarchy of principles," in which "one ought to 
give the ethical right-of-way to principle A over principle 
B," 5 in the event of a conflict of obligations. 6 Even 
though the higher obligation is to be followed, the other 
1Higginson, 129-146. 
2Ibid., 201-227. 
3see, for example, ibid., 11-77. 
4Ibid. I 201. 
5Erickson, 142. 
6See also, Mott, who concurs with Geisler on 
prioritizing duties; Stephen Charles Mott, Biblical Ethics 
and Social Change (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1982), 157-159; and, Shaun J. Sullivan, O.F.M., Killing in 
Defense of Private Property: The Development of a Roman 
Catholic Moral Teaching. Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, 
American Academy of Religion Dissertation Series, no. 15, 
ed. H. Ganse Little, Jr. (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 
1976) I 39. 
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duty does not lapse; it is merely temporarily suspended due 
to the moral conflict. 1 
Scholars who support some form of hierarchicalism 
frequently assert that when one does the higher duty in 
conflict situations, this act is morally right and free from 
sin. 2 John Jefferson Davis holds, for example, that when 
Rahab "suspended the prima facie duty to tell the truth," 
"her course of action was acceptable to God. 113 Her actions 
were not evil, but "were actually good. 114 Philip Wagaman 
concurs, saying a higher duty is "an act of moral goodness, 
and therefore no sin. 115 Moreover, this higher duty is not 
to cause guilt, even though there might be a sense of 
regret. 6 As Richard McCormick states concerning killing in 
self-defense: "The agent may not simply choose the greater 
value and let it go at that. He must, for example, regret 
1see John Jefferson Davis, Evangelical Ethics: 
Issues Facing the Church Today (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1985), 15-16; 
Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 116. 
2see Davis, 14. 
3Ibid., 16. 
4Ibid. 
5Wogaman, Christian Moral Judgment, 107. 
6see Erickson, 144; Mott, 158. 
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taking the life of his assailant even as he does so. 111 
Higginson captures the thinking behind this point well: 
If one has made a well-informed, conscientious decision 
and believes that it is clearly the better alternative, 
I do not see why one ought to feel sinful about it. One 
has done the best one can, and should be able to rejoice 
in the presence of a kindly disposed God with a clear 
conscience--while naturally feeling regret that the 
action to which one has consented is in some respect 
"evil. 112 
In brief then, it can be said that those promoting 
ethical hierarchicalism believe that moral conflicts require 
that the higher obligation be carried out, while the lower 
duty is simply suspended at that point in time. This higher 
duty is a right and good action, and though the actual deed 
performed should be regretted, it should not cause guilt 
since it is not sinful. 
The Principle of Double Ef f ect3 
Though there has been considerable discussion and 
debate over the years concerning the concept of "double 
effect,"4 this theory needs to be taken into account since 
1Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Notes on Moral 
Theology: 1965 Through 1980 (Washington, DC: University 
Press of America, 1981), 306-307. 
2Higginson, 139. 
3This is also sometimes ref erred to as the 
"doctrine," "rule" or "theory" of double effect. 
4see, for example, Donagan, 157-171; Daniel F. 
Montaldi, "A Defense of St. Thomas and the Principle of 
Double Effect," Journal of Religious Ethics 14 (Spring 
1986): 296-332; Cornelius J. van der Poel, "The Principle of 
Double Effect," in Absolutes in Moral Theology?, ed. Charles 
E. Curran (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1968), 186-210; 
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it has frequently been used in connection with moral 
conflicts. As one writer noted: "The principal tool within 
Catholic moral tradition for dealing with conflict-
situations has been the principle of double effect. 111 In 
fact, another scholar has gone so far as to claim that the 
principle of double effect "is, in reality, the fundamental 
John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza, and David Copp, "Quinn on 
Double Effect: The Problem of 'Closeness'," Ethics 103 (July 
1993): 707-725; A. van den Beld, "Killing and the Principle 
of Double Effect," Scottish Journal of Theology 41 (May 
1988): 93-116; Sanford s. Levy, "Paul Ramsey and the Rule of 
Double Effect," Journal of Religious Ethics 15 (Spring 
1987): 59-71; Germain G. Grisez, Abortion: The Myths. the 
Realities. and the Arguments (New York, NY: Corpus Books, 
1970), 321-346; John c. Dwyer, Foundations of Christian 
Ethics (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1987), 152-162; Charles 
E. Curran, Ongoing Revision in Moral Theology (Notre Dame, 
IN: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1975), 173-209. Kemp suggests 
that part of the controversy comes "from those who do not 
admit any morally relevant distinction between intended and 
merely foreseen consequences, a distinction on which the 
Principle crucially depends;" Kenneth w. Kemp, "Just-War 
Theory & the Casuistry of Prima Facie Duties" (Ph.D. diss., 
Graduate School, University of Notre Dame, 1984), 275. 
Blasi (pp. 134-135), however, posits that the controversy is 
over the four part manualist doctrine which does not appear 
that clearly in Aquinas' words. 
1Albert R. Diianni, S.M., "The Direct/Indirect 
Distinction in Morals," Thomist 41 (July 1977): 350. See 
also, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Ambiguity in Moral 
Choice," in Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in 
Conflict Situations, eds. Richard A. Mccormick, S.J., and 
Paul Ramsey (Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1978), 
38; McCormick (Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 
752), Curran (Ongoing Revision in Moral Theology, 182), and 
Dwyer (p. 153), who note that this principle was developed 
to deal with and resolve those cases in which there is a 
conflict of values. McCormick observes that, besides Paul 
Ramsey, Philippa Foot, and a few others, the principle of 
double effect has not been widely used outside the catholic 
tradition; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., How Brave a New 
World? Dilemmas in Bioethics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & 
company, Inc., 1981), 416. 
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principle of all morality, 111 basically because it "provides 
the criterion for every moral judgment. 112 Moreover, it is 
felt that absolute moral rules can be retained if this 
theory is utilized. 3 
In his historical appraisal of this doctrine, Joseph 
Mangan notes that prior to the time of Thomas Aquinas there 
is no indication of a distinctly formulated principle of 
double effect. 4 Mangan recognizes that it is not 
completely clear whether or not st. Thomas himself 
enunciated this principle as such; 5 however, he concludes 
that Aquinas' discussion of killing in self-defense "is the 
historical beginning of the principle of double effect as a 
principle. 116 Though this theory was elaborated on by some 
1Peter Knauer, S.J., "The Hermeneutic Function of 
the Principle of Double Effect," in curran, and McCormick, 
1. 
2Ibid., 2. 
3J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 
(Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1977), 162. Rakestraw, 
(p. 252) arguing for non-conflicting absolutism, says that 
the principle of double effect "can be helpful in the 
application of moral absolutes." 
4Joseph T. Mangan, S.J., "An Historical Analysis of 
the Principle of Double Effect," Theological Studies 10 
(March 1949): 42. 
5Ibid., 43. 
6Ibid., 61. Other scholars concur that in some 
manner this theory can be found in Aquinas. See, for 
example, Daniel Callahan, "The Roman Catholic Position," in 
Abortion: The Moral Issues, ed. Edward Batchelor, Jr. (New 
York, NY: Pilgrim Press, 1982), 69; Ramsey, War and the 
Christian Conscience, 39-40; May, "The Natural Law and 
Objective Morality," 188 (footnote #88); Kemp, 272. 
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commentators of st. Thomas' works during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the formulation most often cited by 
contemporary proponents of this principle is that of the 
nineteenth-century Jesuit priest, Joannes Gury. 1 
The traditional formulation of the principle of 
double effect has four parts. 2 First, the action as 
distinguished from its effects, must itself be morally good 
or neutral, but not morally evil. Second, one must intend 
only its good direct effect; the indirect evil effect, 
though foreseen, must not be desired. Third, the bad effect 
is not to be a means to attain the good effect. And fourth, 
there must be a proportionate reason for tolerating the bad 
effect; that is, the good effect must be sufficiently 
desirable to compensate for allowing the evil effect. 
Various writers have suggested that an illustration 
of how these conditions might be fulfilled can clearly be 
seen in the case of a pregnant woman who urgently needs a 
1Kemp, 273. See also, Blasi, 136. Unfortunately, a 
huge casuistry has built up over the centuries concerning 
the principle of double effect; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., 
"Double Effect, Principle of," Westminster Dictionary of 
Christian Ethics, ed. James F. Childress, and John 
Macquarrie (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1986), 162. 
Rakestraw ("Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-Conflicting 
Absolutism," 253) notes that this principle has been used to 
justify even moral evils, such as, spreading the Christian 
gospel by the sword. 
2see, for example, Neil Brown, The Worth of Persons: 
A Study in Christian Ethics, Faith and Culture Series, no. 7 
(Sydney, Australia: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1983), 
101; Blasi, 135; Higginson, 93; Kemp, 273-274; Dwyer, 156-
157; Diianni, 350-351. 
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hysterectomy due to a fast spreading cancer of the uterus. 1 
First, no moral objection can be raised against the 
operation in itself. Second, the death of the fetus is not 
the intention of the operation. Third, the "bad effect" of 
ending the life of the nonviable fetus is not the means for 
attaining the good effect of removing the cancerous tissue. 
And fourth, saving the life of the mother is at least as 
important a good as the continuation in life of the fetus. 
In essence then, as Philippa Foot succinctly states, 
this doctrine "is based on a distinction between what a man 
foresees as a result of his voluntary action and what, in 
the strict sense, he intends. 112 In other words, "the 
principle of double-effect allows harm to be done to 
innocent people only as the indirect and unintended side-
ef f ect of an action which directly and for a proportionately 
serious reason intends a good effect. 113 This resultant 
evil is considered by catholic moral theologian Richard 
1see, for example, Dwyer, 157; Kemp, 275-276; 
Higginson, 93. 
2Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the 
Doctrine of Double Effect," in Moral Problems: A Collection 
of Philosophical Essays, 2nd ed., ed. James Rachels (New 
York, NY: Harper, & Row, Publishers, 1975), 60. 
3John Madison Carville, "Love Transforming Justice 
in the Christian Ethics of Paul Ramsey" (S.T.D. diss., 
Catholic University of America, 1973), 151. 
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McCormick an "unintended by-product" of the permissible 
action. 1 
Admittedly, there are several scholars who feel that 
the principle of double effect has limitations, faults, and 
ambiguities. 2 Nevertheless, this theory, which promotes 
the doing of a good action which has a bad side effect, has 
been used for many years in an attempt to resolve 
conflicting moral obligations. 3 
summary and conclusions 
The investigation of early Christian views on moral 
conflicts showed that, to some extent Augustine, yet more so 
Thomas Aquinas, believed that on certain issues God has 
permitted exceptions to absolute norms so as to avoid 
greater evils. The views of the two foremost Protestant 
Reformers were seen to be more divergent. While John Calvin 
held firmly to moral absolutes, Martin Luther pitted love 
1McCormick, "Double Effect, Principle of," 162. 
Higginson (p. 92} concurs saying: "Double effect really 
means side effect." McCormick posits that the two essential 
ingredients that led to the formulation of this principle 
were the necessity of a certain good act, and the 
inseparability of this good act from evil in the 
circumstances; McCormick, "Ambiguity in Moral Choice," 39. 
2see, for example, CUrran, Ongoing Revision in Moral 
Theology, 192; Higginson, 190; Dwyer, 159; Blasi, 138-139. 
Blasi (p. 139}, who notes that the "principle of double 
effect seems to be faulty in several respects," gives this 
example of one of the problems: "The principle is altogether 
ambiguous with respect to what is to be understood from such 
terms as 'serious reason,' 'commensurate reason,' and 
'proportionately grave reason.'" 
3This is actually a kind of act utilitarianism. 
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against the law, and stated that the law must be suspended 
and ignored if someone might be hurt as a result of its 
being kept. A similar contrast of perspectives was observed 
between the two most renowned post-Reformation thinkers who 
addressed moral conflicts. On the one hand, Immanuel Kant 
held that moral conflicts are completely impossible, and 
that moral absolutes do not allow any exceptions. On the 
other hand, S~ren Kierkegaard posited that there are times 
when obedience to God conflicts with ethical norms. On 
these occasions the norms should be suspended in view of the 
higher goal. 
The literature considered above indicates that 
several thinkers discussed moral dilemmas in the twentieth 
century. Of the most notable ones, Emil Brunner maintained 
that these conflicts were only apparent and did not really 
exist. Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, however, 
asserting that moral conflicts are real, believed that 
exceptions from moral absolutes are permissible. 
As was demonstrated, five different approaches to 
conflicting moral obligations have emerged over time. One 
of the earliest, utilitarianism, posits that there are no 
unchanging absolute moral norms. Thus, since whatever will 
produce the greatest good for the greatest number, is 
considered a right action, all conflicts can be resolved. 
While situationism does assert that conflicts between law 
and love can arise, it promptly eliminates the confrontation 
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by noting that whatever is the most loving action is the 
right thing to do. In contrast to the two above-mentioned 
relativistic theories, three approaches promoting moral 
absolutes were briefly outlined. The first of these, non-
conflicting absolutism, holds that when correctly defined 
and comprehended, universal scriptural moral norms do not 
and cannot ever conflict. Conflicting absolutism, as the 
name implies, contends that in this fallen world moral 
absolutes do conflict. In these situations one is to do the 
lesser evil, recognize it as sin, and confess it to God 
seeking His pardon. Lastly, hierarchicalism, while it 
maintains that absolutes do conflict, suggests that in these 
circumstances the higher obligation should be followed. 
Since the lower duty is suspended at that point, this action 
is not sinful. 
Finally, the principle of double effect was 
considered. This centuries-old theory can clearly be 
observed as an attempt to provide a formal and structured 
procedure for handling conflict situations. In essence, it 
claims that whenever there is a moral conflict, one may 
perform a morally good or morally neutral action which has 
an indirect and unintended evil side effect, as long as 
there is a sufficiently good reason for permitting this bad 
side effect. In this way, this strategy attempts to retain 
moral absolutes, as well as resolve ethical conflicts. 
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While the above study of the variety of ways in 
which moral conflicts have been and are being addressed is 
by no means exhaustive, it does provide both a broad outline 
of different approaches and methodologies related to ethical 
dilemmas, as well as a sufficient general background for the 
detailed investigation of the hierarchical ethics of Norman 
Geisler. Before undertaking the description, analysis and 
evaluation of Geisler's ethical methodology, however, it 
will be essential to consider his personal philosophical, 
theological and ethical evolution and development. This 
will provide a framework for a clearer understanding and a 
better appreciation of Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism. 
CHAPTER III 
NORMAN L. GEISLER: THE MAN AND HIS THOUGHT 
In the mid-1960s the Protestant clergyman Joseph 
Fletcher suggested a novel method of approaching borderline 
cases in his book Situation Ethics: The New Morality. 1 As 
a young evangelical pastor, Norman L. Geisler was one of 
those who read Fletcher's volume and contemplated the 
perplexing ethical issues that were raised in it. Even 
before the reading of this publication, Geisler had already 
been deliberating on the various logical alternative methods 
of dealing with ethical problems in the contemporary 
Christian world. However, it was on reading Situation 
Ethics: The New Morality that, as Geisler puts it, "I was 
awakened from my dogmatic slumbers. 112 The type of 
predicaments discussed in Fletcher's book confirmed Geisler 
in his belief that real moral conflicts occur in this world. 
Then he looked at Bible stories and concluded that "there 
1Joseph Fletcher, situation Ethics: The New Morality 
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1966). 
2Norman L. Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of 
the Greater Good Ethic," cassette (Lynchburg VA: Quest 
Productions, 1989). Geisler was here quoting the words of 
Immanuel Kant who reacted this way on reading David Hume. 
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are a lot of real conflicts right in the Bible. 111 Thus, 
Geisler's conviction that there are ethical dilemmas in both 
the real world and the Scriptures became the two most vital 
concepts that went into his thinking as he worked on 
formulating his method of hierarchical ethics. 
Recognizing that many factors impact and form one's 
perspective, this chapter aims at elucidating the primary 
elements that have gone into the philosophical, theological 
and ethical development of Norman Geisler, so as to better 
understand his hierarchical approach to ethics. His 
formative training, shaping influences, major concerns, and 
the significance he personally attaches to his 
hierarchicalism are all appraised with a view to 
understanding how they relate to his overall approach to 
ethics. 
The investigation of Geisler and his thought will 
proceed as follows. First, there is an introductory 
biographical sketch, tracing Norman Geisler's life from 
birth through to the present. Then, this chapter focuses on 
the formative influences that played a major part in 
Geisler's theological and philosophical pilgrimage. Next, 
this chapter attempts to demonstrate the significance and 
the extent of Geisler's voluminous and diverse concerns in 
the areas of theology, philosophy, and ethics. After an 
1Geisler, "The origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
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investigation of the importance that Geisler personally 
places on ethical hierarchicalism, a short summary and 
conclusion closes the chapter. 
Biographical Sketch 
Norman Leo Geisler was born on July 21, 1932, in 
Warren, Michigan, the son of a factory worker, Alphonsus 
Herbert, and Bertha Mae (Rottmann) Geisler. 1 His father, 
Alphonsus, was an ex-Roman Catholic, and his mother, Bertha, 
an ex-nominal Lutheran. Furthermore, Norman Geisler's 
favorite uncle, who was his role model when he was young, 
was an atheist. Thus, as Geisler puts it, from his family's 
side, his "religious training was nil. 112 At the age of 
nine someone took him to a Vacation Bible School, and 
thereafter to Sunday School every week up until he was 17 
years old. 
It was at this point in his life that Norman 
Geisler, on February 12, 1950, experienced a personal 
conversion. He recalls: "I came home from Sunday School, 
got down on my knees by my bed, committed my life to Christ, 
and immediately began serving Christ. 113 Because his family 
1Who's Who in Religion, 2d ed. (Chicago, IL: Marquis 
Who's Who, Inc., 1977), 229; Contemporary Authors, New 
Revision Series, ed. Hal May, and James G. Lesniak, 
(Detroit, MI: Book Tower, 1989), 182. 
2Personal interview with Norman L. Geisler at 
Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia, on December 31, 
1990. 
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was essentially non-Christian and very anti-God, they told 
him that he could not be a Christian, and that he "had to 
give up Christ. 111 Even though he loved his parents, 
Geisler chose to remain faithful to his commitment to God. 2 
Right after his dedication to Christ, the youth directors of 
his church got him involved in many outreach activities. 
Within a short time Geisler began to feel called into the 
ministry, at which point he enrolled at William Tyndale 
College in the fall of 1950. 3 
Upon graduation from this college with a diploma in 
theology, Geisler married a pianist, Barbara Jean Cate, on 
June 24, 1955. Six children were born from this union: 
Ruth, David, Daniel, Rhoda, Paul, and Rachel. 4 Over time 
several grandchildren have been added to Geisler's family as 
well. 
1Norman L. Geisler, "Love: A Responsible Attitude," 
in Practical Christianity, ed. Lavonne Neff, Ron Beers, 
Bruce Barton, Linda Taylor, Dave Veerman, and Jim Galvin 
(Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1987), 226. 
2Geisler (ibid., 226-227) notes: "I continued to 
love my folks by caring for them and by praying for them. 
Not long afterward, they realized I was sincere in 
dedicating and committing myself to Christ, so they asked me 
to pray at meals. Year [sic] later, I was able to lead my 
father to Christ when he was in the hospital. I shared 
John 3:16 with him and read his name into the verse. He 
responded." 
3Personal Interview, 1990. This college was then 
known as Detroit Bible College. 
4Who's Who in Religion, 229. 
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During the years of his ministry Geisler, a 
conservative evangelical Christian who votes Republican, has 
lectured and traveled widely. He has ministered in all 50 
states of the United States of America, as well as in two 
dozen countries on six continents. 1 Even with all his 
commitments, Geisler has found time for his hobbies of 
collecting rocks and fossils, skiing, sailing, and 
woodworking. 2 
Geisler has been a pastor, educator, administrator, 
philosopher, theologian, and an ethicist. One day when 
asked how he measures his success, he responded: "I measure 
my own accomplishment by the standard of God's Word. In the 
final analysis, have I brought every thought captive to 
Christ? I am successful to the degree that I think and live 
Christocentrically and captivate every thought, whether it 
happens to be about politics or ethics or family, in the 
light of Christ and His revelation in His Word. 113 
Theological and Philosophical Pilgrimage 
As mentioned above, Norman Geisler regularly 
attended Sunday School during his formative years. This 
religious community was very conservative in their views, 
1Norman L. Geisler, Personal Vitae, given to the 
writer of this research project. 
2contemporary Authors, 182. 
3Angela Elwell Hunt, "Norm Geisler: The World Is His 
Classroom," Fundamentalist Journal, September, 1988, 21. 
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and over time evolved from an independent group, called the 
Calvary Community Church, into a Baptist church. As Geisler 
notes: "That's the church in which I got my initial 
training, and that's the church in which I was baptized and 
became a member. 111 The William Tyndale College, where he 
then went to study for the ministry, was a conservative 
evangelical Bible school. Geisler's conservative training 
continued when he later attended Wheaton College, where he 
received a B.A. in Philosophy in 1958, and then at Wheaton 
Graduate School, where he graduated with an M.A. in Theology 
in 1960. 2 He recalls that he "never seriously entertained 
the liberal or nee-orthodox views 113 as he was growing up 
and engaging in his training for the ministry. 
Geisler, however, did not wait to complete his 
training before getting involved in ministry. As indicated 
above, as soon as he was baptized he became really active in 
his community church. While still working on his first 
college diploma he ministered as Christian Services Director 
for the Northeast Suburban Youth for Christ organization in 
Detroit from 1952-1954. on completion of his theology 
diploma, he pastored the Dayton Center Church in Silverwood, 
Michigan from 1955-1957. It was during this, his first 
fulltime pastorate, that Geisler was ordained to the 
1Personal Interview, 1990. 
2Geisler, Personal Vitae. 
3Personal Interview, 1990. 
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ministry in the Independent Church in 1956. Then, around 
the time he was at Wheaton in Illinois, he served as 
assistant pastor of the River Grove Bible Church from 1958-
1959. Upon receiving his Master's degree he again pastored 
in Michigan, this time at the Memorial Baptist Church in 
Warren from 1960-1963. 1 
It was while Geisler was working on his master's 
degree and while serving as pastor in Warren that he began 
to make the transition from pastoring to teaching. For, 
from 1959-1962 he served as a parttime instructor, and then 
from 1963-1966 as fulltime Assistant Professor in Bible and 
Apologetics at his alma mater, William Tyndale College. 2 
Following this, from 1967-1970 Geisler attended 
Loyola University in Chicago, where he worked on and 
completed a Ph.D. in Philosophy. By the time he graduated 
in 1970, Geisler had done study in philosophy at several 
other educational institutions: Wayne state University 
Graduate School in 1964; the University of Detroit Graduate 
School, from 1965-1966; and Northwestern University in 
1968. 3 Also, toward the end of his doctoral studies, 
Geisler was employed at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School 
as Visiting Professor of Religion from 1969-1970. The 
following year he worked fulltime as Associate Professor of 
1Who's Who in Religion, 229. 
2Ibid. 
3Geisler, Personal Vitae. 
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Philosophy at Trinity College. The same year he became 
Chairman of the Philosophy of Religion Department at Trinity 
Evangelical Divinity School, a position he held through 
1979. The next nine years, 1979-1988, he spent as Professor 
of Systematic Theology at Dallas Theological Seminary. 
Then, after a short stint, from 1989-1991, as Dean of 
Liberty Center for Research and Scholarship at Liberty 
University, he started up his own theological training 
center in Charlotte, North Carolina. currently, Geisler is 
Dean and Chief Executive Officer of this institute, the 
Southern Evangelical Seminary. 1 
Some have concluded that Geisler's thinking and 
philosophy were shaped when he attended Loyola University, a 
Jesuit Catholic educational institution. 2 For example, 
Gordon Clark has stated that a section of Geisler's 
Introduction to Philosophy has an "interpretation of Aquinas 
sponsored at Loyola University. 113 Also, Guy Greenfield has 
observed that Geisler's Christian Ethics has a "Thomistic 
rationalistic style. 114 Moreover, in reviewing Geisler's 
Christian Apologetics, Clark Pinnock observes that "to 
2see Guy Greenfield, review of Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Southwestern 
Journal of Theology 33 (Summer 1991): 54. 
3Gordon H. Clark, review of Introduction to 
Philosophy, by Norman L. Geisler, in Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 24 (December 1981): 350. 
4Ibid. 
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employ Geisler's system requires that one first be baptized 
into Thomistic thought. 111 Then, too, Kenneth Boa, in his 
doctoral dissertation which compared and analyzed four 
approaches to Christian apologetics, concluded that 
"Geisler's thinking has been greatly influenced by the work 
of Aquinas, and his apologetic system reflects a modified 
version of Thomistic philosophy. 112 
While his time at Loyola undoubtedly affected his 
thinking, Geisler himself indicates that his conversion to 
Thomism actually took place a decade earlier when he 
attended the University of Detroit, a Jesuit school, from 
1956-1957. He reminisces: "I was required to take a minor 
in philosophy, and most Jesuit schools were heavily 
influenced at that time by Thomas Aquinas. My first course 
was one in the Theory of Knowledge. The second course was a 
most exciting course--The Metaphysics of Infinite Being. It 
was at this point that I became intellectually converted to 
Thomism. I saw it as the solution to the evangelical 
apologetic problem, as a solution to the evangelical view of 
God. I became especially interested in Aquinas' apologetics 
and theology proper. 11 3 
1clark H. Pinnock, review of Christian Apologetics, 
by Norman L. Geisler, in Christian Scholar's Review 8 
(1979): 384-385. 
2Kenneth D. Boa, "A Comparative study of Four 
Christian Apologetic Systems," (Ph.D. diss., New York 
University, 1985), 152. 
3Personal Interview, 1990. 
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Geisler openly credits Aquinas with "having the most 
influence on my life. 111 Believing that there are other 
Protestants who are "closet Thomists," Geisler has asserted 
that "there is really a strong but too often silent minority 
among us who are directly dependent on Aquinas for our basic 
theology, philosophy, and/or apologetics. 112 He states that 
he does not naively and uncritically accept everything that 
Aquinas has written. 3 Yet, he has such a high regard for 
this thirteenth-century thinker, that he says: "I gladly 
confess that the highest compliment that could be paid to me 
as a Christian philosopher, apologist, and theologian is to 
call me 'Thomistic. 1114 And that is precisely what some 
1Hunt, 20. Geisler says that he chose Thomas 
Aquinas as his most admired hero because, "he was the most 
brilliant, most comprehensive, and most systematic of all 
Christian thinkers and perhaps of.all thinkers of all time;" 
Hunt, 21. 
2Norman L. Geisler, Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical 
Appraisal (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991), 14. 
See also the 1974 presentation on Thomas Aquinas, which 
Geisler later revised and published; Norman L. Geisler, "A 
New Look at the Relevance of Thomism for Evangelical 
Apologetics," Christian Scholar's Review 4 (1975): 192. 
3For example, he does not agree with Aquinas' view 
on transubstantiation, infant baptism, the sacraments, his 
acceptance of the Apocrypha as part of the canon of 
Scripture, his acceptance of the divine authority of the 
Roman catholic Church, etc.; Geisler, Thomas Aquinas: An 
Evangelical Appraisal, 177. 
4Geisler, Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal, 
14. 
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scholars1 have classified him as. Other thinkers have 
labelled him a "Neo-Thomist 11 • 2 
In his volume on Aquinas, Geisler posits that in 
their Reformation zeal, Protestants have erred in throwing 
out the Thomistic baby with the Romanistic bath water. He 
then makes this ecumenical appeal concerning Thomism: "Let 
us take it to our evangelical bosom, bathe it in a 
biblically based theology, and nourish it to its full 
strength. 113 
Even though he considers Thomas Aquinas his most 
admired hero, 4 and one who has had the most influence on 
1see Richard Purdy, who says: "Norman Geisler is one 
contemporary dedicated to the renewal of Thomistic 
apologetics--a methodology long rejected by both Reformers 
and Evangelicals;" Richard Allan Purdy, "Carl Henry and 
Contemporary Apologetics: An Assessment of the Rational 
Apologetic Methodology of Carl F. H. Henry in the Context of 
the Current Impasse Between Ref armed and Evangelical 
Apologetics" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1980), 10. 
See also, David F. Wells and John D. Woodbridge, eds., The 
Evangelicals: What They Believe, Who They Are. Where They 
Are Changing (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1975), 43; 
Donald G. Bloesch, Freedom for Obedience: Evangelical Ethics 
in Contemporary Times (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1987), 181. 
2see Winfried corduan, "Nee-Thomism," in Evangelical 
Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 758; Boa, 153; Purdy, 300. 
3Geisler, Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal, 
23. More than a decade before this book was published, 
Purdy (p. 158) suggested that Geisler was "attempting to 
bridge Protestant and Roman Catholic apologetics." This 
ecumenical approach is confirmed here. 
4Hunt, 21. 
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his life, 1 Geisler maintains that Aquinas' perspectives on 
ethics "had no influence on me whatsoever. 112 He notes that 
he had no knowledge of, and never took any courses in 
Aquinas' ethics. Furthermore, he asserts that he only found 
out what Aquinas believed on ethics after he had developed 
his own method of hierarchical ethics, and after he had 
written his first book on ethics, which was published in 
1971. He concludes that Aquinas' ethics "had absolutely 
nothing to do with the development of my view. 113 
Nevertheless, Geisler does admit that, while attending a 
philosophy class in the mid-1950s at the University of 
Detroit, he may have read about the principle of double 
effect, an ethical perspective promoted by Thomas Aquinas. 
As Geisler correctly recognizes, this concept has 
"similarities with ethical hierarchicalism. 114 Though he 
states that "it had nothing to do, consciously, with the 
development of hierarchicalism, 115 it is quite likely that 
unconsciously this Thomistic ethical concept may have in 
some way shaped Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism. 
1Ibid., 20. 
2Personal Interview, 1990. 
3 Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. Also, Geisler insists that, "the application 
of the principle of double effect to my hierarchicalism was 
an afterthought;" ibid. 
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In addition to being correctly classified as a 
Thomist or Neo-Thomist, Geisler's approach has been labelled 
"rationalistic" by some. 1 Geisler, however, emphatically 
denies that he is a rationalist. 2 Yet, if rationalism is 
defined as that which "emphasizes the use of logical 
criteria (e.g., the law of non-contradiction, cause-and-
effect reasoning, self-consistency, comprehensiveness, [and] 
coherence) in the determination of the validity of competing 
religious philosophies, 113 then, as Kenneth Boa has 
concluded in his doctoral research, Geisler's apologetic 
methodology can rightly be described as "rationalistic 
apologetics. 114 In addition, Geisler's philosophical 
perspective has been labelled "evangelical rationalism. 115 
1see, for example, Boa, 158. 
2Geisler says: "I am not a rationalist. . • . I do, 
of course, believe God has given and expects us to use our 
reason;" Norman L. Geisler, "Avoid All Contradictions: A 
Surrejoinder to John Dahms," Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 22 (June 1979): 158. 
3Boa, 55-56. Boa (p. 56) amplifies this, adding: 
"This form of apologetics uses these criteria to refute the 
truth claims of non-Christian world views and to establish a 
natural theology through theistic proofs. Rationalistic 
apologists have a confidence in the rationalistic abilities 
of the mind, believing that the Imago Dei in the area was 
not radically distorted by the fall of man." 
4Boa (p. 118) writes: "Though he [Geisler] would not 
consider himself a rationalist, the apologetic method he has 
developed fits the definition and description of 
rationalistic apologetics." 
5see J. w. Cooper, review of Introduction to 
Philosophy, by Norman L. Geisler, in Calvin Theological 
Journal 16 (April 1981): 89. 
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Moreover, his approach to ethics has also been considered 
"rationalistic. 111 A perusal of Geisler's ethical works 
appears to verify this as a valid characterization of his 
perspective. 2 
overview of Geisler's concerns 
A scrutiny of the many audio cassettes, articles, 
and books produced by Dr. Norman Geisler over the years 
reveals that he has a wide variety of concerns. This 
breadth of interest can be well illustrated by an 
examination of the topics of many of his audio tapes. 3 For 
example, he has produced several tapes on the history of 
philosophy, and on faith and reason, in which he deals with 
the thinking of people such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, 
Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Karl Barth, 
Schleiermacher, etc. Other tapes of his address matters of 
philosophy (e.g., epistemology, metaphysics, etc.), and 
prolegomena (e.g., worldviews, methodology, etc.). He has 
engaged in debates with humanists, evolutionists, and 
atheists, and has attempted to respond to the major 
questions asked by skeptics concerning Christianity. He has 
1see, for example, Greenfield, 53. 
2chapter 5 that deals with a critical analysis of 
Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism will either validate or 
negate this characterization of Geisler's ethical approach. 
3The information below comes from a promotional 
pamphlet, "Powerhouse," March 1994, produced by Powerhouse 
Christian Tapes and Books, P.O. Box 859, Clayton, CA. 
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lectured on information pertaining to the Bible, theology, 
apologetics, and religions and cults. In addition to 
several tapes on ethical principles and issues, he has 
discoursed on matters as divergent as civil disobedience, 
gambling, space technology, alcohol, logic, ecology, and 
even guidelines for Christian voting. 
Moreover, Norman Geisler has published articles 
which have appeared in books, reference works, and 
periodicals, covering topics such as, Bible manuscripts, 1 
biblical inerrancy, 2 hermeneutics, 3 christology, 4 
1see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "The Extent of 
the Old Testament Canon," in Current Issues in Biblical and 
Patristic Interpretation, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975), 
31-46; Norman L. Geisler, "Bible Manuscripts," in Wycliffe 
Bible Encyclopedia, ed. Charles F. Pfeiffer, Howard F. Vos, 
and John Rea (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1975), 1:248-257. 
2see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "The Concept 
of Truth in the Contemporary Inerrancy Debate," in The 
Living and Active Word of God, ed. Morris Inch, and Ronald 
Youngblood (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1983), 225-236; 
Norman L. Geisler, "Philosophical Presuppositions of 
Biblical Errancy," in Inerrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1979), 305-
324. 
3see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "The Relation 
of Purpose and Meaning in Interpreting Scripture," Grace 
Theological Journal 5 (Fall 1984): 229-245; Norman L. 
Geisler, "Methodological Unorthodoxy," Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 26 (March 1983): 87-94. 
4see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Current 
Chalcedonian Christological Challenges," Evangelical Review 
of Theology 12 (October 1988): 307-324; Norman L. Geisler, 
"The Significance of Christ's Physical Resurrection," 
Bibliotheca Sacra 146 (April-June 1989): 148-170. 
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creationism, 1 the New Age movement, 2 evangelism, 3 
secularism, 4 Christian standards, 5 atheism, 6 Thomism, 7 
1see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Creationism: 
A Case for Equal Time," Christianity Today 26 (19 March 
1982): 26-29; Norman L. Geisler, "Creator in the courtroom," 
Fundamentalist Journal 1 (December 1982): 21-23, 53, 64; 
Norman L. Geisler, "Is Creation-Science Science or 
Religion?" Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 36 
(September 1984): 149-155. 
2see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "The New Age 
Movement," Bibliotheca Sacra 144 (January-March 1987): 79-
104. 
3see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Excuses: A 
Testimony of Personal Evangelism," Fundamentalist Journal 3 
(February 1984): 12-14; Norman L. Geisler, "Some 
Philosophical Perspectives on Missionary Dialogue," in 
Theology and Mission, ed. David J. Hesselgrave (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1978), 241-257; Norman L. 
Geisler, "Ethical Aspects of Evangelism with Particular 
Reference to Patients," in Evangelism for the Medical & 
Dental Professions, ed. Leonard w. Ritzmann (Richardson, TX: 
Evangelism Commission of the Christian Medical Society, 
1985), 23-44. 
4see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, et al, "Is 
Baer Right? Christian Authorities on Secularism Respond," 
Christianity Today 28 (17 February 1984): 16-19. 
5see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "A Christian 
Perspective on Wine-Drinking," Bibliotheca Sacra 139 
(January-March 1982): 46-56; Norman L. Geisler, "The 
Christian as Pleasure-Seeker," Christianity Today 19 (26 
September 1975): 8, 11, 12; Norman L. Geisler, "Let's Drop 
Unbiblical Rules for Church Membership," Christianity Today 
13 (31 January 1969): 393-394. 
6see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "The Collapse 
of Modern Atheism," in The Intellectuals Speak about God, 
ed. Roy Abraham Varghese (Chicago, IL: Regnery Gateway, 
1984), 129-152. 
7see, for example, Geisler, "A New Look at the 
Relevance of Thomism for Evangelical Apologetics," 189-200; 
Norman L. Geisler, "Thomas Aquinas," in Evangelical 
Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 1091-1092. 
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predestination, 1 philosophy, 2 process theology, 3 
dispensationalism and ethics, 4 legislating morality, 5 the 
1see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "God Knows All 
Things," in Predestination & Free Will, ed. David Basinger, 
and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
1986), 63-84; Norman L. Geisler, "Man's Destiny: Free or 
Forced," Christian Scholar's Review 9 (1979): 99-109; Norman 
L. Geisler, "Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism," in 
Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 428-430; Norman 
L. Geisler, "Is Inerrancy Incompatible with the Free Will 
Defense?" Evangelical Quarterly 42 (April 1990): 175-178. 
2see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Philosophy: 
The Roots of Vain Deceit," Christianity Today 21 (20 May 
1977): 8-12; Norman L. Geisler, "Analogy: The Only Answer to 
the Problem of Religious Language," Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 16 (Summer 1973): 167-179; 
Norman L. Geisler, "The Missing Premise in the Ontological 
Argument," Religious Studies 9 (1973): 289-296. 
3see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Process 
Theology," in Tensions in Contemporary Theology, ed. Stanley 
N. Gundry, and Alan F. Johnson (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 
1976), 237-284; Norman L. Geisler, "Process Theology and 
Inerrancy," in Challenges to Inerrancy: A Theological 
Response, ed. Gordon Lewis, and Bruce Demarest (Chicago, IL: 
Moody Press, 1984), 247-284; Norman L. Geisler, "Process 
Theology: A Survey and an Appraisal," Themelios 12 
(September 1986): 15-22. 
4see, for example, "The Use of the Bible in Social 
Ethics VI: Dispensationalism and Ethics," Transformation 6 
(January/March 1989): 7-14; Personal Interview, 1990. 
5see, for example, "Church and state: Wall of 
Separation or Bridge of Cooperation," Cornerstone 16: 10-12; 
Norman L. Geisler, "A Premillennial View of Law and 
Government," Moody 86 (October 1985): 129-131; Norman L. 
Geisler, "A Premillennial View of Law and Government," 
Bibliotheca Sacra 142 (July-September 1985): 250-266; Norman 
L. Geisler, "A Biblical View of Government," Rutherford 
Institute 2 (January/February 1985): 8, 9, 12; Norman L. 
Geisler, "Should We Legislate Morality?" Fundamentalist 
Journal 7 (July/August 1988): 16, 17, 64. 
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sanctity of life, 1 and biblical absolutes and moral 
conflicts. 2 
Over a period of 25 years Geisler has authored or 
coauthored dozens of books on a variety of subjects, which 
have been produced by several publishing houses. He has 
written many volumes on apologetics, 3 and several books 
1see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Sanctity of 
Human Life," in Applying the Scriptures, ed. Kenneth s. 
Kantzer (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 
1987), 139-160; Norman L. Geisler, "The Bible, Abortion, and 
Common Sense," Fundamentalist Journal 4 (May 1985): 24-27; 
Norman L. Geisler, "The Arguments for Abortion Are Strong, 
If ••• ,"Moody 87 (September 1986): 89-90; Norman L. 
Geisler, "Animal Rights or Human Wrongs," Fundamentalist 
Journal 8 (October 1989): 66; "Three Evangelicals Ponder the 
'Right to Die'," Evangelical Newsletter 3 (7 May 1976). 
2see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Conflicting 
Absolutism," Bulletin of the Evangelical Philosophical 
Society 2 (1979); Norman L. Geisler, "In Defense of 
Hierarchial Ethics," Trinity Journal 4 (September 1975): 82-
87; Norman L. Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," Bibliotheca Sacra 131 (July-September 1974): 
219-228. 
3see, for example, Norman L. Geisler Christian 
Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1976). 
Michael Hill (p. 88) classifies the work in this volume as 
"a fundamentally sound overall approach to Christian 
apologetics;" Michael Hill, review of Christian Apologetics, 
by Norman L. Geisler, in Reformed Theological Review 36 
(September-December 1977): 87-88; Norman L. Geisler, The 
Roots of Evil, Christian Free University curriculum Series 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1978). F. R. 
Howe (p. 375) says this book is "well-outlined and carefully 
organized" and "merits a wide and careful reading;" F. R. 
Howe, review of The Roots of Evil, by Norman L. Geisler, in 
Bibliotheca Sacra 137 (October-December 1980): 375; Norman 
L. Geisler, Miracles and Modern Thought, Christian Free 
University Curriculum Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1982); Norman L. Geisler, and Ronald M. 
Brooks, Christianity Under Attack (Lynchburg, VA: Quest 
Publications, 1985); Norman L. Geisler, The Battle for the 
Resurrection (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 
1989); David K. Clark, and Norman L. Geisler, Apologetics in 
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dealing with the study of the Bible. 1 Besides some 
publications addressing issues of current religious 
interest, 2 Geisler has produced three volumes on 
creationism. 3 He has also authored texts dealing with 
the New Age (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1990); 
Norman L. Geisler, and Ronald M. Brooks, When Skeptics Ask 
(Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1990); Norman L. Geisler, In 
Defense of the Resurrection (Lynchburg, VA: Quest 
Publications, 1991); Geisler, Thomas Aguinas: An Evangelical 
Appraisal; Norman L. Geisler, Miracles and the Modern Mind: 
A Defense of Biblical Miracles (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 1991); Norman L. Geisler, and Thomas A. Howe, When 
Critics Ask: A Handbook on Bible Difficulties (Wheaton, IL: 
Victor Books, 1992); Norman L. Geisler, and Abdul Saleeb, 
Answering Islam (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1993). 
1see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, and William E. 
Nix, A General Introduction to the Bible (Chicago, IL: Moody 
Press, 1968; rev. ed., 1986); Norman L. Geisler, Christ. the 
Theme of the Bible (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1968); Norman 
L. Geisler, and William E. Nix, From God to Us (Chicago, IL: 
Moody Press, 1974); Norman L. Geisler, A Popular survey of 
the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 
1977); Norman L. Geisler, To Understand the Bible--Look for 
Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1979); Norman L. 
Geisler, Decide for Yourself: How History Views the Bible 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1982). 
2see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, Cosmos: Carl 
Sagan's Religion for the Scientific Mind (Lynchburg, VA: 
Quest Publications, 1983); Norman L. Geisler, and J. Yutaka 
Amano, The Religion of the Force (Lynchburg, VA: Quest 
Publications, 1983); Norman L. Geisler, Signs and Wonders 
(Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1988); Norman 
L. Geisler, and J. Yutaka Amano, The Infiltration of the New 
Age (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1989). 
3see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, A. F. Brooke 
II, and Mark J. Keough, The creator in the Classroom--Scopes 
II (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1982); Norman L. 
Geisler, and J. Kerby Anderson, Origin Science: A Proposal 
for the Creation-Evolution Controversy (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1987). Russ Bush (p. 75) notes that this 
book contains "a good proposal, one that has intellectual 
and philosophical merit;" L. Russ Bush, review of Origin 
Science: A Proposal for the Creation-Evolution Controversy, 
by Norman L. Geisler, and J. Kerby Anderson, in Southwestern 
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philosophy. 1 In addition to all of this, Geisler has 
drafted several books on ethical issues, 2 as well as fou~ 
Journal of Theology 30 (Spring 1988): 75; Norman L. Geisler, 
Knowing the Truth about Creation: How It Happened and What 
It Means (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Press, 1989). 
1see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, Philosophy of 
Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 
1974). J. A. Witmer (p. 185) called the first edition "an 
excellent treatise," and one that "will unquestioningly 
serve as the standard textbook for courses in the philosophy 
of religion in evangelical colleges and seminaries for many 
years to come;" J. A. Witmer, review of Philosophy of 
Religion, by Norman L. Geisler, in Bibliotheca Sacra 139 
(April-June 1982): 184-185; Norman L. Geisler, and Winfried 
Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1988). Russ Bush (p. 61) calls the second 
edition "an essential introductory work;" L. Russ Bush, 
review of Philosophy of Religion, by Norman L. Geisler, and 
Winfried Corduan, in Southwestern Journal of Theology 32 
(Fall 1989}: 61; Norman L. Geisler, and Paul D. Feinberg, 
Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980). Russ Bush (p. 87} 
calls this "a competent volume;" L. Russ Bush, review of 
Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, by 
Norman L. Geisler, and Paul D. Feinberg, in Southwestern 
Journal of Theology 24 (Spring 1982): 86-87; Norman L. 
Geisler, Is Man the Measure? An Evaluation of Contemporary 
Humanism (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1983). 
Bradley Hayton (p. 48) refers to this book as "a truly 
academically respectable evaluation of humanism;" Bradley P. 
Hayton, review of Is Man the Measure? An Evaluation of 
Contemporary Humanism, in Christianity Today 28 (17 February 
1984): 48-49; Norman L. Geisler, and William D. Watkins, 
Perspectives: Understanding and Evaluating Today's World 
Views (San Bernardino, CA: Here's Life Publishers, 1984); 
Norman L. Geisler, and J. Yutaka Amano, The Reincarnation 
Sensation (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 
1986); Norman L. Geisler, Worlds Apart: A Handbook on World 
Views (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989); Norman L. 
Geisler, Come Let Us Reason: An Introduction to Logical 
Thinking (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1990). 
2see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, To Drink or 
Not to Drink: A Sober Look at·the Problem (Lynchburg, VA: 
Quest Publications, 1984); J.P. Moreland, and Norman L. 
Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time 
(New York, NY: Praeger, 1990); Norman L. Geisler, and Thomas 
A. Howe, Gambling: A Bad Bet (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. 
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volumes that are primarily devoted to an elaboration of his 
method of ethical hierarchicalism. 1 
The above enumeration of the concerns of Geisler 
aptly illustrates the broad scope of his interests, 
particularly in the areas of philosophy, theology, and 
ethics. This interest in the field of ethics, especially 
the significance that Geisler himself attaches to his own 
ethical methodology, will now be explored. 
The Importance of Ethical Hierarchicalism 
The measure of relevance and import that Norman 
Geisler attaches to the method of ethical hierarchicalism 
can be assessed in various ways. Most vital to this 
Revell, 1990); Norman L. Geisler, civil Disobedience: Wben 
Is It Right? Should Christians Ever Break the Law? 
(Lynchburg, VA: Quest Publications, 1990); Francis J. 
Beckwith, and Norman L. Geisler, Matters of Life and Death: 
Calm Answers to Tough Questions about Abortion and 
Euthanasia (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991). 
1Norman L. Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1971). 
Harold Kuhn (p. 96) says that this book "is a valuable 
contribution to Evangelical literature in general, and to 
the ethical endeavors of evangelicals in particular;" Harold 
B. Kuhn, review of Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, by 
Norman L. Geisler, in Journal of the Evangelical Theological 
Society 16 (Spring 1973): 95-96; Norman L. Geisler, The 
Christian Ethic of Love (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1973); Norman L. Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 1981); Norman L. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options 
and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989). 
James Grier (p. 258) notes that this book "is worthy of 
careful consideration as a textbook in ethics for both 
graduate and undergraduate schools of Christian education;" 
James M. Grier, review of Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Grace Theological Journal 
10 (Fall 1989): 257-258. 
90 
appraisal are the actual statements as well as direct 
implications made by Geisler in his own works. In his first 
major volume on ethics, Geisler outlined what he considers 
the "six basic approaches to ethics. 111 In a subsequent 
notable revision of this work, Geisler, in the opening 
chapter titled, "All the Options," restates his view even 
more unequivocally, noting that "there are only six major 
ethical systems. 112 Of these six methods, Geisler rejects 
three--antinomianism, situationism, and generalism--as 
unacceptable and inadequate for Christians since they are 
"non-absolutisms" and since they are not "firmly rooted in 
the unchanging moral character of God. 113 Geisler then 
outlines the other three approaches, all of which are 
ethical absolutisms: non-conflicting absolutism, conflicting 
absolutism, and hierarchicalism. 4 After delineating and 
evaluating non-conflicting and conflicting absolutism, he 
asserts that these views have "serious problems. 115 Then, 
claiming that these two views are inadequate for Christians, 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 13. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 25 
(emphasis added). 
3Ibid., 29. 
4Ibid., 79-132. These three approaches are also 
referred to respectively as "unqualified absolutism" or the 
"third-alternative view," "ideal absolutism" or the "lesser-
evil view," and "graded absolutism" or the "greater-good 
view. 11 
5Ibid., 113. See also, Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, 114. 
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Geisler notes that "some kind of greater good view must be 
true. 111 He concludes: "Hierarchicalism is the best 
synthesis of the tendencies and emphases of the other 
positions. 112 Not only does ethical hierarchicalism appear 
to Geisler as "the most adequate113 approach, in his 
thinking it is "the only adequate view. 114 
A decade after his first volume on ethics, Geisler 
came out with Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
written specifically with the evangelical Christian in mind. 
By means of this book on hierarchical ethics Geisler hoped 
to provide a "biblical, comprehensive, and consistent115 
approach for ethical decision-making in the twentieth 
century. 6 In this book he posits that "graded absolutism 
[i.e., hierarchicalism] seems to be the only viable 
1Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 136. 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 75. 
4Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 427 (emphasis added). Pack (pp. 
44-45) says that Geisler believes his approach, "proven to 
be the only philosophical and the only ethical approach to 
which men are led intuitively, is unveiled in all of its 
splendor biblically;" Rolland W. Pack, "An Examination of 
Norman L. Geisler's Ethic of Hierarchy" (M.A. thesis, 
Harding College, 1979). 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
8. 
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option. 111 Noting that his method is not merely for 
conflicting situations, Geisler posits that hierarchicalism 
is a way of thinking "that covers 100 percent of life's 
situations. 112 Believing that his ethical methodology "is 
not only consistent with biblical Christianity, but also 
provides a viable answer to many problems in both Scripture 
and society, 113 Geisler expressed the hope "that 
evangelicals will increasingly see the value of graded 
absolutism [i.e., hierarchicalism]. 114 
That Geisler believes his hierarchical ethics is 
crucial and vitally important can be observed from the fact 
that, over the years, he has produced audio cassettes, 5 and 
several journal and magazine articles championing it, either 
directly or indirectly. 6 In addition, in books devoted to 
1Ibid., 101 (emphasis added). 
2Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
3Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
114. 
5see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "How to 
Resolve Moral Conflicts," cassette (Lynchburg, VA: Quest 
Productions, 1989); Norman L. Geisler, "Is Lying Ever 
Right?" cassette (Lynchburg, VA: Quest Productions, 1989); 
Norman L. Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
6See, for example, Geisler, "In Defense of 
Hierarchial Ethics;" Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism;" 
Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts;" Norman L. 
Geisler, "Morality: The New and the True," Pastor's 
Quarterly 2 (Spring ,1969); Norman L. Geisler, "Any Chance 
for Morality? Part 2, 11 The Standard, 15 February 1973, 20-
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specific ethical issues Geisler has promoted a hierarchical 
approach. 1 Furthermore, even in volumes not dealing with 
ethics, he has introduced material fostering his ethical 
methodoloqy. 2 
Several Christian thinkers have recognized that 
Norman Geisler is the leading exponent of ethical 
hierarchicalism. 3 His work is considered significant and 
thought-provoking, 4 systematic, 5 based on a sound biblical 
22; Norman L. Geisler, "A Response to Olson's critique of 
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4 (Fall 1986): 
82-87. 
1see, for example, Moreland, and Geisler, The Life 
and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time, 16-18, 151-153; 
Beckwith, and Geisler, Matters of Life and Death: Calm 
Answers to Tough Questions about Abortion and Euthanasia, 
77-79, 156, 157. 
2see, for example, Geisler, "Love: A Responsible 
Attitude;" Norman L. Geisler, "Ethical Aspects of Evangelism 
with Particular Reference to Patients;" Geisler, and 
Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy, 408-427; Geisler, and 
Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 282-288. 
3see, for example, c. Gordon Olson, "Norman 
Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics Revisited," Evangelical 
Journal 4 (Spring 1986): 4; William F. Luck, "Moral 
Conflicts and Evangelical Ethics: A Second Look at the 
Salvaging Operations," Grace Theological Journal 8 (Spring 
1987): 20; Robert v. Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A case for 
Non-Conflicting Absolutism," Criswell Theological Review 2 
(Spring 1988): 246 (footnote #14). 
4Robert v. Rakestraw, "Graded Absolutism: An 
Analysis of Norman Geisler's Ethics," 1983, TMs [photocopy], 
p. 2, a paper presented at the Eastern Regional Meeting of 
the Evangelical Theological Society, Langhorne, PA. 
5Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 242. 
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theology, 1 and as the best way of explaining several 
dilemmatic situations recorded in the Scriptures. 2 
The significance of hierarchicalism is perhaps best 
articulated by Rolland Pack who wrote his master's thesis on 
Geisler's ethical method. In his concluding chapter Pack 
notes: "It is clear that Norman Geisler believes that 
hierarchicalism is the only true ethical system. He 
believes that anyone accepting God's revealed ethic must 
espouse the ethic of hierarchy. Consequently, his 
explanation and defense of hierarchicalism is momentous. 113 
Summary and conclusions 
Even though he was raised in a non-Christian family 
and in an environment somewhat hostile to God, Norman 
Geisler, through the interest and concern of others, was 
able to attend church regularly for several years as a child 
and young man. After making a personal commitment to Christ 
when he was 17 years old, he went to train to be a pastor. 
Both the church he attended in his youth as well as 
the colleges where he obtained his ministerial training 
helped to mold him into a conservative evangelical 
1Louis Goldberg, review of Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Moody 73 (September 1972): 
58. 
2Joseph s. Wang, review of Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Asbury Seminarian 26 (July 
1972): 44. 
3Pack, 151 (emphasis added). 
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Christian. He pastored for several years in Michigan and 
Illinois, and then began to move into the area of lecturing. 
He did graduate work in philosophy at four 
universities, completing his doctorate in 1970 at Loyola 
University, a Roman Catholic institution. While it is 
likely that his study at Loyola did affect his thinking, 
Geisler maintains that he was intellectually converted to 
Thomism more than a decade earlier. He credits Thomas 
Aquinas with having the most influence on his life, and 
considers it the highest compliment to be called a 
"Thomist. 11 Though Geisler asserts that Aquinas' ethical 
thinking had no conscious influence on his own ethical 
methodology, the similarities between Aquinas' principle of 
double effect and his own hierarchicalism suggest that his 
view may have been unconsciously shaped by Aquinas. Geisler 
has also been labelled a "rationalist," a characterization 
that he strongly disputes. 
As a scholar, lecturer, and author, Geisler has been 
producing a prolific amount of material. He has put out 
literally hundreds of audio cassettes, scores of articles 
which have appeared in journals, collections, and reference 
works, and dozens of books. A perusal of this material 
indicates the broad range of Geisler's thinking and 
interests, covering topics such as, epistemology, 
worldviews, philosophy, humanism, evolution, atheism, cults, 
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civil disobedience, logic, biblical inerrancy, theodicy, 
hermeneutics, ethical theory, and the New Age Movement. 
Geisler himself attaches great significance to his 
theory of ethical hierarchicalism. In his major volumes on 
ethical theory he has outlined and evaluated what he 
considers the only six approaches to ethics. He discards 
the three non-absolutistic methodologies as unacceptable for 
Christians, and then posits that non-conflicting and 
conflicting absolutism have such serious problems that they 
are also inadequate for Bible believers. Geisler thus 
concludes that hierarchicalism is the best and only adequate 
ethical view to hold. He maintains that this method is 
comprehensive, consistent, and biblical--the only true 
ethical approach for Christians. 
Clearly Norman Geisler has already lived a full and 
eventful life. His participation in scholarly activities is 
of a scale unequaled by many. Yet, as he himself has noted, 
he gauges his success by the standard of the Word of God. 
Recognizing the importance and significance that Geisler 
personally places on his hierarchicalism, the following 
chapter will undertake an extended and intense investigation 
and elaboration of this ethical perspective. 
CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTIVE OUTLINE OF ETHICAL HIERARCHICALISM 
Even though he had briefly mentioned his approach to 
moral conflicts in a 1969 article, 1 Geisler's first full-
length treatment of this ethical methodology was published 
in 1971 in his Ethics: Alternatives and Issues. 2 In this 
book he proposed his personally formulated strategy of 
resolving the moral conflicts he perceived in the real world 
and in the Bible. Over the decades that he has written on 
this topic, Geisler has referred to his method by a variety 
of names. While in his first book on ethics, he mainly 
called it "ethical hierarchicalism, 113 Geisler has also used 
the terms "hierarchial ethics, 114 and "hierarchical 
1Norman L. Geisler, "Morality: The New and the 
True," Pastor's Quarterly 2 (Spring 1969). 
2Norman L. Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1971). 
Speaking about ethical hierarchicalism, Geisler himself 
says: "I first proposed this view in 1971 in Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues;" Norman L. Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 1981), 92 (footnote #12). 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 114-136. 
4see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "In Defense of 
Hierarchial Ethics," Trinity Journal 4 (September 1975): 82-
87. 
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ethics" 1 to describe his ethical methodology. Furthermore, 
Geisler has labeled his ethical approach the "greater love 
position, 112 the "greater-good view, 113 or the "greater good 
ethic, 114 as well as the "greatest good view. 115 More 
recently, however, it appears that Geisler has been using 
the designation "graded absolutism. 116 Since the labels 
"hierarchical ethics," "ethical hierarchicalism, 11 or simply 
1see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "The Origins 
and Implications of the Greater Good Ethic," cassette 
(Lynchburg, VA: Quest Productions, 1989); Norman L. Geisler, 
and J. Yutaka Amano, The Reincarnation Sensation (Wheaton, 
IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1986), 117. He also 
used this label in his first book, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 193. 
2see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, "Biblical 
Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," Bibliotheca Sacra 131 (July-
September 1974): 226-228. 
3see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, and Paul D. 
Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian 
Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980), 424-
427. 
4see, for example, Geisler, "The Origins and 
Implications of the Greater Good Ethic." See also, Norman 
L. Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan Publishing House, 1973), 74-75. 
5see, for example, Norman L. Geisler, review of The 
Morality Gap, by Erwin w. Lutzer, in Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 16 (Spring 1973): 97-101; 
Norman L. Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 1977, TMs 
[photocopy], p. 6, Center for Research and Scholarship, 
Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. 
6see, for example, Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 81-114; Norman L. Geisler, "A Response to 
Olson's Critique of Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical 
Journal 4 (Fall 1986): 82-87; Norman L. Geisler, Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 1989), 113-132. 
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"hierarchicalism, 111 were originally used by Geisler in his 
first book on ethics, and since it appears to best describe 
his method, wherever possible, these terms will be used 
throughout the rest of this research document. 
While it is clear that Geisler has utilized a 
variety of labels for his ethical theory, a careful 
examination of his work indicates that, besides some shifts 
in emphasis, his basic approach has undergone no significant 
development or transformation over time. 2 Thus, rather 
than chronologically recounting Geisler's method as he has 
described it over the years, an attempt will be made to 
schematically trace his ethical hierarchicalism as it 
emerges from his various works on ethics. 
This chapter will elaborate on hierarchical ethics 
in the following manner. To begin with, the fundamental 
presuppositions of Geisler's view of ethics are considered. 
Second, the basic elements of hierarchicalism are outlined. 
Third, the evidence that Geisler adduces in support of a 
hierarchy of values, as well as a Jcurther explication of 
this hierarchical strategy is then delineated. Finally, an 
overall summary and brief conclusion end the chapter. 
1see, for example, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 114-136. 
2In 1986 Geisler himself stated: "I am more firmly 
convinced of the basic principles of Graded Absolutism 
(Hierarchicalism) than when I proposed the idea 15 years 
ago;" "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical 
Hierarchicalism," 86. 
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Fundamental Presuppositions 
As in every ethical method, Geisler's view of ethics 
has certain essential concepts that are foundational to it. 
Thus, before dealing with the basic principles of ethical 
hierarchicalism itself, it will be essential to consider the 
factors that Geisler sees as fundamental presuppositions of 
morality as a whole, and of Christian ethics in particular. 
The Nature of Morality1 
Geisler's discussion of the basic essence of what is 
obviously a theistic perspective of morality occurs 
primarily in connection with his critiques of other systems 
of belief or ethical methodologies. For example, in Options 
in Contemporary Christian Ethics Geisler asserts that "the 
evangelical has a decided advantage over the non-Christian 
humanist on the question of the nature of morality. 112 He 
then proceeds to outline the following four indispensable 
characteristics of morality. 
1since Geisler's emphasis in the area of ethics has 
been to concentrate on Christian views, he has not written 
extensively and systematically on the nature of morality as 
such. Even when he has done so, it has clearly been from a 
theistic viewpoint. Besides the few pages that address this 
issue in Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics (pp. 34-
37), some brief comments have been located in a few of 
Geisler's other works. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
34. While, on the whole, Geisler disagrees with humanism, 
he does commend humanist Paul Kurtz for his belief in 
objective moral principles; Norman L. Geisler, review of 
Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism, by Paul Kurtz, in 
Christian Research Journal, Fall 1988, 28. 
101 
Objective, Not Subjective 
In demonstrating that morality is objective, Geisler 
notes that issues such as racism and cruelty "are wrong 
because by their very nature these things ought not be 
done. 111 Indeed, if there were no objective standard for 
action, then there could be no moral disagreements as to 
what is right or wrong, there could be no wrong moral 
decisions, and there would be no reason to apologize for 
violating any moral law. 2 Reflecting on the fundamental 
necessity of objective moral norms, Geisler concludes that 
"a purely subjectivistic ethic is like a game without rules 
or a civilization without codes. Ultimately, it is really 
no ethic at all. It is a normless subjectivism in which 
each man feels and does his own 'thing. 1113 In brief then, 
as Geisler states: "Moral values are objective. 114 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
35. 
2Norman L. Geisler, Knowing the Truth about 
Creation: How It Happened and What It Means for Us (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Servant Books, 1989), 76. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 44. 
Incidentally, in his doctoral dissertation, Geisler uses the 
argument of an objective moral law to prove the existence of 
a Moral Law-Giver beyond mankind; Norman L. Geisler, 
"Religious Transcendence: Some Criteria" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Loyola University, 1970), 154[b]. 
4Francis J. Beckwith, and Norman L. Geisler, Matters 
of Life and Death: Calm Answers to Tough Questions about 
Abortion and Euthanasia (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 
1991), 77. 
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Absolute, Not Relative 
Geisler posits that "morality has an absolute 
basis. 111 He maintains that a belief in moral absolutes is 
indeed unavoidable. 2 This is because relative norms do not 
stand alone. They must be relative to something which is 
absolute. 3 In his contrast of absolutism and relativism, 
Geisler notes that absolutism "offers a means for measuring 
all men and all societies which is not subject to change by 
them. This absolute value standard beyond the world makes 
ultimate sense out of behavior and moral judgments in the 
world, a factor that relative value judgments lack. 114 In 
other words, there is "an absolute basis for morality. 115 
Normative, Not Utilitarian 
In connection with moral issues, Geisler explains 
that some decide what one ought to do on the basis of what 
they believe will result in the greatest happiness for the 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
35. 
2Geisler, review of Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of 
Humanism, 28. In Ethics: Alternatives and Issues (p. 45) 
Geisler states that "there must be an absolute to which all 
the conflicting relatives can be related and by which they 
may be resolved." 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 59. 
4Norman L. Geisler, and William D. Watkins, 
Perspectives: Understanding and Evaluating Today's World 
Views (San Bernardino, CA: Here's Life Publishers, 1984), 
38. 
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greatest number of people in the long run. 1 The problem 
with this reasoning, as Geisler notes, is that "anything 
beyond the immediate present is outside of the human 
purview. Only God knows the future. 112 so, appealing to 
long-range results as the basis for determining what rules 
to follow is futile. Put simply, "the end never justifies 
the means. 113 Furthermore, if it were possible to determine 
the future, a normative approach would nevertheless be 
mandatory, for "there must be some norm by which one is able 
to evaluate the consequences, 114 since there is really no 
way to know if the result is "better" unless there is a 
standard of "best" by which it can be appraised. 5 Thus, it 
can be concluded that a normative approach to morality is 
"both inescapable and essential for a meaningful ethic. 116 
Discovered, Not Created by Humans 
In his book, The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues 
of Our Time, which was specifically aimed at reaching 
36. 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 77. 
3Ibid. I 75. 
4Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 26. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., 27. This statement of Geisler's is a 
summary of his discussion, "Why a Normative Approach?". 
While he outlines several reasons for his belief in the 
necessity of a normative approach, only the basic concepts 
essential for this research study have been mentioned above. 
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secular university students, Geisler addresses the issue of 
how to make moral decisions~ 1 Maintaining that all ethical 
decisions fall into either the deontological or the 
utilitarian category, 2 Geisler asserts that "ultimately, 
basic values are discovered, not created. 113 In an earlier 
volume, written specifically with the evangelical Christian 
in mind, Geisler notes that it is God who determines ethical 
values. 4 Moreover, these God-given values are such that 
even "the non-Christian finds it diff icult--if not 
impossible--to live without. 115 Thus, morality is not 
originated but merely discovered by human beings. 
In summary then, Geisler contends that there are 
four defining features of the nature of morality from a 
theistic standpoint: an objective standard, an absolute 
basis, a normative approach, and a divine origin. 
1see J. P. Moreland, and Norman L. Geisler, The Life 
and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time (New York, NY: 
Praeger, 1990), 143-155. 
2Ibid., 143. 
3 Ibid., 145. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
37. For essentially the same sentiments, see Geisler, and 
Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian 
Perspective, 367. Looking at this issue from the opposite 
perspective, Geisler says that "if humans were not created 
by God, then they have no moral duty to Him. There are no 
absolute values to discover; there are only relative values 
to create;" Geisler, Knowing the Truth about Creation: How 
It Happened and What It Means for Us, 115. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
37. 
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The Christian View of Ethics 
A study of Geisler's material reveals that his 
theistic view of morality in general can be seen as the 
foundation for his understanding of Christian ethics in 
particular. However, according to Geisler, Christian ethics 
tends to interpret these features more specifically. 
Moreover, he asserts that Christian ethics has additional 
aspects that further distinguish it. The following seven 
attributes characterize the Christian view of ethics. 1 
The Revelation of God--Its Basis 
As mentioned above, Geisler holds that morality in 
general is determined by God, but only discovered by humans. 
In connection with Christian ethics, Geisler asserts that it 
is based on general and special revelation from God. 2 He 
says: "General revelation (in nature] contains God's 
commands for all people. Special revelation [in Scripture] 
declares his will for believers. But in either case, the 
basis of human ethical responsibility is divine 
revelation. 113 God has expressed Himself in the Bible which 
1Five of these seven characteristics are taken from 
Geisler's explanation of "A Christian View of Ethics," in 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22-25. While this 
book has some overlap with concepts in Options in 
contemporary Christian Ethics, 37-41, Geisler gives two 
additional aspects of Christian ethics in the latter volume. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 23. 
3 Ibid. 
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gives Christians the basis for moral obligations. 1 This 
"written Word of God is love manifested in propositional 
form. 112 Expanding on this idea, Geisler affirms that "the 
Scriptures are definitive and specific in the declaration of 
God's moral will for the lives of men. 113 Thus, fundamental 
to Christian ethics is the belief that "the Bible provides 
an objective knowable reference point for discovering the 
will of the immutably loving and just God. 114 
The Character ox God--Its Source 
Geisler states: "The Christian ethic is anchored 
ultimately in the unchanging nature of a God of perfect love 
and justice. 115 More specifically, "the moral law is rooted 
in God's good and loving nature, 06 and is "a reflection of 
His unchanging character. 117 And since "it is impossible 
1Norman L. Geisler, "Ethical Aspects of Evangelism 
with Particular Reference to Patients," in Evangelism for 
the Medical & Dental Professions, ed. Leonard W. Ritzmann 
(Richardson, TX: Evangelism Commission of the Christian 
Medical Society, 1985), 26. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
40. 
3Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 366. 
4Ibid. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
25-26. 
6Norman L. Geisler, and Ronald M. Brooks, When 
Skeptics Ask (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1990), 30. 
7Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
23. 
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for God to will something that is not in accordance with His 
nature, 111 it is clear that all "the ethical imperatives 
that God gives are in accord with his unchangeable moral 
character. 112 One of the examples Geisler cites as proof of 
this point deals with the truthfulness of God. Geisler 
first quotes the biblical passage that says, "'it is 
impossible for God to lie, 1113 and then deduces that since 
God cannot lie, "we should not lie either."4 Geisler 
concludes: "In brief, Christian ethics is based on God's 
will, but God never wills anything contrary to his 
unchanging moral character. 115 This is the ultiinate source 
of Christian ethics. 6 
Christ's Life--Its Best Manifestation 
Recognizing the decisive impact of a model, Geisler 
declares: "When it comes to knowing and doing what is right 
there is no substitute for a living example. Christ was 
1Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 30. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
3Ibid. He was here referring to the New 
International Version's rendering of Hebrews 6:18. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
5Ibid. 
6Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 368. See also, Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 37-38, where he notes: "If 
the Christian claim [concerning God] is correct, then the 
ultimate source of its morality (in the character of God) is 
infinitely superior to any mere humanistic ethic." 
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that example. 111 He came to live on this earth where He 
showed people how to live. 2 Thus, Christ "not only taught 
the moral law of God but He lived it to perfection. 113 
Since His life personified all the moral precepts of 
Scripture, 4 "Christ is our complete moral example. 115 In 
view of this, Geisler attests that Christian ethics "is not 
a mere legalistic assent to a written code; it is a dynamic 
relation to a living Pe~son. The essence of morality is not 
the love of abstract laws; it is the love of a person, Jesus 
Christ, and through Him and by Him the love of all 
persons. 116 
The Love of Christ--Its Motivation 
Geisler notes that, while humanism might hold some 
correct laws, it cannot generate the motivation from within 
itself to keep those laws. 7 By contrast, for Christian 
ethics, "the value of Christ's example of love is 
39. 
39. 
1Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 53. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 53. 
4Ibid. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
6Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 369. See also, Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 39. 
7Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
40. 
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inestimable."1 For, the love of Christ becomes the 
motivating factor in keeping the moral laws of God. 2 
Geisler recognizes that many of the great social movements 
that set out to help suffering humanity were started by 
Christians activated by the love of Christ. These were "men 
and women who said in essence, 'The love of Christ controls 
us. 1113 For the Christian then, "Christ's love is more than 
a pattern for our life; it is the very possibility and power 
enabling us to live a life of perfect love. 114 Truly, it is 
the love of Christ that inspires and influences the 
Christian to live in accord with God's moral laws. 5 
Prescriptive, Not Descriptive 
From a Christian perspective, according to Geisler, 
"a purely descriptive ethic is no ethic at all. 116 The 
function of describing human behavior is the realm of 
40. 
1Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 60. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
3 Ibid., 41. Geisler was here quoting the Revised 
Standard Version's rendering of 2 Corinthians 5:14. 
4Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 61. 
5see Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to 
Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, 369, where Geisler 
states: "The Christian view of right entails a superior 
motivation--the love of Christ." In The Christian Ethic of 
Love (pp. 96-97), Geisler adds that the Holy Spirit 
motivates one to ethical action, but always in accord with 
Scripture. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 23. 
110 
sociology, while that of prescribing human behavior is the 
province of morality. 1 In other words, "what people 
actually do is not the basis for what they ought to do. If 
it were, then people ought to lie, cheat, st~al, and murder, 
since these things are done all the time. 112 Thus, 
"morality is not determined by what men do but by what they 
ought to do. 113 This moral rightness that people are 
expected to do is prescribed by a moral God, and hence 
Christian ethics is prescriptive. 4 Approaching this point 
from a slightly different angle, Geisler warns that the 
moral law is not to be identified with the laws of nature, 
because the latter are descriptive, and not prescriptive, as 
moral laws are. 5 In other words, "morality is imperative, 
not just declarative. 116 Indeed, "Christian ethics is by 
its very nature prescriptive, not descriptive. 117 
2Ibid., 24. 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 12. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 23. 
5Geisler, Knowing the Truth about Creation: How It 
Happened and What It Means for Us, 77. See also, Geisler, 
and Watkins, Perspectives: Understanding and Evaluating 
Today's World Views, 37. 
6Geisler, review of Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of 
Humanism, 28. 
7Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 23. 
Geisler has also phrased this concept thus: "A moral duty is 
an 'ought' not an 'is'. A moral duty is a prescription, not 
a description;" Geisler, "Ethical Aspects of Evangelism with 
Particular Reference to Patients," 23. 
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Deontological, Not Teleological 
Geisler maintains that "ethical systems can be 
broadly divided into two categories, deontological (duty-
centered) and teleological (end-centered). 111 Then he 
states: "Christian ethics is deontological. 112 In other 
words, it is the Christian's obligation to follow the moral 
law whatever the outcome, since "right is right no matter 
how painful the consequences may be. 113 This categorical 
statement, however, is qualified and clarified by Geisler 
when he notes that, while long-range results cannot really 
be known, short-range or near-view results are not to be 
completely ignored. 4 Using various illustrations from the 
physical world, 5 Geisler concludes that deontologists 
"should generally be content with acting for short-range 
results. Since we do not know the future, we should allow 
the long range to take care of itself • 116 He asserts that, 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 24. 
2Ibid. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and peath Debate: 
Moral Issues of our Time, 145. 
4Ibid., 144-146. 
5see ibid., 146-147, where Geisler mentions issues 
such as inoculation for better health. See also, Geisler, 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 25, where, among other 
illustrations, Geisler notes that a Christian should 
calculate the results of the "direction a gun is pointing 
before he pulls the trigger." 
6Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and peath Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 147. 
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"in Christian ethics these [immediate] results are all 
calculated within rules or norms. 111 What this means is 
that projected remote consequences are not to be the basis 
of an ethical action, and should not be used to determine 
what is right. 2 Furthermore, "no anticipated result as 
such can be used as a justification for breaking any God-
gi ven moral law. 113 The predicted "end may justify the use 
of good means, but it does not justify the use of any means, 
certainly not evil ones. 114 Thus, since moral laws are 
intrinsically right, 5 and since no results ever justify the 
use of wrong methods, the ethical approach maintained by the 
Christian is certainly deontological. 
Absolute Moral Obligations Affirmed 
In agreement with one of the features of the nature 
of morality in general, "Christian ethics is firmly 
absolutist. 116 Explaining more in detail, Geisler adds: "It 
is based on the character of an unchanging God 'who cannot 
lie' (Titus 1:2, NEB). It is manifest in God's law which 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 25. 
2Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death pebate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 145. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 25. 
4Ibid. 
5Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 16. 
6Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
9. 
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'cannot be broken' (John 10:35, NIV) and in the person of 
Jesus Christ who 'is the same yesterday, today and forever' 
(Heb. 13:8, NEB). 111 In other words, since God's moral 
character does not change, it follows that moral obligations 
flowing from His nature are absolute. 2 That is, "they are 
always binding everywhere on everyone. 113 For instance, 
people are commanded not to murder because human beings are 
created in God's image. Thus, murder is wrong at all times 
and all places for all people. 4 In brief, Christian ethics 
maintains a belief in absolute moral duties, which "are 
binding on all people at all times and in all places. 115 
By way of summary, it can be said that Geisler holds 
that there are seven essential characteristics of the 
Christian ethic: the revelation of God as expressed in the 
Bible is its basis; the unchanging character of God is its 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
3 Ibid. 
4Ibid., 23. 
5 Ibid. This view of Geisler's concerning the 
meaning of "absolute" does appear to be defined somewhat 
differently in connection with ethical hierarchicalism. For 
example, while Geisler says that the universal commands in 
Scripture against adultery, murder, lying, etc., "are 
absolute, and these are binding on all men at all times and 
all places" (Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 123), he 
admits that hierarchicalism "may be called qualified 
absolutism or contextual absolutism" (ibid., 124), for he 
maintains that "not all absolutes are absolutely absolute. 
Some are only relatively absolute;" Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
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source; it is best exemplified in the life of Christ; it is 
motivated and activated by the love of Christ; it is 
prescriptive in that it shows people what they ought to do; 
it is deontological, thus requiring that the moral law be 
obeyed irrespective of projected consequences; and, it holds 
that there are absolute moral obligations which all people 
everywhere need to follow at all times. 
Now that Geisler's fundamental presuppositions on 
the nature of a theistic view of morality and the essential 
features of Christian ethics have been outlined, his 
personal method of hierarchical ethics will be delineated. 
Basic Elements of Ethical Bierarchicalism 
In most of his major books on ethical approaches 
Geisler critically evaluates the various ethical 
methodologies that he considers to be logically possible. 
Since these analyses include both the strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach, from Geisler's perspective, a 
brief summary of his conclusions of the procedures other 
than ethical hierarchicalism will serve to illustrate some 
of the primary features of his own ethical methodology. 
The antinomian approach contends that there are no 
objective, timeless, God-given moral laws. 1 The values of 
this view are that it stresses personal relations and 
individual responsibility, recognizes an emotive element, 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 33-
34. 
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and accents the human perspective of ethics. 1 Geisler 
considers this approach as unacceptable because it is self-
defeating, ineffective, irrational, too subjective, too 
individualistic, 2 and too relativistic. 3 
Generalism, which posits that there are many ethical 
norms of general but not universal application, is 
illustrated in the various utilitarian approaches. 4 
Geisler asserts that, while generalism recognizes the need 
for norms and proposes a solution to conflicting norms, it 
is inadequate because of its lack of universal and absolute 
norms, and because these acts have no intrinsic value. 5 
Situationism holds that love, the one universal 
absolute, is placed above law as the only intrinsically good 
ruling norm. 6 For Geisler situationism is valuable because 
it is a normative position, an absolutism, it resolves the 
issue of conflicting norms, gives due value to differing 
1Ibid., 34-35. See also, Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, 43-44. 
41. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 39-
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 45. 
4Ibid., 47-56. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 63-73. 
5Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 58-59. 
See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 75-
77. 
6see Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 60-
71; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 43-54; 
Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 63-66. 
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circumstances, and stresses love and the value of persons. 1 
His criticisms are that one norm is too general, that the 
situation does not determine the meaning of love, that many 
universal norms are possible, that a different universal 
norm is viable, and that a many-norm ethic is defensible. 2 
Non-conflicting absolutism affirms that there are 
many absolute norms which never really conflict. 3 
According to Geisler, there is much to be commended in this 
position, including its biblical orientation, its search for 
third alternatives to breaking any moral law, its strong 
belief in the providence of God, its attempt to maintain 
moral absolutes, 4 its belief that there is always a way to 
avoid sinning, its deontological emphasis that the rule 
determines the result, 5 its desire to reconcile conflicting 
moral principles, and its recognition of the need to define 
norms more precisely. 6 Geisler's criticisms of this 
approach are that it is based on some false premises, that 
it holds false and unsuccessful qualifications, that it 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 54-
57; Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 71-74. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 74-77; 
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 57-60. 
54. 
88. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 79. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 87-
6Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 92-93. 
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depends too much on providence, that third alternatives are 
not always available, that some moral conflicts are 
inevitable, that it tends to legalism, 1 that it has a naive 
acceptance of absolutes, that it fails to show the 
interrelation of absolutes, that it does not resolve the 
conflicts of norms, and that it fails to recognize the 
priority of some norms over others. 2 
Conflicting absolutism claims that there are many 
absolute norms and that it is wrong to break any of them. 
Ideally these absolute norms do not conflict, but conflicts 
are unavoidable in this fallen world. In this method 
"ought" does not imply "can," and the inevitable duty to 
choose the lesser of two evils is excusable, and forgivable 
when confessed. 3 Geisler asserts that the positive 
contributions of this strategy include its desire to 
preserve many exceptionless absolutes, a perspective on the 
nature of responsibility and grace, 4 a realistic 
recognition of moral dilemmas, and an acknowledgment that 
moral dilemmas are rooted in the moral depravity of human 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 88-
95. See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 54-64. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 93-95. 
3Ibid., 98-106; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options 
and Issues, 100-102. See also, Geisler, The Christian Ethic 
of Love, 70-71; Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 68-70. 
4Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 108-109. 
118 
beings. 1 However, Geisler criticizes conflicting 
absolutism for having a tendency to legalism, a 
misapplication of the doctrine of depravity since it holds 
that humans must sin, a misunderstanding of moral 
responsibility since it maintains that one is responsible 
for what is unavoidable, and a serious christological 
problem since it implies that Jesus must have sinned. 2 
The above outlining of Geisler's evaluation of these 
ethical approaches reveals, by means of comparison and 
contrast, several vital facets of ethical hierarchicalism. 
The fundamental characteristics of this approach, as Geisler 
delineates and explains them, will now be considered. 
The sources of Hierarchical Ethics 
Investigation of Geisler's works shows that he 
proposes essentially two basic sources for hierarchicalism. 
Intuitively-Known Natural Law 
Geisler posits that human beings know what is right 
and wrong by their "own natural intuitions. 113 Moreover, a 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 102-
103; Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 71-72. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 109-112; 
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 103-110; 
Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 72-73; Geisler, 
Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 70-80. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 148. See also, Beckwith, and 
Geisler, Matters of Life and Death: Calm Answers to Tough 
Questions about Abortion and Euthanasia, 77-78. Geisler 
cautions that the use of intuitions in ethical deliberation 
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hierarchy of values is known intuitively. 1 For example, 
"rational and moral creatures know intuitively that love is 
to be pref erred to hate and that some forms of love are 
higher than other forms. 112 Geisler takes this concept 
further, and states that human beings "know intuitively that 
it is better to love God than man and better to save many 
lives than one. 113 The reason for this is that the natural 
law is written in everyone's heart. 4 "God knew that not 
all men would have access to the truths of Scripture at all 
times, so He inscribed a law upon their hearts. 115 Thus, 
Geisler concludes that one of the bases of ethical 
hierarchicalism is the intuitively-known natural law. 
Divine Revelation in the Bible 
The Christian Scriptures, according to Geisler, are 
yet another basis for hierarchical ethics. 6 As a second 
should not be identified with "Intuitionism" as advocated by 
G. E. Moore, A. c. Ewing, and others; ibid., 20 (endnote 
#6). 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 125. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., 126. 
4Norman L. Geisler, "Natural Law and Business 
Ethics," in Biblical Principles & Business: The Foundations, 
Christians in the Marketplace Series, vol. 1, ed. Richard c. 
Chewning (Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 1989), 164-165. 
5Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 362. 
6Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 127. 
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source, the Bible does not contradict the natural law, but 
rather complements and supplements it. "The same God whose 
moral nature is reflected in natural law has expressed His 
moral character in biblical commands to believers. Or to be 
more explicit, the eternal moral principles reflecting God's 
nature that are embodied in the Second Table of the Mosaic 
Law are the same as those expressed in natural law. 111 A 
revelational approach, however, is preferred since it is 
much more definitive, and less subject to misunderstanding 
than human intuition. 2 Also, Geisler claims that the Bible 
has "a hierarchical arrangement of norms. 113 Christians are 
not to decide for themselves what the ethical priorities 
are. Rather, "it isGod who established the pyramid of 
values in accordance with His own nature. 114 Thus, Geisler 
concludes that his ethic of "hierarchy is objective and 
determined by God, 115 and is inscripturated in the Bible. 
1Geisler, "Natural Law and Business Ethics," 172. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 127; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 33-34. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 127. See 
also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 116; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 81-82. 
This hierarchy will be outlined later in this chapter. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
94; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124; 
Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 83. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
94. 
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Now that the two basic sources of hierarchical 
ethics--natural intuition and biblical revelation--have been 
traced, the other features of this method will be examined. 
A Plurality of Absolute Duties 
In contrast to situationism, which maintains that 
there is "only one absolute, 111 and in agreement with one of 
the tenets of conflicting absolutism, Geisler's ethical 
hierarchicalism insists that there are "many moral 
absolutes. 112 Furthermore, while situationism does not hold 
any absolutes with substantive content, hierarchicalism 
does. 3 In other words, Geisler asserts that, according to 
ethical hierarchicalism, "the universal commands of 
Scripture such as the prohibitions against blasphemy, 
idolatry, adultery, murder, lying, and so forth are 
absolute, and these are binding on all men at all times and 
all places. 114 
However, the clear and unequivocal declaration that 
certain biblical commands "are absolutely binding on all men 
1Ibid., 93. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 123; Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial 
Ethics," 82. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 27; 
Norman L. Geisler, review of The Morality Gap, 97. See 
also, Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 16. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 123. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
93; Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 82. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 123. 
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at all times and all places, 111 is somewhat tempered by 
other of Geisler's statements. For instance, Geisler says 
that "adultery is always wrong as such. Murder is never 
right in itself. Lying is universally culpable in and of 
itself • 112 Even though he holds that these absolute 
biblical commands have "no exceptions, 113 Geisler notes that 
"when a conflict occurs, the greater duty is to fulfill the 
higher law. 114 In other words, "one's duty to the lower may 
be suspended in view of his responsibility to do the 
higher. 115 For example, Geisler posits that "murder is 
never right as such. 116 However, he contends that "what is 
absolutely binding as such in a simple relation is not 
necessarily the right course of action in a complex 
situation where one must decide between two commands ~ 
conflictinq. 117 Geisler observes that his ethical theory 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
93. See also, Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 
82. 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 74. See 
also, Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 
226. 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 75. See 
also, Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 286. 
4Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 286-287. 
See also, Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 741; 
Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral conflicts," 226. 
5Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 74. 
6Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 
226 (emphasis added). 
7Ibid., 227. 
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raises the question, namely, "in what sense is this view 
absolute when it allows that one is not obligated to follow 
some (lower) ethical laws when they are in conflict with 
higher ones?"l 
Geisler responds that "there are three ways in which 
hierarchicalism is an absolutism. 112 It is first of all 
absolute in its source, since it holds that all norms are 
based in the absoluteness of God. God does not change, and 
moral principles based on His nature are likewise 
unchanging. 3 "Second, each particular command is absolute 
as such, 114 "and should be obeyed absolutely, 115 unless 
there is a conflict between these absolutes, at which point 
the hierarchy is used to determine which is the higher 
relationship that takes precedence. 6 And third, the very 
hierarchy of values by which the conflicts are resolved is 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
94. See also, Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," 227; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 124. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 94; 
Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 288; Geisler, "In 
Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 83. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
94. 
5Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 288. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 94; 
Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 288; Geisler, "In 
Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 83. 
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absolute. 1 By way of example, Geisler notes that "it is 
absolutely established in accordance with the nature of God 
that in an unavoidable conflict between God and parent one 
must put God first. 02 Thus, "whenever there is a conflict 
in God's commands due to our finite-fallen world it is our 
absolute duty to follow the higher command as revealed by 
God in Scripture. 113 In brief then, hierarchical ethics 
holds that moral laws are absolute in their source, absolute 
in their sphere when they do not conflict, and absolute in 
their sequence of priority. 4 
Even though Geisler has propounded the above ideas 
to prove that hierarchicalism is an absolutism, he is 
nonetheless aware of the criticism that "it seems 
contradictory to claim that a moral principle is absolute 
when it can sometimes be broken. For what has exceptions is 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 94; 
Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 288; Geisler, "In 
Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 83. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
94. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 124. 
3Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 17. 
4Geisler, "The origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic;" Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 94; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 124. Referring to his view of absolutes, Geisler 
notes: "If people say, 'Well that's not an absolute,' then 
we're talking semantics;" "The Origins and Implications of 
the Greater Good Ethic." 
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not universal, and what is broken is not absolute. 111 
Geisler replies to this objection, in three ways. First, he 
says that the lower command is not really "broken" when the 
higher command is obeyed. Rather, the overriding duty to 
keep the higher obligation simply renders it unnecessary for 
one to perform the demands of the lesser law. 2 Second, 
"the command remains absolute even when it is not followed, 
for its absoluteness is based in the nature of God that does 
not change, 113 and "not in its performance by man. 114 While 
God never ceases to manifest absolutely what is absolutely 
right, He does not demand obedience to lower laws in 
unavoidable clashes. 5 And third, since even one exception 
to a law means that it is not absolute or universal, 6 
Geisler holds that hierarchicalism does not allow any 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 129. 
Geisler does not provide the source of this criticism, but 
merely mentions and responds to it in a section dealing with 
objections to hierarchicalism. 
2Ibid.; Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 99-100. Geisler illustrates this point by referring 
to a magnet (a higher law) which attracts a nail without 
breaking the law of gravity (a lower law). This issue will 
be discussed later in chapter 5. 
100. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 129. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
5Ibid.; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 129. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 127; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 98. See 
also, Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A 
Christian Perspective, 426. 
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exceptions. 1 However, he maintains that in unavoidable 
conflicts in which the individual is to follow the higher 
duty, God Himself exempts one from fulfilling the lower 
law, 2 from the culpability for not performing it, 3 and 
"from the moral consequences of disobeying this law." 4 In 
brief then, Geisler posits that "God knows we cannot 
actually do opposites, so he exempts us from doing the lower 
duty, even though we ought to do it. 115 
All of the above information demonstrates that 
ethical hierarchicalism has a somewhat moderated view of 
moral absolutes. It is not simply a moral law that is 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 127. 
2Ibid., 27, 130; Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction 
to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, 426. See also, 
Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 74. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 128. 
4Ibid. See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 98. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 130. 
Geisler explains that "the 'ought' is universally binding, 
even when one cannot do it because he is performing his 
higher obligation;" Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique 
of Ethical Hierarchicalism, 11 84. While this view might 
appear to stand in tension with the statement that "'ought' 
does imply that one 'can' by the grace of God always avoid 
sinning" (Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 424), it must be noted that for 
Geisler, the way to avoid sinning is to do the higher 
obligation. When it comes to the question of human freedom, 
Geisler states: "Ought does imply can; responsibility does 
imply the ability to respond;" Norman L. Geisler, "Man's 
Destiny: Free or Forced," Christian Scholar's Review 9 
(1979): 108. For Geisler, that means one can keep the law 
in normal times, and the higher law in times of conflict. 
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"absolutely binding on all men at all times and all 
places, 111 as Geisler has stated. Geisler himself 
recognizes that: 
If lower ethical norms can be transcended by higher ones 
without incurring guilt for not following the lower 
ones, then it follows that these lower norms are not 
universal in the broadest sense of the word. They are 
universal only in their context. They cover everything 
in their area. That is, lower ethical norms cannot be 
universally universal but only locally universal. They 
are valid on their particular relationship but not on 
all relationships. There are no legitimate exceptions 
to an ethical absolute, but not all absolutes are 
absolutely absolute. Some are only relatively absolute, 
i.e., absolute relative to their particular area. 2 
Hence, for ethical hierarchicalism, a more accurate 
definition of a moral absolute would be: "An ethical duty 
that has the highest degree of incumbency possible in that 
context and cannot be overridden by any other duty. 113 All 
the norms that flow from God's character are thus considered 
"absolute in a given context. 114 Accordingly, Geisler 
admits that ethical hierarchicalism may be called "qualified 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
93. See also, Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 
82. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 157. 
4Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
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absolutism or contextual absolutism. 111 Nevertheless, he 
insists that hierarchicalism "is not really a relativism. 112 
A Duty-centered Procedure 
As noted earlier, Geisler posits that ethical 
methods can be broadly separated into either deontological 
or teleological categories. 3 While utilitarianism is an 
example of a teleological ethic, Christian ethics is 
deontological. 4 
Referring to his own approach, Geisler declares: 
"Ethical hierarchicalism is not a utilitarian ethic; it is a 
deontological ethic built on intrinsic values. 115 What this 
means is that "hierarchicalism does not resolve ethical 
conflicts by an appeal to an extrinsic end (what will bring 
the greatest good to the greatest number), but to a higher 
intrinsic norm as revealed by God. 116 Furthermore, when 
hierarchicalists speak of performing the "'greater good' 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124. 
See also, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
2Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 426. 
3see "Deontological, Not Teleological," under the 
section "The Christian View of Ethics." 
97. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 24. 
5Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 131. 
6Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
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they do not mean greater results but the higher rule," 1 
which is based on the pyramid of values that God has 
established. 2 In other words, the basis for their action 
is not future consequences but present commands. 3 Thus, 
ethical hierarchicalism is a duty-centered procedure, which 
holds that the Christian's obligation is to follow the 
divinely-established moral duties, and to comply with the 
hierarchy of values in unavoidable conflicts. 4 
In connection with this duty-centered strategy, it 
should be noted that Geisler periodically underscores the 
importance of the concept of obedience to God's command. 
Geisler says: "It is always right to obey His commands. 115 
He asserts that any "divine command is one which one ought 
to obey. 116 Thus, he concludes that "whatever God commands 
his children to do--whether to love their neighbors or off er 
sacrifices--demands moral obedience. 117 It is the 
Christian's moral responsibility to obey God's commands. 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 127. 
2Ibid., 124; Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 94. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 127. 
4see, ibid., 124, 127; Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 94, 97. 
5Norman L. Geisler, "God, Evil and Dispensations," 
in Walvoord: A Tribute, ed. Donald K. Campbell (Chicago, IL: 
Moody Press, 1982), 104. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
7Ibid. 
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concepts Based on Bible Narratives 
Although he acknowledges that "what people actually 
do is not the basis for what they ought to do, 111 and "that 
the Bible records things that it does not approve, 112 
Geisler nevertheless places great value on concepts that he 
derives from several scriptural accounts. Throughout his 
works on ethical method and ethical issues, Geisler refers 
to many Bible stories. 3 He uses these cases to establish 
primarily two notions that are vital to hierarchical ethics, 
namely, the existence of genuine ethical conflicts, and the 
prioritizing of values so as to resolve the problem. 
1Ibid., 24. Geisler also states that "morality is 
not determined by what men do but by what they ought to do;" 
Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 12. Geisler notes 
that "the 'is/ought' fallacy holds that because people are 
doing it, therefore, they ought to do it;" "Ethical Aspects 
of Evangelism with Particular Reference to Patients," 23. 
This issue will be addressed in chapter 5. 
2Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 166. 
3see, for example, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 121-123; Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 77-
86; Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 84-
88, 90-91; Geisler, Christian Ethics; Options and Issues, 
117-122; Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417, 423; Norman L. Geisler, 
"Conflicting Absolutism," Bulletin of the Evangelical 
Philosophical Society 2 (1979): 6; Norman L. Geisler, "Any 
Chance for Morality? Part 2," The Standard, 15 February 
1973, 22. 
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The Existence of Moral Conflicts 
In order to prove that "unavoidable moral conflicts 
exist, 01 Geisler argues that "the Abraham and Isaac story 
(Gen. 22) contains a real moral conflict. 'Thou shalt not 
kill' is a divine moral command, and yet God commanded 
Abraham to kill his son, Isaac. 02 Besides this "classic 
example of a conflict of moral principles, 03 Geisler refers 
to the stories of Rahab's lie to save life, 4 Samson's 
"divinely approved suicide, 05 Jephthah's sacrifice of his 
daughter, 6 David's "'stealing' of the showbread, 07 
Daniel's disobedience of the government, 8 and others, as 
evidence of his theory that inevitable ethical dilemmas do 
exist. 9 Thus, Geisler concludes that there are many 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
84. 
2Ibid. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options 
and Issues, 117; Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to 
Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, 416. 
85. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 121. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 118. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 118. 
7Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 6. 
8Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
9see, for example, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 118-119; Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 84-87. These stories and the way in which Geisler 
has interpreted them will be appraised later in chapter 5. 
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"biblical examples of genuine, unavoidable moral 
conflicts. 111 
The Prioritizing of Moral Values 
To illustrate his theory that there is a certain 
hierarchy of values to be used to resolve moral conflicts, 
Geisler frequently refers to the issue of lying to save 
life. On the one hand, he recognizes that "deception and 
lying are repeatedly condemned in Scripture. 112 Yet, he 
alleges that, "the Bible indicates that there are occasions 
when intentionally falsifying (lying) is justifiable. 113 
Geisler posits that "there are numerous cases in 
Scripture where God (implicitly or explicitly) commended the 
faith of those involved in intentional deception in order to 
save lives. 114 In support of this, Geisler mentions 
Obadiah's "deceptive activity115 to save the lives of one 
hundred prophets of God, Elisha's deception of his would-be 
captors in order to save his own life, Rahab's act of 
"justifiable116 lying to save the spies, and the Hebrew 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
2Ibid., 122. 
3 Ibid. 
4Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. 
91. 
5Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 79. 
6Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
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midwives' "divinely approved lying"1 to the king in order 
to save the male babies. 2 Geisler comments that "since all 
things in the Old Testament are 'for us' (Rom. 15:4) and 
happened 'for our example' (I Cor. 10:11), it seems 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that these were God-
approved examples of how He wants us to behave in similar 
moral conflicts. 113 He deduces that "in the real conflict 
situations recorded in Scripture there is no condemnation of 
those who did the greater good. 114 
In addition to using biblical stories to establish 
the priority of "mercy over veracity, 115 Geisler employs 
this strategy to show that one should place "love for God 
over love for man, 116 and must "obey God over government. 117 
He concludes that "the Bible includes many examples of 
2Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. See also, Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 91; Geisler, Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues, 122; Geisler, The Christian 
Ethic of Love, 78-79; Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 122-123. These stories and the manner in which 
Geisler has interpreted them will be discussed later in 
chapter 5. 
3Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. 
4Ibid., 425. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 121. 
6see Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 77. 
7Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 121; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 90. 
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persons who were praised by God for following their highest 
duty in situations of conflict. 111 Based on his personal 
understanding of several Scripture stories, Geisler says 
that "in each case there was not only no divine condemnation 
for the moral law they did not keep. There was, rather, 
evident divine approval. 112 Thus, he maintains that ethical 
hierarchicalism teaches that "whenever we face a situation 
where there is a higher and a lower principle in unavoidable 
conflict, it's our obligation to do the higher. 113 
An Intention-Motive-Means Complex 
If, as Geisler maintains, ethical hierarchicalism is 
based on natural law and special revelation, it advocates an 
absolutist and duty-centered approach, and holds that Bible 
stories show that moral dilemmas exist and that one should 
obey the higher duty in these conflict situations, then the 
question naturally arises: What components are indispensable 
for any human endeavor to be considered morally correct? 
Over the years, as Geisler has been producing 
materials on ethical methodology, he has frequently 
considered this issue. While at first glance it might 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
2Ibid. 
3Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." In his earliest volume on ethics, 
Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 123, Geisler states that 
these biblical stories "illustrate the general hypothesis 
that lower principles (of whatever kind) ought to be 
'broken' when it is necessary to keep higher ones." 
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appear as though Geisler is contradictory in his thinking, 
careful investigation reveals much consistency in his view, 
even though there has been some clarification of concepts, 
different shifts in emphases at various points in time, a 
more precise defining of terminology, and a slight 
refinement of perspective. 
Crucial to ethical hierarchicalism is the belief 
that "the ethic complex must be thought of as a whole. 111 
As Geisler notes: "Good intentions alone are not sufficient 
to make an act morally right. 112 For example, Hitler may 
have intended to produce a better world by attempting the 
genocide of the Jews, but this would not have justified his 
actions. 3 By contrast, "an act as such apart from its 
motive or intention is not necessarily good. 114 For 
instance, those who give to the poor so as to receive human 
praise are not to be morally commended. 5 Thus Geisler 
1Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 4. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. From the context of this statement it 
appears that Geisler basically equates "motive" with 
"intention." This can be seen from the fact that he 
repeatedly refers to the "intention-act complex," with no 
other reference to "motive;" see ibid. This can also be 
seen from the way he discusses "intentions" and "acts" 
throughout the rest of his works until 1990, when he 
coauthored The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our 
Time, with J. P. Moreland. In this volume (pp. 67-68) 
Geisler speaks of a tripartite intention-motive-means 
complex, which will be discussed later in this sub-section. 
5Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 4. 
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states: "To do something with a bad motive is bad. However, 
to do something with a good motive does not automatically 
make it good."1 
At times Geisler has stressed the importance of 
one's "intention," or "motive" to the virtual exclusion of 
the action involved. He asserts: "Jesus taught morality is 
a matter of intent. 112 Also, he notes that "it is really 
the component of intent that defines the essence of a moral 
act. 113 By way of illustration, Geisler states that sex 
outside of marriage is the "greatest good," and therefore 
morally right, if that were the only thing one could do in 
order to save a life. 4 Then too, he says: "Masturbation is 
not necessarily immoral. In fact, when the motive is not 
lust but self-control, masturbation can be a moral act. 115 
Geisler himself recognizes that "much of the discussion on 
these issues hinges around the question of whether an act of 
1Geisler, "Ethical Aspects of Evangelism with 
Particular Reference to Patients," 41. 
2Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 
223. As support for this concept, Geisler notes Matthew 5: 
22 I 28 • 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 75. In The Christian Ethic of 
Love (p. 95), Geisler goes so far as to say that "God judges 
an act to be intrinsically good if it was intended to be in 
compliance with His commands;" (emphasis added). 
4Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 208. 
5Ibid., 200. Geisler holds that "if it is used as a 
limited, temporary program of self-control to avoid lust 
before marriage," then masturbation "can be done to the 
glory of God;" ibid. 
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itself is intrinsically good or evil. 111 He concludes that 
there is no such thing. 2 
Yet, Geisler repeatedly emphasizes the fact that 
"the end never justifies the means. 113 For instance, forced 
infanticide of all children known to be carriers of genetic 
"impurities" is not justified by the goal of a purified 
genetic stock. 4 "That is to say, an act is not 
automatically good simply because it has a good goal. The 
means to achieve it must be judged good by some objective 
standard of good. 115 Only good methods are to be used for 
good ends. 6 In other words, "something is not good because 
the intentions underlying it are good; it is good only if 
the actions are also good," 7 i.e., if "the intentions are 
in accord with what is intrinsically right (namely, a law or 
divine command). 118 Two examples illustrate this point. In 
connection with taking one's own life, Geisler posits: 
1Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 4. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
109. See also, Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 4. 
3see, for example, Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 37, 75, 162, 178, 188, 191; Geisler, 
Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 131. 
13. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 37. 
5Ibid., 75. 
6Ibid., 191. 
7Ibid., 75. 
8Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
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"Whatever the motive, suicide is wrong because God alone is 
sovereign over human life, and he has commanded us to 
respect his authority over us and his image within us. 111 
Similarly, in relation to abortion, Geisler says: "Killing 
the unborn is murder, whether it is done maliciously or with 
good motives, for good motives do not justify murder. 112 
The resolution to these seemingly contradictory 
concepts lay in other statements by Geisler that qualify and 
restrict what on the surface sounds like assertions in favor 
of an unequivocal position on intrinsically right actions. 
Geisler explains: 
Actions always associated with evil (for example, rape, 
killing one's children) are evil because the motive was 
always evil, not because the act as such was evil. If 
actions were evil apart from human intentions, then 
animals or imbeciles who performed the same actions 
would also be morally culpable. It is not an action as 
such which is evil but an intention-action complex. 3 
In other words, the previously mentioned examples of 
infanticide, suicide, and abortion are morally wrong, not 
because they are intrinsically evil, but because they are 
1Norman L. Geisler, "Sanctity of Human Life," in 
Applying the Scriptures, Papers from ICBI Summit III, ed., 
Kenneth s. Kantzer (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1987), 147. Incidentally, though Geisler sometimes 
refers to self-sacrificial acts as suicide (see, for 
example, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 239-240), 
he does admit that strictly speaking such acts are not 
suicide, but rather evidence of the greatest love; ibid., 
148-149; Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 103. 
2Geisler, "Sanctity of Human Life," 149. This is 
because "the end does not justify an evil means;" ibid. 
3Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
109-110. 
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always associated with evil. As Geisler notes: "Simply 
because a given action is usually associated with evil does 
not mean that the same action performed for a different 
purpose (that is, in obedience to a higher moral law) cannot 
sometimes be morally good. 111 Thus, in hierarchicalism, the 
killing of innocent children would be morally acceptable, if 
there were no way to avoid destroying them in a just war 
against an evil aggressor. 2 Also, if a soldier were to 
throw himself on a hand grenade in order to save his 
friends, this would be a morally justifiable "sacrificial 
suicide. 113 Then too, if a woman's life were threatened by 
her fetus, Geisler holds that it would be morally right to 
terminate the pregnancy. 4 Based on this reasoning, Geisler 
cautions that "Christians should be very careful in calling 
the actions of another person evil simply because those 
actions are often (even usually) associated with evil. 115 
In short, ethical hierarchicalism contends that "mere human 
1Ibid., 109. 
2see, for example, Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 225-237. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 239-240. 
For Geisler, the morally unacceptable form of suicide is a 
"selfish suicide;" ibid., 236. 
4Geisler, "Sanctity of Human Life," 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 152. 
prefers not to call this an abortion, since 
basically killing in self-defense; ibid. 
150; Geisler, 
However, Geisler 
he sees it as 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
111. 
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actions as such are not intrinsically good or evil. 111 It 
all depends "on the purpose for which they are performed. 112 
In his attempt to further clarify the issue 
concerning the nature of human actions, Geisler points out 
that hierarchicalism "does not proclaim that the evil is a 
good thing to do, but rather that the highest obligation in 
the conflict is the good thing to do. 113 He elaborates: 
For example, in falsifying to save a life, it is not the 
falsehood that is good (a lie as such is always wrong), 
but it is the act of mercy to save a life that is good--
despite the fact that intentional falsification was 
necessary to accomplish this good. In other words, it 
is unfortunately true that what is called "evil" 
sometimes accompanies the performance of good acts. 4 
In these cases God does not consider a man culpable for 
the concomitant "evil" in view of the performance of the 
greater good.s 
Geisler admits that, in this respect, ethical 
hierarchicalism "is similar to the principle of double 
effect, which states that when two results--a good result 
and an evil result--emerge from one act, the individual is 
held responsible only for the good one he intended and not 
1Ibid., 109. see also, Geisler, "Conflicting 
Absolutism," 4. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
109. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 126. 
4Ibid. See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 96. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
96. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 127. 
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for the evil one which necessarily resulted from the good 
intention. 111 
This principle of double effect illuminates a 
further refinement of the intention-action complex of 
ethical hierarchicalism described above. While in virtually 
all of his works it appears that Geisler uses the terms 
"intention" and "motive" practically interchangeably, in The 
Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of our Time Geisler 
clearly separates these two concepts. He now explains that, 
in addition to intentions and actions (or means), motives 
are pertinent in evaluating morality. 2 These three terms 
are defined as follows: (a) Motive: "An inducement that 
stimulates a person to perform an act; 113 (b) Intention: 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 126-
127. see also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 96-97. In the book he coauthored with Moreland, ~ 
Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time, 67, Geisler 
explains that this principle of double effect states that 
"when an action has good and bad consequences, then the 
action may be performed under the following circumstances: 
1. The act is good or at least indifferent regarding the 
end that one directly intends. 
2. The good and evil effects follow immediately from the 
act; that is, the good effect is not obtained by means 
of the evil effect. 
3. One only intends the good effect but merely tolerates 
the bad effect, even if that bad effect was foreseen 
prior to the act. 
4. There is a proportion between the good and bad effects; 
that is, the good must be at least equal to the bad." 
2Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 68. 
3 Ibid., 161. 
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"What one intends to bring about; 111 and, (c) Means-to-End: 
"The way an act is carried out. 112 In brief, "a motive is 
why one acts, an intent is what one is intending to do, and 
a means is how one acts, that is, the steps one takes to 
accomplish one's intent. 113 Geisler therefore concludes 
that, "motives, intents, and means to ends are relevant in 
assessing the moral worth of an action. 114 
None of this, however, should be construed to imply 
that actions in and of themselves can be considered 
intrinsically right or wrong. Geisler maintains that 
specific actions, apart from the motive or intention of the 
one performing them, cannot be identified as evil. 5 He 
declares that ethical hierarchicalism rigorously maintains 
that an act "changes its moral value (from evil to good) 
when used for a good purpose or in a good context. 116 
In summarizing Geisler's perspective concerning what 
constitutes morally acceptable human undertakings, the 
following may be said. While his emphasis has changed over 
time, he has consistently held that one's motives or 
113. 
1Ibid., 160. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., 68. 
4Ibid. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
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intentions are the indispensable elements of morality. 
Specific actions in and of themselves are not intrinsically 
right or wrong. As long as one has proper motives and 
intentions, and follows one's highest obligation, the means 
utilized are then considered morally good. In brief then, 
as noted previously, "mere human actions as such are not 
intrinsically good or evil; 111 it all depends on "the motive 
or purpose of the one performing them. 112 
In concluding this section concerning the basic 
elements of ethical hierarchicalism, the following should be 
noted. Geisler holds that his ethical approach is based on 
intuitively-known natural law and biblical revelation, it 
advocates a moderated absolutist and duty-centered approach 
of obedience to God's commands, it posits that Scripture 
stories prove both that real moral dilemmas exist and that 
one ought to follow the higher obligation in such conflict 
situations, and it holds that, while no actions are 
intrinsically right or wrong, correct motives and intentions 
must be used in order for human endeavors to be considered 
moral. Now that the essential aspects of hierarchicalism 
have been outlined, the concept of a hierarchy of values 
will be considered. 
1Ibid., 109. 
2Ibid., 113. 
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A Hierarchy of Values 
Geisler contends that "historically, there have been 
many examples of hierarchically ordered values, 111 most of 
them springing from the Nee-Platonic fountainhead, 
Plotinus. 2 The basic premise common to all hierarchicalism 
is that things are ordered on a scale of good, ranging from 
least good to most good. 3 
This type of hierarchy of virtue, Geisler finds in 
the writings of other Christian theologians. For example, 
according to Geisler, Augustine held "there is a hierarchy 
of sins, some being worse than others. Since Augustine's 
ethic is centered in love, he sees an ordered priority in 
the things we are to love: 114 God, then humans, then 
things. 5 Moreover, Geisler says Augustine believed that 
when moral duties conflict "the believer is exempt from his 
duty to the lower by virtue of his obedience to the higher. 
In this sense, Augustine is a precursor to the graded 
absolutist [or hierarchicalist]. 116 Providing another 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 115. 
2Ibid. Geisler refers to "the neo-plotinian 
fountainhead," but apparently means "the nee-platonic 
fountainhead;" see Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of 
Philosophy, 9 vols. (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1985), 1:463-
475. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 115. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 114. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. 
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historical source for hierarchicalism, Geisler notes that 
Charles Hodge, the twentieth-century systematic theologian 
whose writings preceded his own by about two decades, also 
promoted a similar view of hierarchical ethics. 1 
In addition to this historical background, Geisler 
posits that the theory of a hierarchy of values is firmly 
founded on Scripture. Before addressing this issue, 
however, it will be instructive to briefly consider how 
Geisler defines and describes what a "moral conflict" is, 
and how he relates to the question of the "real world" in 
which human decisions need to be made. 
Definition of Moral Conflicts 
Throughout virtually all of his works on ethics 
Geisler does not take time to meticulously define the 
concept of conflicting moral obligations. This is probably 
due to the fact that he spends so much effort on dealing 
with a variety of examples of what he considers to be 
ethical dilemmas. Hence, by simply reading through his 
materials one can come to an understanding of how he 
understands this concept. However, in a few places Geisler 
does provide specific statements that assist in revealing 
his basic definition of moral conflicts. 
In discussing conflicting moral duties, Geisler 
asks: "What should one do when two or more moral principles 
1Ibid., 114-116. 
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come into unavoidable conflict? 111 In other words, for 
Geisler, a moral conflict is when at least "two commands 
come into direct and unavoidable conflict and both cannot be 
performed. 112 Illustrating this point, Geisler mentions the 
problem of lying to save life: "If one does not lie, then he 
does not do all he can to protect the innocent life. And if 
he does lie, then he has not kept the command to be truthful 
at all times. 113 Geisler is aware of the fact that there 
are some people who disagree with him on this issue because 
they believe that their only obligation is to tell the 
truth, while the other duty is the responsibility of the 
person threatening to do the killing. 4 Consequently, 
Geisler responds: "Is there not also a duty upon me to save 
innocent lives (that is, to show mercy)?" 5 The real 
conflict here is between truth-telling and mercy-showing. 6 
Then he concludes: "In other words, the choice is really 
between an act of commission and one of omission. And would 
1Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 411. See also, Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 67; Geisler, Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues, 97. 
2Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 6. 
3Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 411. 
56. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
5Ibid., 56-57. 
6Ibid., 57. 
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not a sin of omission be just as much a sin as a sin of 
co:mmission? 111 
Therefore, according to Geisler, hierarchical ethics 
holds that a moral conflict can be defined as a time when 
one is confronted with two moral obligations, only one of 
which can be performed. Moreover, this type of situation 
can also arise when one is faced with a conflict between an 
act of commission and one of omission. 
The Ideal Versus the Real World 
In his critique of non-conflicting absolutism, 
Geisler observes that; "while it is no doubt true that moral 
conflicts are not God's ideal, it is also a fact that this 
is not an ideal world. It is a real and fallen world. 112 
He adds: "There are no moral conflicts in God, 113 for "there 
is perfect harmony in heaven between the Lover, the Beloved 
Son, and the Spirit of Love. 114 But, "when love comes to 
earth some of these duties conflict. Responsibilities 
overlap and we are torn between two absolute co:mmands. 115 
1Ibid. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 96. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
64-65. 
3Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical 
Hierarchicalism," 84. 
4Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 282. 
5Ibid. As can be seen from this statement, Geisler 
believes that "the very law itself is an expression of His 
love;" Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 44. 
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Illustrating his point from the world of nature, Geisler 
says: "It's God's attributes shining through the spectrum of 
this finite world that give us a whole spray of colors from 
top to bottom that overlap. 111 And it is here, in the 
fallen finite world, that the conflicts occur. 2 
Geisler provides various examples to substantiate 
his view. For instance, "ideally God designed one husband 
for one wife, but because this is a fallen world, He allowed 
polygamy on a limited basis for a certain time. 113 Also, 
while war is undesirable, it is nevertheless unavoidable 
because of the fallen world in which force will always be 
necessary to stop sinful people. 4 Force is also used by 
police, although ideally these killings should not be 
necessary. 5 "But this is not an ideal world; it is an evil 
world. 116 Thus, while Geisler believes that "there are no 
conflicts in God's essence nor did he design his laws to 
1Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
3Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 410. 
4J. Yutaka Amano, and Norman L. Geisler, The 
Infiltration of the New Age (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House 
Publishers, Inc., 1989), 138. 
5Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 134. 
6Ibid. 
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conflict, 111 he maintains that "this ideal is not fully 
realized in this fallen world. 112 In brief then, "ideally, 
moral duties do not conflict, but this is not an ideal 
world. In the real world there are moral tragedies. 113 
Biblical support for a Scale of Values 
One of the major innovations of Geisler's ethical 
hierarchicalism is the hypothesis that there is a scale of 
values arising from the biblical text itself. 4 Geisler 
suggests that whenever moral duties come into conflict, 
there is at least one principle that indicates which is the 
highest obligation to follow. 5 Again illustrating by means 
of a prism, but this time in a somewhat different manner, 
Geisler states: "The pyramid of principles emerges as the 
light of God's love passes through the prism of human 
experience thereby casting a spectrum or order of God's 
laws. 116 In brief, "God has set up the hierarchy in His 
1Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 18. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 153. 
4see, for example, Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 81-84; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options 
and Issues, 116-117; Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," 223, 227. 
5Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 76. 
6Ibid. In his earlier works, Geisler promoted a 
seven-part scale: (a) Love for God versus love for man; (b) 
Life-saving versus truth-telling; (c) Love for persons 
versus love for things; (d) Love for many persons versus 
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Word. 111 The biblical evidence that Geisler cites in 
support of this scale of values will now be outlined. 
Weightier Matters of the Law 
Hierarchicalism posits that not all moral laws are 
of equal weight. For instance, "Jesus spoke of the 
'weightier' matters of the law (Matt. 23:23) and of the 
'least' (Matt. 5:19) and the 'greatest' commandment (Matt. 
22:36). 112 Furthermore, the Bible speaks of the "greatest" 
virtue (1 Cor. 13:13), and also of "greater" acts of a given 
virtue (John 15:13). 3 By way of example, Geisler notes: 
"Justice and mercy have greater weight on the scale of God's 
love for few persons; (e) Love for the actual versus love 
for the potential; (f) Potential persons versus actual 
persons; and (g) Complete persons versus incomplete persons; 
Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 76-87. See also, 
Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 115-121, where he 
has a slightly different order, and where (p. 120) he has 
the concept that "personal acts which promote personhood are 
better than those which do not," in place of "life-saving 
versus truth-telling." Because Geisler has not promoted the 
above seven-part scale since 1973, and since he now uses a 
three-part strategy for making decisions in conflicting 
conditions, this seven-part scale will not be discussed 
further. The three-part scheme will be considered later in 
this chapter under "Criteria for Conflict Decision-Making." 
1Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 116. 
See also, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 82; 
Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A 
Christian Perspective, 424; Geisler, and Brooks, When 
Skeptics Ask, 283; Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," 223; Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 7. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 116. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
82. 
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values than does tithing, although the law required both 
(Matt. 23:23). 111 Also, Geisler states that "helping a 
human being in need was of more importance to Jesus than 
'profaning the sabbath' (Matt. 12:5). 112 Then too, Geisler 
says that "Jesus most emphatically taught that it is greater 
to love God than man. It is the 'first' and the 'great' 
commandment as opposed to the 'second' (Matt. 22:38, 39). 113 
Thus, ethical hierarchicalism holds that "several lines of 
evidence indicate that not all moral matters are weighed 
equally by God. 114 
The Inequality of Sins 
Approaching this idea of a scale of values from a 
different vantage point, Geisler asserts that "all sins are 
sin, but not all sins are equally sinful. 115 The belief 
that "all sins aren't equa1116 is primarily based on the 
idea that people "will be judged according to the degree of 
evil they have performed. 117 For example, Geisler remarks 
that the following statement of Jesus shows that there are 
1Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 88. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., 89. 
4Ibid. 
5 Ibid. I 91. 
6Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
7Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 90-91. 
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at least three levels of sins with their corresponding 
judgments: 1 "'Everyone who is angry with his brother shall 
be liable to the judgment; whoever insults his brother shall 
be liable to the council, and whoever says, "You fool!" 
shall be liable to the "hell of fire"' (Matt. 5:22). 112 
Another example of this gradation of sin is found in the 
text where "Jesus declared to Pilate, 'he who delivered me 
to you has the greatest sin' (John 19:11). 113 Geisler adds: 
"The fact that some Christian sins call for excommunication 
{l Cor. 5) and others for death {l Cor. 11:30) also supports 
the general biblical pattern that all sins are not equal in 
weight. In fact, there is one sin so great as to be 
unforgivable (Mark 3:29). 114 
Graded Levels of Biblical Commands 
Based on the above evidence that not all sins are 
equal, 5 and that there are "higher and lower moral laws, 116 
Geisler observes: "The real question, then, is this: Are the 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 116. 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 91. 
3Ibid. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 116. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
82-83; Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 7; Geisler, "The 
Origins and Implications of the Greater Good Ethic." 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
6Ibid. 
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moral laws hierarchically graded? 111 He answers in the 
affirmative, and suggests three reasons in support of a 
gradation of laws. 
First, Geisler posits that "all ethical obligations 
are moral laws. 112 He explains that Christians have an 
ethical obligation to obey civil laws, not simply as a civil 
duty, but rather as a moral duty, "since such obedience is 
enjoined by the moral law Giver (God) for 'conscience's 
sake' (Rom. 13:5). 113 Yet, these "moral laws" are clearly 
lower on the scale than other moral obligations, as seen 
from the many cases in Scripture where people rightly 
disobeyed the government in view of a higher moral law. 4 
Second, even the commands to "perform ceremonial 
duties are divine commands and, as such, involve a moral 
duty. 115 In other words, "by its very nature, a divine 
command is one which one ought to obey; it is an ethical 
3Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
83. 
4see Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
119, 121. 
5Ibid., 117. Geisler does admit though, that "not 
every command in the Bible is absolute. That is, not all 
moral injunctions are for all men and for all times;" 
Geisler, "Any Chance for Morality? Part 2, 11 20. For 
example, he notes that the ceremonial laws concerning animal 
sacrifices "are clearly not binding on Christians today;" 
ibid. This apparent discrepancy of view will be addressed 
later in chapter 5. 
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responsibility. 111 Yet, the very fact that "Jesus said that 
God desired mercy more than animal sacrifices, 112 shows a 
scale of laws. In connection with the above two points, 
Geisler asserts that "the distinctions between civil, 
ceremonial, and moral laws are not rigid (if maintainable at 
all). 113 This is so because, "whatever God commands his 
children to do--whether to love their neighbors or off er 
sacrifices--demands moral obedience. 114 
And third, even for those who believe that moral law 
is distinct from civil and ceremonial regulations, Geisler 
maintains that there are times when two of these moral laws 
clearly conflict. 5 As an example of this, Geisler refers 
to the story of the Hebrew midwives who lied to save life. 6 
Thus, once again, a scale of values can be seen. From the 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 123. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
84; Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A 
Christian Perspective, 416. Geisler contends that "the 
whole division of commands into civil, ceremonial, and moral 
is postbiblical, questionable, and probably of late 
Christian origin (possibly the thirteenth century);" 
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 92. Geisler 
himself recognizes, however, that not all laws are binding 
in a universal sense. He says that the ceremonial and civil 
laws "are binding in a more limited sense;" Geisler, and 
Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian 
Perspective, 410. This issue will be examined in chapter 5. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., 117-122. 
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three reasons given here, Geisler therefore deduces, "that 
there are graded levels of moral commands in Scripture. 111 
Based on this view of "greater and lesser goods, 112 
and "levels of evil, 113 Geisler draws these'conclusions: 
First, it is evident that there are degrees of good and 
evil. Some acts are better and some are worse than 
others. Good and evil are ranked in a pyramid with the 
best at the top and the worst on the bottom and varying 
degrees of good and evil in between. Second, some 
single moral acts are more vicious than numerous other 
acts of evil. For example, one brutal act of murder can 
be more evil than a hundred little lies. Third, 
whenever there is a conflict among good alternatives or 
between good and evil, then the morally right course of 
action is always the greatest good or the most loving 
thing to do. 4 
In brief then, it should be noted that ethical 
hierarchicalism maintains that all biblical moral laws are 
hierarchically graded. Furthermore, hierarchical ethics 
emphasizes that, in view of the relative values of different 
moral acts, it is incumbent upon the Christian to carefully 
assess the alternatives for appropriate action, even though 
this is not always easy to do. 5 This appraisal of options 
should, however, not be established on a human basis, for 
ethical hierarchicalism holds that "the Christian does not 
1Ibid., 117. 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 88. 
3Ibid., 91. 
4Ibid., 92. 
5Ibid. 
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decide for himself what the ethical priorities are. 01 
Rather, "each believer must be informed by Scripture of the 
divine scale of values and make his ethical decisions 
accordingly. 112 
Bo Guilt for Doinq the unavoidable 
One of the most frequently recurring convictions of 
Geisler is that a person is not held morally accountable for 
doing what is unavoidable when faced with a genuine moral 
conflict. 3 In critiquing conflicting absolutism, he notes 
that this approach maintains that in conflict situations, 
"one should do the lesser evil, for which he is guilty. 04 
By contrast, in hierarchicalism "the focus is on doing the 
greatest good, and you can't be guilty for doing good. In 
the former, man is condemned for doing what was unavoidable; 
but here man is praised for doing his best. 115 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124. 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 93. 
3see, for example, ibid., 75; Geisler, Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues, 119-120; Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 87-89; Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, 136; Geisler, and Brooks, When 
Skeptics Ask, 286; Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to 
Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, 424-425; Geisler, and 
Amano, The Reincarnation Sensation, 117; Geisler, "Biblical 
Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 224-225; Geisler, "In 
Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 86-87; Geisler, "Conflicting 
Absolutism," 3; Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 6-7; Geisler, 
"The Origins and Implications of the Greater Good Ethic." 
4Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 286. 
5 Ibid. 
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Geisler maintains that there are a number of factors 
that indicate the "truth of this point. 111 First, he states 
that "logic dictates that a just God will not hold a person 
responsible for doing what is actually impossible. 112 In 
other words, "it does not seem consistent with the nature of 
the God of Scripture to set up absolute but unavoidable 
conflicting commands and then impute individual guilt to men 
because they had to break them, even though they did their 
moral best. 113 Thus, Geisler concludes that "the tragic 
moral act is guiltless, 114 for "God does not blame a man for 
what he cannot avoid. 115 
Second, a person "is not morally culpable if he 
fails to keep an obligation he could not possibly keep 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
2Ibid., 119-120. 
3Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 
225. In connection with the idea that it is God who set up 
unavoidable moral conflicts, it should be noted that Geisler 
holds that "only a moral world where evil actually occurs is 
one where the greatest moral good is achievable. For the 
highest moral perfection is dependent on the presence of 
evil obstacles;" Norman L. Geisler, Philosophy of Religion 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1974), 373-
374. When challenged on this (see John V. Dahms, "How 
Reliable Is Logic?" Journal of the Evangelical Theological 
Society 21 [December 1974): 372), Geisler, using somewhat 
circular reasoning, stated: "I believe this evil world to be 
the best way God can produce the best world achievable, 
granted the sinfulness of man;" Norman L. Geisler, "Avoid 
All Contradictions: A Surrejoinder to John Dahms," Journal 
of the Evangelical Theological Society 22 (June 1979): 159. 
4Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 3. 
5Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 6. 
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without breaking a higher obligation. 111 By way of 
illustration, Geisler notes that a man is not morally 
blameworthy for breaking a promise to meet his wife for 
dinner at a specific time if he has been delayed by helping 
to save a life. 2 In fact, "the praiseworthy and exemplary 
conduct of keeping the higher obligation absolves one of any 
responsibility to the lower duty. 113 According to Geisler, 
"God simply intervenes in love and exempts a man from the 
demands of a command which cannot be kept without breaking a 
higher command. 114 For Geisler, this is the "way of escape" 
promised in the Bible, 5 so that one can "by the grace of 
God always avoid sinning. 116 In brief, "there is always a 
way out of real conflicts without sinning (1 Cor 10:13). 
The way out is through keeping the higher command. 117 
Third, Geisler posits that there are many examples 
in the Bible "of persons who were praised by God for 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 87. 
5Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 424. Here, Geisler makes reference 
to 1 Corinthians 10:13, as he interprets this verse. 
6Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 424. 
7Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 6-7. 
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following their highest duty in situations of conflict. 111 
He asserts that Abraham was rewarded and "commended of God 
for his willingness to sacrifice (kill) his son Isaac. 112 
Likewise, Daniel and his three companions "received divine 
approval for their disobedience of human government. 113 
Similarly, "the Hebrew midwives who lied and disobeyed the 
king were blessed by God and given families as a reward." 4 
Also, "David and his men who broke into the temple and stole 
the consecrated bread were declared guiltless by Christ. 115 
In addition to these examples from the lives of 
Bible characters, Geisler notes: "Neither does the Scripture 
hold guilty those who kill in self-defense (Exod. 22:2). 116 
Referring to the Scripture stories, Geisler concludes that 
"in each case there was not only no divine condemnation for 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
88; Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A 
Christian Perspective, 425. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
3 Ibid. 
4Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 425. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
6Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 425. This passage, together with 
the above examples, will be considered later in chapter 5. 
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the moral law they did not keep. There was, rather, evident 
divine approva1. 111 
Ho Repentance for Xqnorinq Lower Laws 
Closely allied to the concept that "there is no 
guilt for what is unavoidable, 112 because "God will not hold 
a man guilty for doing his best, 113 is the belief that a 
person does not need to repent for not keeping lower laws. 
This view is apparently based on at least the following two 
factors. 
First, Geisler claims that, "technically speaking 
the lower command is not really broken when the higher 
command is followed; it is merely not kept in favor of 
keeping the higher obligation. 114 Since, "the overriding 
duty to do the greater value simply renders it unnecessary 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
See also, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 136; 
Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 227. 
Earlier, in his 1981 volume, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 88, Geisler phrased the above concept 
slightly differently, stating that "they 'broke' (or better, 
did not follow)" the moral law. The word "broke" is no 
longer utilized in this context in his more recent works 
that discuss ethical hierarchicalism. 
2Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 75. 
4Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 87. 
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for us to perform the demands of the lesser command,"1 
there is no guilt or personal culpability involved. 2 
Second, ethical hierarchicalism declares that 
because a person is considered innocent of having "broken" 
any law, there is obviously no need for repentance. 3 
Geisler explains: "It is true that unavoidable moral 
conflicts often involve unpleasant activities. 114 For 
instance, killing in self-defense may be "necessary. 115 
However, Geisler adds, "while one may surely regret what is 
necessary to do in order to obey the higher command, surely 
he need not repent of it. Keeping the higher law is not an 
evil; it is the greatest good. 116 
Criteria for conflict Decision-Makinq 
According to ethical hierarchicalism, there are 
biblical precedents for every moral conflict that anyone 
3Ibid; Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to 
Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, 425. 
4Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 425. 
5Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 136. 
6Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 425. See also, Geisler, 
"Conflicting Absolutism," 3. In Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 136, Geisler similarly emphasized the word regret in 
this context. But here in this book he stated: "He need not 
repent," thus highlighting this term also. 
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will face. 1 Geisler states that "the basic priority of 
values is as follows: (1) God comes before persons (Matt. 
10:37); (2) one's family comes before others (I Tim. 5:8); 
(3) persons come before things (Mark 8:36)."2 While 
Geisler has made some adjustments to his basic list over 
time, 3 he has quite consistently advocated the following 
three concepts as criteria for decision-making in conflict 
situations. 
Love for God over Love for Man 
Geisler maintains that "the most obvious and basic 
of all divisions or levels of duty is between the command to 
love God and the command to love one's neighbor. The former 
always take precedence over the latter. 114 This idea is 
supported by the clear statements of Jesus that love to God 
must be "first" and "greatest. 115 Geisler notes that "one 
implication of this is that if parents teach a child to hate 
God, the child must disobey the parents in order to obey 
1Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 427. 
2Ibid. 
3see, for example, the longer and slightly different 
lists in Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 76-87, and 
Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 115-121. These 
lists are footnoted above under "Biblical Support for a 
Scale of Values." 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
5Ibid., 121. 
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God. 111 Furthermore, Geisler finds grounds for this view in 
the example of Abraham, whose "love for God took precedence 
over his love for his son. 112 Thus, hierarchicalism affirms 
that, "whenever there is a conflict between divine and human 
values, 'we must obey God rather than men. "' 3 
Obey God over Government 
Rather unequivocally, Geisler claims that "God 
ordained human government and commands the Christian to 
'submit' to and 'obey' those in authority, even if they are 
evil men (Rom. 13:1-2; Titus 3:1). 114 Hence, "it is clear 
that Christians are commanded of God to obey government. 115 
However, Geisler posits that there are several 
biblical instances in which God approved of disobedience to 
rulers. For example, Daniel prayed to God when forbidden to 
do so by a king. His three Hebrew companions refused to 
worship an idol when required by civil law. The apostles 
continued to proclaim the gospel even when the authorities 
outlawed this. And, the Hebrew midwives disobeyed the king 
1Ibid. 
2Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 287. See 
also, Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 77; Geisler, 
"Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 227. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 117. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 121. 
5Ibid. 
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when he ordered them to murder innocent children. 1 These 
cases show that "the moral obligation to pray, worship God, 
preach the gospel, and so forth, is a higher duty than the 
one to obey the government. 112 In a nutshell, "love for God 
always outweighs our duty to the government. 113 
Mercy over Veracity 
Perceptively, Geisler notes that not all conflicts 
involve a choice between loving God and loving people. 4 He 
states: "Sometimes the choice is among two spheres in which 
human love operates. For example, should one lie to save a 
life? 115 Noting some clear scriptural texts, Geisler says: 
"There is no question that the Bible commands Christians to 
not 'give false testimony' (Exod. 20:16). 116 He concedes 
that "deception and lying are repeatedly condemned in 
Scripture. 117 However, he insists that "the Bible indicates 
that there are occasions when lying is justifiable. 118 
3Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 287. see 
also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 90-
91; Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 227. 
91. 
4Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 79. 
5Ibid. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 121. 
7 Ibid., 122. 
8Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
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This assertion of Geisler is based on certain Bible 
narratives. For instance, Rahab intentionally deceived in 
order to save the lives of the Israelite spies and she "was 
immortalized in the spiritual 'hall of fame' (Heb. 11)."1 
Geisler says that "it appears that her lie was actually an 
expression of her faith in God. 112 And, "it seems that God 
blessed her because of it, not in spite of it. 113 
A second example is the story of the Hebrew midwives 
who lied to the king to cover up their disobedience to his 
command to kill the baby boys at birth. 4 Based on the text 
which states that, "because the midwives feared God he gave 
them families, 115 Geisler says that this is "an even clearer 
case of divinely approved lying to save a life. 116 Thus, he 
proposes: "In view of the biblical examples one is forced to 
conclude that lying to save life is justifiable. 117 
In brief then, Geisler maintains that in conflict 
situations, one must love God more than people, obey God 
rather than the government, and place mercy over veracity. 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 79. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
4Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 79. 
5Geisler was here referring to the Revised Standard 
Version's rendering of Exodus 1:21. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
7Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 78. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
As a method of dealing with moral issues, ethical 
hierarchicalism was first proposed by Norman Geisler in 
1971. He personally formulated this strategy in order to 
resolve the conflicts of moral obligations that he perceived 
both in the real world as well as in the Scriptures. Though 
he has used several terms to designate this approach, his 
basic ethical methodology has not undergone any serious 
change over the years. 
Foundational to Geisler's view of hierarchicalism is 
his understanding of both the nature of theistic morality in 
general, and of Christian ethics in particular. He posits 
that morality is defined by four essential features: an 
objective standard, an absolute basis, a normative approach, 
and a divine derivation. Christian ethics, while building 
on this foundation, is characterized as a prescriptive, 
absolute, deontological approach, with the Bible as its 
basis, God's character as its source, the life of Christ as 
its best manifestation, and the love of Christ as its 
activating force. 
The description and analysis that Geisler has done 
of the ethical strategies of antinomianism, generalism, 
situationism, non-conflicting absolutism, and conflicting 
absolutism serve to highlight some of the aspects that 
Geisler feels are imperative for a valid and useful 
Christian ethical method. For Geisler the positive elements 
167 
from these approaches include, an emphasis on love and the 
value of persons, a stress on personal relations and 
individual responsibility, an appreciation of differing 
circumstances, a recognition of an emotive element, an 
accent on the human perspective of ethics, an acknowledgment 
of the need to define norms more precisely, an ambition to 
reconcile conflicting moral rules, a commitment to finding 
ways to obey moral laws, a perspective on the nature of 
grace, and a belief in the providence of God. 
According to Geisler, ethical hierarchicalism has 
certain essential elements. First, the two sources of 
intuitively-known natural law and biblical revelation are 
said to reveal both what is morally right as well as what 
the hierarchy of values consists of. Second, though rightly 
considered a qualified absolutism, hierarchicalism maintains 
that moral laws are absolute in their source, absolute in 
their sphere when they do not conflict, and absolute in 
their sequence of priority. Third, it is a duty-centered 
approach of obedience to God's commands, which calls for 
faithfulness to the rules irrespective of results, as well 
as compliance with the hierarchy of norms in conflicting 
situations. Fourth, it posits that Scripture stories reveal 
that genuine moral conflicts do exist, and that Bible 
characters resolved these problems by means of a priority of 
moral values. And fifth, it asserts that, since no human 
actions as such are intrinsically right or wrong, morality 
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is to be gauged by the motives and intentions of the one 
performing them. 
Geisler has expended considerable effort on his 
concept of a hierarchy of values. He maintains that, 
historically, there have been several examples of 
hierarchically ordered values, including those proposed by 
Plotinus, Augustine, and most recently, Charles Hodge. 
Claiming that life in the real world includes moral 
conflicts in which only one command can be obeyed, Geisler 
suggests that the Bible provides a scale of values by which 
these dilemmas may be resolved. He states that the Bible 
indicates there are higher and lower moral laws, different 
degrees of sin, and graded levels of moral commands. Thus, 
if a person loyally follows the biblical hierarchy, being 
sure to do the greatest good in conflict situations, there 
is no guilt involved, but rather praise for doing one's 
best. Furthermore, while there may be cause for regret, 
since it may be necessary to do something as drastic as 
killing in self-defense, there is no need to repent, since 
keeping the higher law is good and not evil. Finally, in 
order to better facilitate decision-making in times of 
crisis, Geisler holds that the Bible teaches that one love 
God more than people, obey God over the government, and 
place mercy above veracity. 
Unquestionably, Norman Geisler has invested much in 
the formulation of his theory of ethical hierarchicalism. 
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The following chapter will firstly critically analyze this 
ethical method by comparing the fundamental presuppositions 
of theistic morality and Christian ethics as propounded by 
Geisler, with his own ethical hierarchicalism. Then, his 
hierarchicalism will be appraised by examining the concepts 
that conflict within this approach, as well as by addressing 
other problematic issues in this strategy. 
CHAPTER V 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL HIERARCHICALISM 
In his evaluation of antinomianism, Norman Geisler 
submits that "antinomianists make a contribution to ethics 
by stressing the relative dimension." 1 What this means is 
that "finite man does not have an infinite understanding of 
the infinite·. 112 Even though "the basic ethical principles 
are absolute, 113 human beings do "not have an absolute 
understanding of God's absolutes. 114 Geisler observes that 
"our understanding of God's perfect law is imperfect, 115 yet 
he insists that, despite the fact that it is not omniscient, 
"our understanding is adequate and sufficient. 116 
To a certain degree Geisler himself recognizes that 
even his own ethical approach is subject to this finite 
1Norman L. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989), 35. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Norman L. Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 
23. 
5Ibid., 24. 
6Ibid. 
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dimension. For instance, in the preface to his Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues he acknowledges that this book 
was made necessary by, among other factors, changes in 
approach to certain topics, and even "a shift of viewpoint 
from earlier works on such issues as abortion. 111 With this 
knowledge in mind, it would clearly be unfair to arbitrarily 
charge Geisler with holding what would otherwise appear as 
contradictory views on these issues. Nevertheless, an 
examination of ethical hierarchicalism in Geisler's works 
does appear to indicate serious problems in relation to 
several significant matters. While it is true that, as 
Erwin Lutzer noted in connection with Joseph Fletcher's 
situationism, "perhaps every author should be permitted at 
least a few contradictions, 112 it is also true that issues 
crucial to any ethical method must be both coherent and 
consistent if the approach is to be of any practical use. 
Recognizing the indispensability of the coherence, 
self-consistency, and non-contradiction of any moral scheme, 
this chapter will set out to evaluate hierarchical ethics as 
proposed by Norman Geisler. First, ethical hierarchicalism 
is compared and contrasted both with what Geisler himself 
maintains are the essential components of the nature of 
morality from a theistic viewpoint, and with the defining 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 13. 
2Erwin W. Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical 
Response to Situation Ethics (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 
1972), 60. 
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characteristics of the Christian perspective of ethics. 
Then, several concepts vital to hierarchicalism are examined 
with a view to illuminating the tensions that appear among 
the various points made by Geisler. Next, additional 
problematic issues are considered, especially in light of 
what other scholars have noted in connection with 
hierarchical ethics. To close the chapter, a brief synopsis 
and conclusion are made. 
Pundamental Presuppositions and Bierarchicalis• 
The previous chapter of this research document 
outlined what Geisler has proposed as the factors that he 
considers fundamental for both theistic morality as a whole 
and Christian ethics in particular. In addition, the 
essential features of ethical hierarchicalism were noted. 
The question naturally arises as to whether or not Geisler's 
hierarchicalism harmonizes with these foundational concepts. 
Nature of Morality 
A careful comparison of ethical hierarchicalism with 
Geisler's view of the basic nature of theistic morality 
reveals both accord and discord. 
Areas of Agreement 
Geisler rigorously holds that morality must contain 
objective moral norms. For, "a purely subjectivistic ethic 
is like a game without rules or a civilization without 
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codes. Ultimately, it is really no ethic at all. 111 While 
it is clear that ethical hierarchicalism subscribes to the 
importance of objective moral standards for the ordinary 
circumstances of life, questions have been raised concerning 
the issue of subjectivism in relation to the exceptional 
situations in which hierarchicalism calls for following the 
higher obligation. It has been asked: "Doesn't each person 
have to decide for himself what is the greatest good? And 
doesn't this amount to subjectivism? 112 Geisler responds, 
saying that believers are not to decide for themselves what 
the ethical priorities are, for it is God who establishes 
the pyramid of values in harmony with His own nature. 3 
Geisler notes: "The priority of values is objective and 
determined by God; the only subjective factor is our 
understanding and acceptance of God's values. 114 
1Norman L. Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1971), 44. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 123. 
This a question that Geisler himself raises and then 
responds to in a section addressing objections to 
hierarchical ism. 
3Ibid., 124. Whether or not the Bible supports this 
concept of the pyramid of values will be addressed below. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124. 
While Geisler admits there is a "subjective factor" involved 
here, he notes that "this is a limitation shared by the 
other Christian views [of ethics] as well;" ibid. His point 
here is that, in contrast to subjectivistic approaches such 
as situationism in which "someone makes up his own hierarchy 
of values based on his own subjective choices" (ibid., 123), 
for ethical hierarchicalism "these [values] are recorded in 
Scripture and, hence, they are no more subjective than is 
anything else revealed in Scripture;" ibid., 124. Geisler 
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A second area in which there appears to be concord 
between Geisler's basic presuppositions of morality and his 
own ethical strategy occurs in relation to the question of 
origins. As noted earlier, 1 Geisler states that one of the 
defining characteristics of the nature of theistic morality 
is that human beings do not create basic ethical values; 
they merely discover them. 2 "It is God who determines 
ethical values. 113 Similarly, Geisler notes that for 
hierarchical ethics, "something is right or wrong because 
God has declared it, 114 while "situational factors only help 
one to discover what God has determined that we should 
do ... s 
Thus, it appears that ethical hierarchicalism is 
firmly grounded in these two major spheres. Just as 
theistic morality is objective rather than subjective, and 
just as it is based on a divine rather than a human origin, 
so is hierarchicalism. On these two counts Geisler's own 
(ibid., 123) would apparently view the "universal commands 
of Scripture" against murder, adultery, etc., as objective, 
even though they are subjectively understood and accepted. 
1see "Discovered, Not Created by Humans," under "The 
Nature of Morality" in chapter 4. 
37. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 93. 
5Ibid. 
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ethical scheme satisfies the criteria he establishes for an 
authentic moral methodology. 
Factors That Diverge 
According to Geisler, morality is absolute and not 
relative. As opposed to relative expectations, absolute 
moral obligations "are always binding everywhere on 
everyone. 111 By way of illustration, Geisler notes that 
ethical hierarchicalism espouses that "the universal 
commands of Scripture such as the prohibitions against 
blasphemy, idolatry, adultery, murder, lying, and so forth 
are absolute, and these are binding on all men at all times 
and all places. 112 
Despite lucid and categorical statements such as 
these, Geisler indicates that hierarchicalism posits that 
"not all absolutes are absolutely absolute. Some are only 
relatively absolute. 113 Plainly, this equivocation of 
Geisler stands in stark contrast to his other unconditional 
statements on the meaning of absolute. Various scholars 
concur with Geisler on his earlier unqualified definitions 
of the term "absolute." For instance, an ethical absolute 
is described as something "that maintains its validity under 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
2Ibid., 123. See also, Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 93. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
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any and every circumstance, no matter what; 111 it is an 
"ethical standard applicable to everyone everywhere, 112 one 
which is "unqualified, 113 and "always binding, irrespective 
of situation. 114 To his credit, Geisler acknowledges that 
hierarchicalism "is not an unqualified absolutism. 115 
Admitting that, for hierarchical ethics "each moral 
principle is absolute [only] in its context, 116 Geisler 
suggests that his method may be called "qualified 
absolutism. 117 This term, however, is just as paradoxical 
as the idea that some absolutes are only "relatively 
absolute. 118 In the final analysis, even though Geisler 
1John E. Smith, "Absolutes, Ethical," in Dictionary 
of Christian Ethics, ed. John Macquarrie (Philadelphia, PA: 
Westminster Press, 1967), 2. 
2John H. Serembus, "Absolutes and Absolutism," in 
Ethics, vol. 1, ed. John K. Roth (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 
Inc., 1994), 6-7. 
311Absolute," New Webster's Dictionary of the English 
Language (United States of America: Delair Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1984). 
4Millard J. Erickson, "Absolutes, Moral," in Baker's 
Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1973), 3. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124. 
6Personal interview with Norman L. Geisler at 
Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia, on December 31, 
1990. See also, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 
132. 
7Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124. 
8 see Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
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insists that his approach "is not really a relativism, 111 it 
is evident that according to the established normal and 
regular understanding and usage of the terms "absolute" and 
"relative," ethical hierarchicalism is indeed a relativistic 
strategy. 
In his first volume dealing with moral methods and 
problems, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, Geisler outlined 
several reasons for his belief in the necessity of a 
normative approach to ethics. Contrary to the utilitarian 
calculus that the conduct that is right is that which will 
produce the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people, 2 Geisler points out that "the end never justifies 
the means. 113 Considering his own strategy to be a 
normative approach, Geisler says: "Ethical hierarchicalism 
is not a utilitarian ethic. 114 
Further investigation, nevertheless, raises doubts 
about this assertion. For instance, Geisler creates a 
radical dichotomy between so-called long-range and short-
1Norman L. Geisler, and Paul D. Feinberg, 
Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980), 426. 
2see, for example, Jeremy Bentham, "The Principle of 
Utility," in Moral Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Jack 
Glickman (New York, NY: st. Martin's Press, 1976), 528; 
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), 411; Frederick 
Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, 9 vols. (New York, 
NY: Image Books, 1985), 8:9-10. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 75. 
4Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 131. 
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range results. Thus, while hierarchicalism states that one 
should "leave the long-range consequences to God, 111 since 
they are "out of the range of humans, 112 it holds that "all 
ethical decisions are made, or ought to be made, with 
immediate results in view. 113 This statement is interesting 
in view of Geisler's own incisive critique of whether one 
can know what is best for the future. He queries: "But how 
long is 'long'? A few years? A lifetime? Eternity? 114 
Then he declares: "Anything beyond the immediate present is 
outside of the human purview. Only God knows the future. 115 
Lutzer concurs, noting that "we cannot predict even the next 
five minutes, much less the future. 116 Clearly, this 
division between distant and direct results is an erroneous 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 127. 
2Ibid., 77. See also, Norman L. Geisler, review of 
Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Humanism, by Paul Kurtz, in 
Christian Research Journal, Fall 1988, 28. 
3J. P. Moreland, and Norman L. Geisler, The Life and 
Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time (New York, NY: 
Praeger, 1990), 147. Geisler clearly articulated this 
concept at least as long ago as 1973, when he noted: "In the 
Christian ethic of love the long range results are left to 
God. Man is responsible only for the intended immediate 
results of choices;" Norman L. Geisler, The Christian Ethic 
of Love (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 
1973), 95. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 76-
77. 
5Ibid., 77. 
6Erwin w. Lutzer, The Necessity of Ethical 
Absolutes, Christian Free University Curriculum Series 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1981), 75. 
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dichotomy. As Anthony Blasi has stated: "It does not matter 
whether the consequence is a proximate objective or a remote 
end. 111 Thus, even though Geisler contends that his method 
is a normative technique, Lutzer is correct that, due to the 
concept of the need to act in view of the greater good, 
"hierarchicalism and utilitarianism cannot be separated. 112 
The above evidence, therefore, indicates that 
Geisler's hierarchical ethics diverges in these principal 
domains. Rather than being an authentic absolutism, 
hierarchicalism turns out to be a relativistic ethic. 
Moreover, instead of being a normative method, it ends up 
utilitarian, by operating in view of projected results. 3 
On these two matters Geisler's scheme contradicts the 
criteria he establishes for a legitimate ethical procedure. 
Christian View of Ethics 
Meticulous comparison of ethical hierarchicalism 
with what Geisler holds as the defining elements of the 
Christian view of ethics discloses areas in which there is 
correspondence as well as spheres of deviation. Since 
1Anthony J. Blasi, Moral Conflict and Christian 
Religion, American University Studies Series VII, Theology 
and Religion, vol. 35 (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1988), 134. 
2Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 104 (footnote). 
3williams observes that when one is "'acting for the 
best'" in a conflict situation, this is actually a form of 
utilitarianism; Bernard Williams, "Ethical Consistency," in 
Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 56. 
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Geisler's theistic view of morality in general forms the 
foundation for his Christian perspective of ethics, there 
will naturally be some noticeable overlap between this 
critique and the foregoing. Nevertheless, this analysis is 
essential since it will consider the additional aspects that 
further distinguish general morality from Christian ethics. 
Elements That Harmonize 
For Geisler, Christian ethics is based on both 
general and special revelation. He asserts: "General 
revelation [in nature] contains God's commands for all 
people. Special revelation [in Scripture] declares his will 
for believers. But in either case, the basis of human 
ethical responsibility is divine revelation. 111 In basic 
agreement with this position, hierarchical ethics maintains 
that it is also founded on natural law and the Bible. 2 
Geisler explains that God knew that everyone would not have 
access to the Scripture, "so He inscribed a law upon their 
hearts. 113 Furthermore, "the same God whose moral nature is 
reflected in natural law has expressed His moral character 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 23. 
2see, for example, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 125-130. 
3Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 362. 
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in biblical commands to believers. 111 Just as in the 
Christian view of ethics, hierarchicalism posits that a 
revelational approach to ethics is preferred since it is 
much more definitive and less subject to misunderstanding 
than human intuition. 2 
Another area of confluence between the main features 
of Christian ethics and hierarchicalism is that which is 
related to the life of Jesus Christ. For Christian ethics, 
Jesus' life is a vital model: "When it comes to knowing and 
doing what is right there is no substitute for a living 
example. Christ was that example. 113 He came to live on 
this earth where He showed people how to live. 4 Similarly, 
hierarchicalism often appeals to the example of Jesus in 
support of its claims. 5 For example, Geisler says that the 
death of Jesus on the cross shows that ethical conflicts 
1Norman L. Geisler, "Natural Law and Business 
Ethics," in Biblical Principles & Business: The Foundations, 
Christians in the Marketplace Series, vol. 1, ed. Richard c. 
Chewning (Colorado Springs, co: NavPress, 1989), 172. 
2see Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to 
Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, 366; Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, 127; Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 33-34. 
39. 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 53. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
5Whether the interpretation of these incidents is 
contextually accurate according to the biblical evidence or 
not will be addressed later on in this chapter. 
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exist. 1 Also, he states that Jesus faced moral conflicts, 
such as the choice between obeying parents or God, without 
ever sinning. 2 Thus, according to hierarchical ethics 
Jesus Christ "is our complete moral example. 113 
This brief comparison shows that in two primary 
spheres hierarchicalism is fully compatible with Christian 
ethics as defined by Geisler. Both approaches are based on 
natural law and the Bible, with an emphasis on the latter 
since it is a clearer revelation of God's will. Likewise, 
both hold that ethics is best exemplified in the life of 
Christ. Thus, on these two issues Geisler's own ethical 
method measures up to the standard he establishes for a 
genuine Christian approach to morality. 
Points ox Tension 
Geisler observes that "the Christian ethic is 
anchored ultimately in the unchanging nature of a God of 
perfect love and justice. 114 In other words, all "the 
ethical imperatives that God gives are in accord with his 
unchangeable moral character. 115 For example, since "'it is 
25-26. 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
2Ibid., 125. 
3Ibid. 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
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impossible for God to lie, 1111 "we should not lie either. 112 
Geisler concludes: "In brief, Christian ethics is based on 
God's will, but God never wills anything contrary to his 
unchanging moral character. 113 
Hierarchicalism, however, contends that lying is 
sometimes ethically right. 4 In attempting to explain this 
issue, Geisler states that "even though lying to save a life 
cannot be based ·in God as true, nevertheless, it can be 
based in God as merciful. 115 For instance, when truth and 
mercy conflict as in a life or death emergency, lying "finds 
its basis in God's nature as merciful. 116 Therefore, 
ethical hierarchicalism alleges that 11 justif iable lies are 
not based in God's truthfulness but in his mercy. 117 When 
this assertion is contrasted with Geisler's previous 
unambiguous remark that all ethical commands are in harmony 
with God's unchangeable moral character, it becomes clear 
that hierarchicalism here draws an illegitimate disjunction 
between God's attributes of mercy and truth. Moreover, by 
1Ibid. Geisler was here referring to the New 
International Version's rendering of Hebrews 6:18. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 121-122. 
5Ibid., 129. 
6Ibid. I 130. 
7 Ibid. 
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positioning mercy and truth as conflicting traits, ethical 
hierarchicalism seems to imply that God's character is 
discordant and chaotic. 1 In evaluating this notion of 
justified lying being based on the nature of God as 
merciful, Donald Bloesch concludes that Geisler can "be 
accused of drawing a bifurcation within God. 112 Then 
Bloesch forcefully adds: "But surely there must be a unity 
between God's attributes!"3 
A second point of tension appears in connection with 
the question as to what it is that provides the impetus for 
Christian ethics. Geisler observes that, for Christian 
ethics, "the value of Christ's example of love is 
inestimable. 114 For, the love of Christ becomes the 
motivating factor in keeping the moral laws of God. 5 
In outlining hierarchicalism, Geisler never mentions 
that the motivating power behind his own ethical strategy is 
the love of Christ. In fact, discussion of the love of 
1see Rakestraw, who notes that "the character of God 
as perfect and consistent within his own moral nature 
appears to be jeopardized by any view which holds that God's 
absolutes genuinely conflict;" Robert v. Rakestraw, "Ethical 
Choices: A Case for Non-conflicting Absolutism," Criswell 
Theological Review 2 (Spring 1988), 255. 
2Donald G. Bloesch, Freedom for Obedience: 
Evangelical Ethics in Contemporary Times (San Francisco, CA: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987), 183. 
3Ibid. 
4Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 60. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
40. 
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Christ as motivator is completely nonexistent. However, in 
just one place he concisely explains that it is the Holy 
Spirit who enables the Christian to act ethically: "Without 
the Spirit revealed principles for action and the Spirit 
empowered motivation to perform what is right there can be 
no truly Christian ethic. 111 Thus, in contrast to his 
emphasis on the indispensability of the love of Christ as 
the energizing force in the Christian view of ethics, 
Geisler's own ethic is devoid of this factor, while it only 
briefly suggests that the Holy Spirit does this motivating. 
A third concern deals with the very nature of 
ethical methods. Geisler warns that "morality is not 
determined by what men do but by what they ought to do. 112 
If morality were based on what human beings did, "then 
people ought to lie, cheat, steal, and murder, since these 
things are done all the time. 113 The function of describing 
human behavior is the realm of sociology, while that of 
prescribing human behavior is the province of morality. 4 
Indeed, as Geisler notes, "Christian ethics is by its very 
nature prescriptive, not descriptive. 115 
1Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 96. 
2Ibid., 12. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 24. 
4Ibid., 23. 
5Ibid. 
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While Geisler acknowledges that "the Bible records 
things that it does not approve, 111 he nonetheless uses 
concepts derived from various scriptural accounts to 
establish two notions that are vital to hierarchical ethics. 
To prove that unavoidable moral conflicts exist, 2 Geisler 
refers to the story where God commands Abraham to sacrifice 
Isaac, and labels this a "classic example of a conflict of 
moral principles. 113 Also, based on his interpretation of 
the deceptive actions of various Bible characters, 4 Geisler 
concludes that these are "God-approved examples of how He 
wants us to behave in similar moral conflicts. 115 This 
descriptive approach taken by ethical hierarchicalism, 
however, is .in direct contradiction to Geisler's initial 
1Norman L. Geisler, and Ronald M. Brooks, When 
Skeptics Ask (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1990), 166. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
84. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 121. 
4see, for example, ibid., 123; Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 91; Geisler, Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
5Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. Whether or not these are 
indeed "God-approved examples" will be addressed below in 
the section dealing with the "Interpretation of Vital Bible 
Passages." In the interim, it should be noted that Geisler 
personally acknowledges that "God sometimes blesses us in 
spite of ourselves and He is able to bring good out of 
evil;" ibid., 397. In view of these factors, extreme 
caution needs to be taken in drawing conclusions concerning 
how God is viewed as relating to human actions. 
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observations that Christian ethics is prescriptive, and not 
descriptive. 1 
A fourth factor that includes considerable ambiguity 
relates to the specific focus of the moral method. Geisler 
holds that "ethical systems can be broadly divided into two 
categories, deontological (duty-centered) and teleological 
(end-centered). 112 These are "mutually exclusive groups. 113 
As William Frankena states in agreement: "Deontological 
theories deny what teleological theories affirm. 114 Geisler 
notes that the deontological approach is "an ethic of 
principle which is concerned with one's duty to do what is 
intrinsically right apart from foreseeable consequences. 115 
1As indicated in chapter 4 above, in the section 
labeled "Prescriptive, Not Descriptive," Geisler maintains 
that "morality is not determined by what men do but by what 
they ought to do;" Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 12. 
Also, concerning the Christian view of ethics, he notes that 
"moral rightness is prescribed by a moral God;" Geisler, 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 23. For Christian 
ethics, these prescriptions include the command not to lie; 
ibid., 24. In contradistinction to the Christian view of 
ethics, hierarchicalism, based on its descriptive approach, 
contends that it is sometimes right to lie; see, for 
example, ibid., 121-122, 130. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 24. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 9. See also, Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, 11, and Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 312, 314, where he notes that a 
deontological approach is "opposed" to a teleological one. 
4William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2d ed., Foundations of 
Philosophy Series, ed. Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), 15. 
5Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 20. 
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Concurring with Geisler, other scholars maintain that the 
deontological method "considers actions to be intrinsically 
right or wrong regardless of their consequences. 111 In 
other words, it is the Christian's obligation to follow the 
moral law whatever the outcome. 2 Geisler then declares: 
"Christian ethics is deontological. 113 
However, as noted in the previous chapter, the above 
categorical statements are later moderated by Geisler 
himself, as when he posits that deontologists "should 
generally be content with acting for short-range results. 
Since we do not know the future, we should allow the long 
range to take care of itself. 114 This equivocation by 
Geisler is evidently necessary since his own hierarchical 
approach is heavily dependent on projected results. To 
prove the validity of hierarchicalism, Geisler provides 
these illustrations: "Sometimes no one will jump off an 
overcrowded lifeboat, and either all will sink or some must 
be pushed off •• There are times when either the would-
1Richard A. Spinello, "Deontological Ethics," in 
Ethics, vol. 1, ed. John K. Roth (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 
Inc., 1994), 219. See also, Richard M. Gula, s.s., What Are 
They Saying about Moral Norms? (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 
1981), 87; Neil Brown, "Teleology or Deontology?" The Irish 
Theological Quarterly 53 (1987): 36. 
2see Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death 
Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time, 144-145. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 24. 
4Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 147. 
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be murderer is killed or else his victim(s) will die. 111 As 
is manifest, hierarchical ethics operates in view of the so-
called short-range intended outcome. In brief then, ethical 
hierarchicalism shows "a strong teleological influence,"2 
in its actual outworking, and is not a truly deontological 
approach. 
A final component that exhibits some ambivalence 
relates to the question of absolute moral obligations. To 
begin with, Geisler attests that "Christian ethics is firmly 
absolutist. 113 He explains: "Since God's moral character 
does not change (Mal. 3:6; James 1:17), it follows that 
moral obligations flowing from his nature are absolute. 
That is, they are always binding everywhere on everyone. 114 
Murder and lying are two examples of these absolute 
1Ibid., 153. See also, "Three Evangelicals Ponder 
the 'Right to Die'," Evangelical Newsletter, 7 May 1976; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 96. 
2Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 252. See also, Luck (p. 26, 
footnote #22), who notes that Geisler's hierarchicalism 
"claims to be a pure deontology (duty centered ethics), but 
it seems actually to be a crypto-teleology (consequence 
ethics);" William F. Luck, "Moral Conflicts and Evangelical 
Ethics: A Second Look at the Salvaging Operations," Grace 
Theological Journal 8 (1987). Interestingly, Schuller 
comments that "a teleological ethics is not ethics but pure 
praxeology;" Bruno Schuller, Wholly Human: Essays on the 
Theory and Language of Morality, trans. Peter Heinegg 
(Dublin, Ireland: Gill and Macmillan, 1986), 176. 
3Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
9. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
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duties. 1 In brief, Christian ethics maintains a belief in 
absolute moral duties, which "are binding on all people at 
all times and in all places. 112 As previously noted, this 
is the proper standard definition of the term "absolute. 113 
In connection with ethical hierarchicalism, however, 
Geisler appears to modify these explicit statements on the 
meaning of "absolute." For instance, in discussing moral 
conflicts, he contends that "what is absolutely binding as 
~ in a simple relation is not necessarily the right 
course of action in a complex situation where one must 
decide between two commands as conflicting. 114 As an 
example of this, Geisler notes that "lying as such is always 
wrong. 115 But, "while lying as such is never justified, 
lying to save a life is. 116 Geisler recognizes that his 
1see, for example, ibid., 23; Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 9. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 23. 
see also, Norman L. Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial 
Ethics," Trinity Journal 4 (September 1975): 82, where 
Geisler notes: "The universal commands of Scripture, e.g., 
are absolutely binding on all men at all time [sic] and all 
places." 
3see the above section on "Factors That Diverge" 
under "Nature of Morality." 
4Norman L. Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," Bibliotheca Sacra 131 (July-September 1974): 
227. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 127. 
See also, Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 11; Geisler, 
"Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 226. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 129. 
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ethical theory raises the query as to how hierarchicalism 
can profess to affirm absolute moral obligations when it 
permits people to ignore certain ethical laws in conflict 
situations. He answers that "there are three ways in which 
hierarchicalism is an absolutism. 111 It is first of all 
absolute in its source, since it holds that all norms are 
based in the absoluteness of God. 2 "Second, each 
particular command is absolute as such, 113 and must be 
obeyed, unless there is a moral conflict, at which point the 
higher law must be followed. 4 And third, the very 
hierarchy by which the conflicts are resolved is absolute. 5 
This conclusion, that hierarchicalism is absolute 
only in its source, its sphere, and its sequence, flies in 
the face of Geisler's own statements that actual absolute 
moral obligations, such as the specific acts of lying and 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
94. See also, Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," 227; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 124. 
94. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124. 
3Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
4Ibid. Luck (p. 25, footnote #20) observes: "The 
obligation to follow the higher law is a rule-governing 
rule. The fact that the rule-governing rule is absolute 
does not in the slightest make any of the rules that it 
governs absolutes." 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 124. 
Luck (p. 25, footnote #20) notes: "The fact that the order 
is absolute does not make each rule absolute." 
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murder, "are always binding everywhere on everyone. 111 
Also, it conflicts with the notion of the inherent evil of 
such acts in and of themselves. 2 As William Luck, in his 
critique of this idea of absolutism has correctly noted: 
"None of these arguments establishes that lower laws are 
absolutes. 113 Or, as Lutzer has observed: "If absolutes are 
only absolutes in certain situations, then of course they 
are not absolutes. 114 Perhaps the final word on this issue 
should be from Geisler himself, where he provides a rather 
muted redefinition of the meaning of an absolute duty. He 
claims that an absolute is "an ethical duty that has the 
highest degree of incumbency possible in that context and 
cannot be overridden by any other duty. 115 Thus it can be 
seen that, while Geisler holds that Christian ethics affirms 
a belief in absolute moral obligations, hierarchical ethics 
posits a fairly different view. 
By way of summary then, it can be said that a 
comparison of five of the characteristics that Geisler 
considers essential for the Christian view of ethics with 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 22. 
2see, for example, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 20, where he speaks of acts that are "inherently 
right," and of "an intrinsic good in the act itself." 
3Luck, 25 (footnote #20). 
4Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 103. 
5Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of our Time, 157. 
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his own position of ethical hierarchicalism reveals some 
major points of tension. First, while Christian ethics is 
based on the immutable character of a God who, for example, 
cannot lie, hierarchicalism says that justifiable lies find 
their basis in God's nature as merciful. Second, while the 
love of Christ is for Christian ethics the motivating factor 
in obeying moral laws, Geisler's own ethic lacks this 
component, and only briefly submits that the Holy Spirit 
does this activating. Third, while Christian ethics is by 
its very character prescriptive and not descriptive, to some 
degree ethical hierarchicalism assumes a descriptive stance, 
especially in relation to the issue of moral conflicts. 
Fourth, while Christian ethics adopts a deontological 
approach in which one does what is intrinsically right 
irrespective of consequences, hierarchicalism often depends 
upon projected results in order to determine what to do. 
And fifth, while Christian ethics maintains a belief in 
absolute moral duties, which are always binding everywhere 
on everyone, hierarchical ethics ends up with no absolute 
moral duties, but merely with a perfect source, a proscribed 
sphere, and a precise sequence of obligations. In short, 
based on these five defining characteristics of Christian 
ethics as identified and elucidated by Geisler himself, the 
approach of ethical hierarchicalism would have to be 
rejected and considered unacceptable as a method of morality 
for Bible-believing Christians. 
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Conf lictinq concepts in Hierarchical Bthics 
In addition to the numerous divergent factors 
between Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism and what he 
considers the basic features of both theistic morality and 
Christian ethics, ~here appear to be other elements in the 
method of hierarchicalism that do not synchronize suitably. 
A Plurality of Absolutes or Hot 
In the outline of Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism 
in the preceding chapter, it was noted that this approach 
claims a belief in "many moral absolutes. 111 Specifically, 
as Geisler puts it, "the universal commands of Scripture 
such as the prohibitions against blasphemy, idolatry, 
adultery, murder, lying, and so forth are absolute, and 
these are binding on all men at all times and all places. 112 
He categorically states: "God's law is absolute, and there 
are absolutely no occasions when it is morally justifiable 
to break it. 113 In other words, "the commandments of Christ 
do spell out the meaning of love for the Christian. Each 
1see "A Plurality of Absolute Duties" in chapter 4. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
101; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 102, 
123. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 123. 
3Ibid., 102. Geisler made this statement when 
outlining what he considers the positive contributions of 
conflicting absolutism. 
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commandment indicates clearly what love means in a given 
human relationship. 111 
Despite these emphatic comments in support of a 
belief in a plurality of substantive moral absolutes, other 
statements made by Geisler seriously undermine this entire 
notion. For example, according to hierarchicalism, lying, 
adultery, and murder, 2 are morally wrong only when in a 
simple relation, while they could be right "in a complex 
situation where one must decide between two [conflicting] 
commands. 113 When there is this conflict, Geisler maintains 
that "it is our absolute duty to follow the higher command 
as revealed by God in Scripture. 114 Geisler recognizes that 
"it seems contradictory to claim that a moral principle is 
absolute when it can sometimes be broken. 115 He contends, 
however, that the lower command is not really "broken" when 
the higher command is obeyed. 6 This is because, in genuine 
unavoidable conflicts, the keeping of the higher obligation 
"renders it unnecessary for us to perform the demands of the 
222. 
1Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 
2Ibid., 226. 
3Ibid., 227. 
4Norman L. Geisler, "Ethical Conflicts," 1977, TMs 
[photocopy], p. 17, Center for Research and Scholarship, 
Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 129. 
6Ibid. 
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lesser command. 111 Also, under these circumstances, "God 
does not demand obedience to lower laws. 112 
In the discussion of his limited understanding of 
absolute moral norms, where he propounds that "not all 
absolutes are absolutely absolute, 113 Geisler confesses that 
in ethical hierarchicalism, "there can be only one thing 
[sic] which is absolute in the full and final sense of that 
word (viz., God). 114 In essence, Geisler ends up with only 
one "absolute" in his ethical strategy. As Luck correctly 
observes: "Since in the hierarchicalist system all laws 
lower than the highest law are laws subject to an exempting 
process, only one law in the hierarchicalist system can be 
an absolute.115 Similarly, Stanley Grenz notes that ethical 
hierarchicalism "claims to include a plurality of universal 
norms. But in actuality it contains only one norm, that 
which stands at the top of the hierarchy. 116 Luck concludes 
that, due to this, hierarchicalism "is unacceptable to 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
4Ibid. In a more recent work, Geisler makes a 
similar statement, by saying that "only one thing can be 
loved suprememly, not many;" Moreland, and Geisler, The Life 
and Death Debate: Moral Issues of our Time, 133. 
5Luck, 25. 
6stanley J. Grenz, "The Flight from God: 
Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Universal Ethical 
Systems," Perspectives in Religious Studies 14 (Summer 
1987): 158. 
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Evangelicals who find that Scripture teaches the plurality 
of absolutes. 111 Furthermore, by suggesting that the only 
ultimate "absolute" is God, hierarchical ethics winds up 
with an "absolute" that has no specifically defined content. 
Hence, as Geisler has perceptively deduced in his analysis 
of situationism, "a single but contentless absolute is the 
same as no absolute at all. 112 In brief then, though 
ethical hierarchicalism claims to believe in many 
substantive moral absolutes, in its actual application it 
ends up with only one contentless "absolute," which is 
really no absolute at all. Therefore, in the final analysis 
the ethical hierarchicalism of Geisler "reduces to 
antinomianism."3 
1Ibid. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
21. See also, Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," 221-222, where he notes that, "to tell a man to 
'love' in all situations without spelling out what this 
means is like telling him to do 'X' or to 'zirkle' when he 
faces a conflict. None of these symbols has any meaning 
unless it is defined with specific content." 
3Geisler makes this comment about situationism; see 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 21. 
Since, as has been demonstrated above, situationism and 
hierarchicalism both end up with one contentless "absolute," 
it does not appear inappropriate to conclude that Geisler's 
assessment of situationism is also fitting for his own 
ethical methodology. Note that, in the above concluding 
paragraph regarding "Points of Tension" under "Christian 
View of Ethics," it was similarly deduced that "hierarchical 
ethics ends up with no absolute moral duties." Hence, 
Geisler's critique of the generalist is appropriate here 
also. He notes: "Since he has no absolute moral principles, 
his view tends to be reducible to antinomianism;" Geisler, 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 77. 
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Intentions versus Ends to Justify Means 
A thorough perusal of Geisler's works reveals that 
he repeatedly underscores the point that "the end never 
justifies the means. 111 For instance, in his penetrating 
critique of utilitarianism, Geisler states at length: 
Utilitarianism believes that the end justifies the 
means. But this is clearly wrong. Hitler's goal to 
have a more perfect race was good, but his means of 
attaining it were evil. President Nixon's goal of 
national security was a noble one, but the criminal and 
unethical activity of Watergate was not justified to 
reach it. The end never justifies the means; the means 
must justify themselves. That is to say, an act is not 
automatically good simply because it has a good goal. 
The means to achieve it must be judged good by some 
objective standard of good. The road to destruction is 
paved with good intentions (Prov. 14:12). 2 
Geisler provides several additional examples in 
support of the dictum that "the end never justifies the 
means." He notes that "forced infanticide of all children 
thought to be carriers of genetic 'impurities' is not 
justified by the goal of a purified genetic stock. 113 
Similarly, it would be wrong to kill AIDS patients in order 
to curb the spread of this deadly disease, or to eliminate 
political dissenters for the sake of national harmony. 4 In 
his negative assessment of the actions of pro-life people 
1see, for example, Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 37, 75, 162, 178, 188, 191; Geisler, 
Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 131. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 75. 
3Ibid., 37. 
4Ibid., 179, 178. 
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who commit civil disobedience in order to stop abortion, 
Geisler says: "The good end (saving babies) is being used to 
justify the illegal means (breaking the law). But the end 
never justifies the means. 111 Then he adds: "Even in the 
saving of a life the Christian cannot use wrong means to 
accomplish this good end. God gives life and ultimately He 
is responsible to punish those who take it. 112 Geisler 
explains that "it is never right to correct a wrong by doing 
a wrong, 113 since "two wrongs do not make a right, and the 
end does not justify the means. Such reasoning is 
humanistic and situational, not Christian and biblical. 114 
In brief, "evil means are not justified by good ends. Only 
good means are to be used for good ends. 115 
The frequent use, by Geisler, of such concepts as, 
"evil means" or "unethical activity" versus "good means" or 
"good acts" might on the surface appear to sustain a belief 
in the intrinsic value of human actions. As has been 
1Norman L. Geisler, Civil Disobedience: When Is It 
Right? Should Christians Ever Break the Law? (Lynchburg, VA: 
Quest Productions, 1990), 18. Though this section is listed 
as having been compiled by Douglas Van Gordon, Geisler, in 
an interview on August 29, 1990, indicated that this section 
accurately reflects his own views. 
2Geisler, Civil Disobedience: When Is It Right? 
Should Christians Ever Break the Law?, 18. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 180. 
4Norman L. Geisler, "A Biblical View of Government," 
Rutherford Institute 2 (January/February 1985): 12. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 191. 
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recorded in the foregoing chapter, Geisler is completely 
cognizant of the fact that "much of the discussion on these 
issues hinges around the question of whether an act of 
itself is intrinsically good or evil."1 He avers that 
there is no such thing. 2 To prove his point, he posits 
that "if some acts were intrinsically good or evil, then an 
act of killing committed by an animal or an imbecile would 
have to be considered morally wrong." 3 Thus, Geisler 
concludes that, "mere human actions as such are not 
intrinsically good or evil;"4 it all depends on "the motive 
or purpose of the one performing them." 5 For instance, 
1Norman L. Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 
Bulletin of the Evangelical Philosophical Society 2 (1979): 
4. See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 74; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
106. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
109. See also, Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 4; 
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 106. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 89. 
In an earlier work, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 109, Geisler similarly argued that "if actions were 
evil apart from human intentions, then animals or imbeciles 
who performed the same actions would also be morally 
culpable." For Geisler (see, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 89), moral culpability is a prerequisite for being 
considered human. However, this would mean that a newborn 
infant is not human, since it has not yet developed any 
moral sensitivity, and cannot be morally culpable. Even 
though an imbecile or an animal would not be considered 
morally culpable for killing someone, the act in itself 
would surely not be considered good or neutral as such, but 
still evil. 
4Geisler, Options in contemporary Christian Ethics, 
109. 
5Ibid., 113. 
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ethical hierarchicalism holds that, in lying to save a life, 
it is not the lie that is good, "but it is the intent and 
action to save a life that is good--despite the fact that 
intentional falsification was necessary to accomplish this 
good. 111 
Clearly, what matters most for Geisler is the 
element of intent. Though he recognizes that "intention is 
only one aspect of an ethical action, 112 and that "good 
intentions alone are not sufficient to make an act morally 
right, 113 Geisler asserts that "it is really the component 
of intent that defines the essence of a moral act. 114 In 
other words, hierarchicalism posits that an act "is right if 
it is done w.i th good intentions and wrong if it is done with 
bad intentions. 115 However, in the same book where this 
statement is made, Geisler keenly critiques utilitarianism, 
1Ibid., 96. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 126. In stating this belief in the 
justifiability of lying to save life, Geisler indisputably 
contradicts his own view noted above, where he states: "Even 
in the saving of a life the Christian cannot use wrong means 
to accomplish this good end. God gives life and ultimately 
He is responsible to punish those who take it;" Geisler, 
Civil Disobedience: When Is It Right? Should Christians Ever 
Break the Law?, 18. 
2Geisler, Options in contemporary Christian Ethics, 
13. 
3Geisler, "Conflicting Absolutism," 4. See also, 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 13. 
4Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 75. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 312. 
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categorically insisting that "something is not good because 
the intentions underlying it are good; it is good only if 
the actions are also good. 111 Therefore, using Geisler's 
own reasoning, ethical hierarchicalism can be seen to have 
the same inadequacy as utilitarianism on this point. Hence, 
similar to Geisler's conclusion on generalism, it seems that 
hierarchicalism "tends to be reducible to antinomianism. 112 
In the glossary of one of Geisler's later works on 
ethical issues, an intention is defined more precisely as, 
"the end that constitutes the nature of a given act and 
specifies what kind of action it is; what one intends to 
bring about." 3 This concept, that the "intention" and the 
"end" one seeks to accomplish are in reality identical, is 
echoed by James Gustafson: "Moral action is governed in part 
by the intentions of the actor, by his thought about the 
purposes he is seeking to fulfill, the ends he is seeking to 
achieve. 114 
If, as rightly recognized by both Geisler and 
Gustafson, there is no real difference between an intention 
and an "end," and if, as Geisler holds, all actions in and 
of themselves are morally neutral, then it becomes clear 
1Ibid., 75. 
2Ibid., 77. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of our Time, 160. 
4James M. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 256. 
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that, notwithstanding Geisler's vehement denial that 
"ethical hierarchicalism is not a utilitarian ethic,"1 his 
moral methodology does in reality promote the belief that 
"the end justifies the means." Geisler's own critique of 
this concept is thus appropriate: "Such reasoning is 
humanistic and situational, not Christian and biblical. 112 
Moral, Civil, and cereaonial Laws 
The very first of the three essential premises in 
the biblical argument for ethical hierarchicalism asserts 
that there are higher and lower moral laws. 3 According to 
Geisler, the basic evidence for this contention that moral 
laws are hierarchically graded is the belief that "the 
distinction between civil, ceremonial, and moral laws are 
not rigid (if maintainable at all). 114 Certainly, Geisler 
is aware of the fact that "it has been common among 
theologians to distinguish between the moral law, the civil 
law, and the ceremonial law in the Mosaic legislation. 115 
However, he says that "nowhere does the Bible divide the law 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 131. 
2Geisler, "A Biblical View of Government," 12. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 116; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 81-82. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
5Norman L. Geisler, "The Use of the Bible in Social 
Ethics, VI: Dispensationalism and Ethics," Transformation 6 
(January/March 1989), 7. 
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into distinct ceremonial, civil, and moral categories."1 
In fact, he holds that "the whole division of commands into 
civil, ceremonial, and moral is postbiblical, questionable, 
and probably of late Christian origin. 112 The view, that 
"the law of God is unified113 in this sense, is crucial for 
hierarchicalism. For, if civil, ceremonial, and moral laws 
are all part of the "ethical obligations"4 incumbent on 
Christians, then it is clear that there are several events 
in the Bible where conflicts of these obligations occur. 5 
And if this is the case, then a hierarchy may be needed. 
Interestingly though, over the years Geisler himself 
has maintained that there is a distinct difference between 
these laws. For instance, in utilizing conflict situations 
to illustrate hierarchicalism in his earliest work on 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 205. 
Some writers concur with Geisler, noting that this 
distinction is not a very fruitful way of discovering the 
ethical relevance of the law. See, for example, Terrance 
Tiessen, "Toward a Hermeneutic for Discerning Universal 
Moral Absolutes," Journal of the Evangelical Theological 
Society 36 (June 1993): 193; Christopher J. H. Wright, An 
Eye for an Eye: The Place of Old Testament Ethics Today 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 153. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 92. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
61. He says that "this distinction has been around since at 
least the time of Aquinas (d. 1274);" Geisler, "The Use of 
the Bible in Social Ethics, VI: Dispensationalism and 
Ethics," 14 (footnote #3). 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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ethical approaches in 1971, he concedes that "not all of 
these are conflicts between two absolute moral laws (some of 
them being civil laws). 111 He has also noted that "the law 
(torah} of Moses has three major aspects, the moral law 
(e.g., the Ten Commandments}, the civil law (personal and 
property rights, etc.) and the ceremonial law (dealing with 
sacrifices and feasts). 112 Recognizing the differences 
between these laws, Geisler states that, in contrast to 
universally binding ethical duties, "there are other things 
that are binding in a more limited sense. These are based 
on the will of God for a particular people and/or time. 113 
Then he illustrates this, by saying: "The ceremonial laws of 
the Old Testament (such as offering sacrifices or undergoing 
circumcision} fit into this category. 114 As Geisler 
acknowledges in his 1990 book on ethics: "The ceremonial 
laws of Moses are not binding today. 115 Similarly, the 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 123. See 
also, Norman L. Geisler, "Any Chance for Morality? Part 2, 11 
The Standard, 15 February 1973, 20; Norman L. Geisler, A 
Popular Survey of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Book House, 1977), 58-60. 
2Norman L. Geisler, "Ceremonial Law," nd, TMs 
[photocopy], Center for Research and Scholarship, Liberty 
University, Lynchburg, VA. 
3Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 410. 
4Ibid. 
5Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 110. Years earlier (in 1973) he 
noted that these laws "are clearly not binding on Christians 
today;" Geisler, "Any Chance for Morality? Part 2, 11 20. 
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"obligation to obey civil governments111 is also limited. 
Thus, "it is certainly true that Christians are not under 
either the ceremonies (Heb. 8-10) or the curses of the 
Mosaic law (Gal. 3:13)."2 
The differentiation between these three law codes is 
recognized by other scholars as well. For example, Old 
Testament theologian, Walter Kaiser, maintains that "the 
notion that there is some type of division within the law is 
not a concept that has been imposed on it from the 
outside. 113 That this categorization is fair to the 
biblical text, Kaiser shows by indicating that the civil 
statutes in the Covenant Code of Exodus 21-23 had a heading 
that referred to its laws as "judgments" to be used as 
precedents. 4 While "the Decalogue carried no socially 
recognizable setting with its laws, 115 thus implying its 
permanency, the ceremonial regulations, from Exodus 25 
through at least Leviticus 7, "had an expressed word of 
built-in obsolescence when it noted several times over that 
1Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 410. See also, Moreland, and 
Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our 
Time, 110. 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 43. 
3Walter c. Kaiser, Jr., "God's Promise Plan and His 
Gracious Law," Journal of the Evangelical Theological 
Society 33 (September 1990): 291. 
4Walter c. Kaiser, Jr., Toward Old Testament Ethics 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 46. 
5Ibid. 
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what was to be built was only a model. 111 Not only is this 
division demonstrated in the Old Testament, but even "Jesus 
appealed to just such a distinction. 112 Kaiser concludes 
that "the law can and must be viewed as being divided into 
various components. 113 
In what appears to be a specific reference to 
Geisler's hierarchical approach, Kaiser states that this 
"threefold distinction was an attempt to avoid this type of 
arbitrariness in deciding which commands were or were not to 
be observed by Christians. 114 While the civil and 
ceremonial laws are clearly of limited significance, "the 
moral law is the foundational aspect of the whole law, and 
its address is to all persons in all times. 115 Gordon 
Olson, in his critical analysis of hierarchicalism, 
similarly proposes that ethical norms be divided into the 
two major categories of absolute and limited norms. 6 While 
2Kaiser, "God's Promise Plan and His Gracious Law," 
299 (footnote #24). 
3Ibid., 300. 
4Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 46. 
5Kaiser, "God's Promise Plan and His Gracious Law," 
301. 
6c. Gordon Olson, "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical 
Ethics Revisited," Evangelical Journal 4 (Spring 1986): 4. 
In a rebuttal to Olson, Geisler claims that his ethic does 
distinguish between two levels of norms; Norman L. Geisler, 
"A Response to Olson's critique of Ethical Hierarchicalism," 
Evangelical Journal 4 (Fall 1986): 84. As evidence of this, 
he says that "the very title of one of the chapters 
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moral absolutes are "those norms whose applicability is 
nowhere limited in Scripture, 111 things such as obedience to 
civil governments, and ceremonial commands "are clearly 
limited in their applicability. 112 Thus, since "all the 
examples of Geisler's exemption principle have to do with 
conflict between these two kinds of norms, 113 Geisler's main 
thesis, that absolute moral laws conflict and that therefore 
a hierarchical gradation of laws is necessitated, is 
invalidated. 4 
defending Graded Absolutism [i.e., ethical hierarchicalism] 
is 'Loving on Two Levels;' (Christian Ethic of Love, ch. 
3);" ibid. Even though it is technically correct for 
Geisler to say this, there is a radical difference between 
Olson's two-tiered structure of absolute and limited norms, 
and Geisler's concept of two levels of love based on his 
interpretation of the Ten commandments. 
1olson, s. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., 4. In his response to Olson's article, 
Geisler asserts that there are "real moral conflicts between 
two absolutes;" Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of 
Ethical Hierarchicalism," 85. careful scrutiny of Geisler's 
examples of "conflicts between two absolutes" disproves this 
notion. Instead of his "absolutes" being prescriptive moral 
laws, they are either merely descriptive attributes of God 
which are wrongly turned into conflicting commands (see, for 
example, "Points of Tension" in the "Christian View of 
Ethics" above, and "The Existence of Moral Conflicts" in the 
"Interpretation of Vital Bible Passages" below), cases of 
falsely assumed responsibilities (see, for example, the 
sections below on "Sins of Commission or omission," "Assumed 
Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," and "The Existence of Moral 
Conflicts" in the "Interpretation of Vital Bible Passages"), 
or questionable interpretations of biblical data (see, for 
example, the section below dealing with the "Interpretation 
of Vital Bible Passages"). 
4see Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 46; Olson, 
4-8, 10-12. 
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The above information shows that Geisler holds two 
mutually exclusive views on the unity of or differentiation 
between the civil, ceremonial, and moral laws. While the 
concept of the unity of these codes is indispensable to 
Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism, he himself separates 
them, claiming that the moral law is universally binding, 
whereas civil and ceremonial laws are not. Thus, his view 
of the distinction between these laws concurs with other 
scholars who have demonstrated that no hierarchical method 
is necessitated when norms are properly divided into 
absolute laws and limited obligations. Hence, hierarchical 
ethics is to a large degree undermined and negated. 
Biblical Accounts and Approval of Actions 
Geisler recognizes that "the Bible records things 
that it does not approve. 111 For example, David's sins, 
Solomon's polygamy, and Satan's lie in Genesis 3, are all 
recorded without being approved. 2 "Morality is not 
determined by what men do but by what they ought to do. 113 
In other words, while "the 'is/ought' fallacy holds that 
because people are doing it, therefore, they ought: to do 
1Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 166. See 
also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 280-
281. 
2Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 166. 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 12. 
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it, 111 Geisler opposes this theory, noting that "what people 
do is not the basis for what they ought to do. If it were, 
then people ought to lie, cheat, steal, and murder, since 
these things are done all the time. 112 In contradistinction 
to this "is/ought" ideology, Geisler correctly points out 
that "the task of the (Bible] interpreter is to determine 
whether the passage is approving or merely reporting what is 
said. 113 Hence, one "is not to imply that everything 
contained in the Bible is being taught by the Bible. 114 
Nevertheless, while Geisler has frequently and 
repeatedly cautioned that "the Bible does not approve of 
every thing it records, 115 he has used Bible stories to 
establish two concepts vital to ethical hierarchicalism. 
The first of these is the belief that unavoidable moral 
conflicts exist. To prove this, Geisler refers to stories 
such as God's command that Abraham offer up Isaac as a 
1Norman L. Geisler, "Ethical Aspects of Evangelism 
with Particular Reference to Patients," in Evangelism for 
the Medical & Dental Professions, ed. Leonard w. Ritzmann 
(Richardson, TX: Evangelism Commission of the Christian 
Medical Society, 1985), 23. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 24. 
3Norman L. Geisler, "Theological Method and 
Inerrancy: A Reply to Professor Holmes," Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 11 (Summer 1968): 144. 
4Ibid. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 280. 
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sacrifice, 1 Rahab's deception to save the lives of the 
spies, 2 Jephthah's sacrifice of his daughter, 3 and 
Daniel's disobedience of civil law. 4 Based on his 
interpretation of these incidents, 5 Geisler concludes that 
these are some of the many "biblical examples of genuine, 
unavoidable moral conflicts. 116 The second concept crucial 
to hierarchicalism, which Geisler establishes on his own 
interpretation of scriptural accounts, is the so-called 
hierarchy of values which is to resolve moral conflicts. 
For instance, Geisler claims that there are many cases in 
Scripture where God "commended the faith of those involved 
in intentional deception in order to save lives. 117 
Included in these are, Rahab's act of "justifiable" 
deception, 8 and the Hebrew midwives' "divinely approved 
1Ibid., 117-118; Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 84. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 118. 
3 Ibid. 
4Ibid., 119. 
5Geisler's interpretation of these passages will be 
carefully compared below with the actual biblical data. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
7Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. 
8Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
91. 
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lying. 01 In a similar manner, Geisler employs Bible 
stories to show that one ought to place "love for God over 
love for man, 02 and "obey God over government. 113 These 
narratives are thus understood as "examples of persons who 
were praised by God for following their highest duty in 
situations of conflict. 114 
In alluding to the chronicles of those who lied to 
save life, Geisler asserts: "Since all things in the Old 
Testament are 'for us' (Rom. 15:4) and happened 'for our 
example' (I Cor. 10:11), it seems difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that these were God-approved examples of how He 
wants us to behave in similar moral conflicts. 05 This is a 
rather paradoxical deduction in view of Geisler's own 
adamant conviction recorded three years prior to his first 
book on ethics, that one "is not to imply that everything 
1Ibid. It appears that Geisler bases his conclusion 
as to whether or not these lies are justifiable, on both the 
intentions and the consequences of the acts. These passages 
dealing with lying, as well as the others that Geisler uses, 
will be considered below in the "Interpretation of Vital 
Bible Passages." 
2see Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 77. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 121. 
4Ibid., 120. 
5Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. Though Geisler recognizes 
that the Bible does not approve everything it records, it 
appears that he needs this interpretation of Paul's 
statement in order to support his hierarchical ethics. 
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contained in the Bible is being taught by the Bible."1 
Additionally, this conclusion challenges Geisler's more 
recent statement, which cautions that "one cannot derive a 
prescriptive ought statement from a mere descriptive is 
statement. 112 That is, the actions of any Bible characters 
are not necessarily normative for the believer. As Kaiser 
has explained: "Reporting or narrating an event in Scripture 
is not to be equated with approving, recommending, or making 
that action or characteristic normative for emulation by all 
subsequent readers. 113 In fact, Geisler has himself noted 
that "the Bible contains.many references to lies, sins and 
falsehoods that it in no way approves or teaches. 114 
Furthermore, even the bestowal of God's grace upon 
the person is no necessary proof of heavenly approbation. 
John Murray refers to the belief that God's blessings are 
evidence of divine approval of people's behavior as "poor 
theology and worse theodicy. 115 He fittingly observes that 
1Geisler, "Theological Method and Inerrancy: A Reply 
to Professor Holmes," 144. This article was published in 
1968. 
2Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of our Time, 20 (footnote #1; emphasis added). 
This book was published in 1990. 
3Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 283. 
4Norman L. Geisler, review of The Debate about the 
Bible, by Stephen Davis, in Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 21 (September 1978): 264. 
5John Murray, Principles of Conduct: Aspects of 
Biblical Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1957), 137. 
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"we know little of biblical theology if we do not recognize 
that God fulfils his determined purpose of grace and promise 
notwithstanding the unworthy actions of those who are the 
beneficiaries of that grace. 11 1 As Kaiser suitably remarks: 
"Commendation of a person or notable action need not imply 
commendation of every element of the men and women cited. 112 
Rather, Kaiser insists that everyone must constantly 
distinguish, on the basis of explicit statements, and the 
immediate and larger contexts, between what the Bible 
teaches and what it merely reports in order to describe how 
far the people of God departed from the standard of the 
holiness of His person and the requirements of His law. 3 
Thus, as John Jefferson Davis affirms: "The precepts and 
commands of Scripture have priority over the narrative 
passages in discerning the moral law. 114 In other words, 
the only time the example of Scripture characters should be 
followed is when they themselves acted in a manner 
consistent with the absolute moral laws of God as clearly 
revealed in the Bible. 
By way of summary the following can be said. On the 
one hand, Geisler declares that biblical morality is not 
1Ibid. 
2Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 283. 
3 Ibid. 
4John Jefferson Davis, Evangelical Ethics: Issues 
Facing the Church Today (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing Company, 1985), 78. 
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determined by what people do. Yet, on the other hand, he 
bases some tenets indispensable to hierarchicalism on his 
personal interpretation of Bible stories. Likewise, while 
Geisler acknowledges that the Bible includes many references 
to deception without approving any, he contends that those 
who lied to save life are to be emulated. Thus, Geisler's 
hierarchicalism denies the basic principles that he himself 
lays down concerning how to correctly understand and 
interpret the biblical accounts. 
Problematic Issues in Ethical Bierarchicalism 
Besides the above mentioned conflicting concepts, 
further scrutiny of ethical hierarchicalism indicates that 
there are additional problematic issues that need to be 
considered, especially in light of what other scholars have 
noted with regard to Geisler's ethical approach. 
Sins of commission or omission 
Over the years that Geisler has been writing on 
ethics, he has consistently held that "not resisting evil is 
a sin of omission, and sins of omission can be just as evil 
as sins of commission. 111 For example, he states: "To 
permit a murder when one could have prevented it is morally 
wrong. To allow a rape when one could have hindered it is 
an evil. To watch an act of cruelty toward children without 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 174. 
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trying to intervene is morally inexcusable. 111 Geisler 
asserts that this concept is based on James 4:17: "'Anyone, 
then, who knows the good he ought to do and doesn't do it, 
sins. 1112 
In discussing the "preservation of life principle," 
Geisler posits that "we have a moral duty to preserve and 
protect human life whenever possible. 113 It appears that 
Geisler builds this belief on the sixth commandment, for he 
says that "the command 'You shall not murder' (Exod. 20:13) 
implies that we should help prevent the unnatural death of 
innocent people as well. 114 In response to the view that 
committing murder is distinct from not saving a life, 
Geisler contends: "What significant moral difference is 
there between a sin of commission (which takes an innocent 
life), and one of omission (which willfully allows an 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 232. 
See also, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 174. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 232. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of our Time, 18. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 183. 
Geisler apparently utilizes the word "innocent" here since 
he believes in capital punishment (see ibid., 209-213) for 
the guilty. The term "unnatural" is presumably used here 
since, in connection with one form of euthanasia in which 
one allows natural death to occur, Geisler does believe that 
there is a difference between "taking a life and letting one 
die;" Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 232. See 
also, ibid., .124-125; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 167; Geisler, "Ethical Aspects of Evangelism with 
Particular Reference to Patients," 43; Moreland, and 
Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our 
Time, so. 
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innocent life to be taken)? Human life made in God's image 
has the same intrinsic value no matter which way one 
contributes to its demise. 111 Thus, since "it is morally 
unjustifiable not to resist evil, 112 "failing to prevent 
such a death is as culpable as actually causing it. 113 
All of the above reasoning is significant in 
Geisler's argument for ethical hierarchicalism, as can be 
observed for instance, in his negative assessment of the 
beliefs of non-conflicting absolutists. In discussing their 
position that there is no real dilemma in the case of lying 
or permitting a murder, Geisler states: 
1Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical 
Hierarchicalism, 11 83. In connection with the issue of war, 
Holmes similarly holds: "To fight is to take human life. 
Not to fight is to let human life be unjustly taken;" Arthur 
F. Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions, Contours of 
Christian Philosophy Series, ed. c. Stephen Evans (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 55. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 174. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 183. 
That Geisler sees absolutely no significant moral difference 
between intentionally killing and permitting the death of an 
innocent human being, can be observed from the way he 
discusses the case of a pregnancy in which the mother's life 
is in significant danger unless she gets an abortion. While 
he does note that in an abortion the unborn is "killed," he 
also simply says that in this case the fetus will "die." If 
the mother does not have the abortion, he states that "she 
will forfeit her own life." However, he states that as a 
result of this choice two lives may be "snuffed out;" 
Francis J. Beckwith, and Norman L. Geisler, Matters of Life 
and Death: Calm Answers to Tough Questions about Abortion 
and Euthanasia (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991), 
78-79. This fluid use of language confirms that, for 
Geisler, to kill is morally the same as to allow an innocent 
person to die. 
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They believe there is really only one moral obligation 
in this situation--to tell the truth. The only other 
duty, they say, belongs to the person threatening to do 
the killing. He is responsible for what he does with 
the truth we give him. But is this overlooking the fact 
that there is also a duty to save innocent lives, to 
show mercy? In short, is there a real conflict between 
truthfulness and mercifulness? In other words, the 
choice is really between an act of commission and one of 
omission. And a sin of omission can be lust as much a 
sin as a sin of commission (James 4:17). 
Thus, for Geisler, the fact that one is at times 
faced with either a sin of omission or one of commission 
becomes weighty additional evidence that in this real and 
fallen world, inevitable and unavoidable conflicts of moral 
obligations will occur. 2 
This notion that there is no morally relevant 
difference between intentionally committing an act and 
merely allowing one is seriously challenged by numerous 
scholars. For instance, in discussing the principle of 
double effect, Vincent MacNamara contends that "there is a 
difference between aiming at something and permitting it. 113 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 89-
90. See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 56-57. Incidentally, Geisler is not here arguing 
for the conflicting absolutist position that one sometimes 
lands in positions of having to choose between two sins. 
Since, as shown previously, he holds that in these 
situations the lower duty is suspended in view of the 
higher, it is clear that Geisler would not consider it a sin 
to tell a lie in this context. 
2see Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
96, 232. 
3vincent MacNamara, Love. Law and Christian Life: 
Basic Attitudes of Christian Morality (Wilmington, DE: 
Michael Glazier, 1988), 146. 
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It is true that if an impersonal viewpoint is taken, the end 
result becomes the only morally relevant factor. 1 However, 
if one rejects this utilitarian view and adopts a personal 
moral perspective, it becomes important, as Neil Brown 
notes, to distinguish for instance, "'acts intentionally 
designed to kill' from deaths that are brought about in 
other ways through the interventions or non-interventions of 
human agency. 112 This moral distinction between killing and 
permitting death is recognized by several thinkers. 3 
Approaching this essential difference from an intuitional 
perspective, Carla Kary says at length: 
Suppose one lets a drowning man die because he believes 
saving him would result in his own death. Or again, 
suppose that in order to secure medicine necessary to 
save the life of her mother, a woman must submit to a 
rape. The woman may well choose to let her mother die 
to avoid being raped. 4 
Now the intqition for these cases is that it would 
not be correct to judge either of the acts of letting 
die immoral. In the first case, one ought not be blamed 
for refusing to save if doing so puts one's own life at 
risk. And similarly in the second, one ought not be 
blamed for refusing to save if doing so requires one to 
submit to total degradation. The intuition is simply 
1Neil Brown, "Teleology or Deontology?" 48. 
2Ibid. 
3see, for example, Olson, 11-12; Richard L. 
Trammell, "The Nonequivalency of Saving Life and Not Taking 
Life," Journal ·of Medicine and Philosophy 4 (September 
1979): 251-262; Carla Kary, "A Moral Distinction Between 
Killing and Letting Die," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
5 (December 1980): 326-332. 
4Though Kary uses the word "rape" here, it would be 
more accurate to ref er to this action as a form of 
"prostitution," since it would be a case of sexual 
intercourse in order to secure economic gain. 
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that no person ought to be blamed for refusing to suffer 
violation to either his body or his spirit for the sake 
of saving someone whose impending death he did not 
cause. 1 
Considering this issue from a biblical perspective, 
Lutzer comes to analogous conclusions. Recognizing that the 
Scriptures teach that a man should provide for his family, 
Lutzer asks what he should do if crippled for life in an 
accident. He reasons that in such a case the man is not 
morally responsible for not fulfilling his obligations. 2 
Next, Lutzer discusses the story of a woman who decides to 
commit adultery so as to be released from prison in order to 
be able to care for her family. He observes that, "since 
the Scriptures clearly forbid doing evil that good might 
come, she is not free to commit adultery without incurring 
quilt. Through a situation beyond her control she was 
placed in a position where she could not fulfill the duty to 
her family. She is not therefore in a position where she 
must sin."3 Thus, when one is either physically or morally 
restricted, one is not morally culpable for permitting an 
1Kary, 328-329. Pack perceptively notes that the 
"bad consequences that appear to come from a given action 
may be due to the evil action of another moral agent;" 
Rolland w. Pack, "An Examination of Norman L. Geisler's 
Ethic of Hierarchy," (M.A. thesis, Harding College, 1979), 
87-88. 
2Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 108. 
3Ibid., 109. 
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undesirable situation to occur or to exist. Put simply: "He 
is not accountable for a tragedy beyond his control. 111 
An example of this can be seen in the illustration 
of an obstetrician who, in the process of delivering a baby, 
finds himself in the situation of being able to save either 
the life of the mother or that of the child. While it is 
true that there will be a death in either case, there is a 
qualitative difference, as noted above, between the two 
acts. As Carla Kary appropriately explains: "He can choose 
to save the mother by killing the child, 112 or "he can 
choose to let the mother die because he refuses to kill the 
child. 113 Commenting on just such a pathological birth, 
Josef Fuchs points out that "there is in fact no commandment 
to save the mother at all costs. There is only an 
obligation to save her in a morally permissible way. 114 
Consequently, as Kary notes, it is morally right to allow 
the mother to die, since "the doctor does not want to commit 
what he (reasonably) believes is an immoral act. 115 Since 
the physician is unable to save the mother without killing 
the child, he is not responsible for this tragedy. As Kary 
1 Ibid.' 97. 
2Kary, 330. 
3Ibid. 
4Josef Fuchs, S.J., Natural Law: A Theological 
Investigation, trans. Helmut Reckter, and John A. Dowling 
(New York, NY: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 131. 
5Kary, 331. See also, Fuchs, 131. 
222 
succinctly concludes: "In a significant sense, his choices, 
drastic though they are, become easy to make. He is no 
longer thrust into the position of a god (and of having to 
decide who should live or die] and then confronted with the 
impermissibility of acting like one. 111 
By way of recapitulation, the following should be 
noted. Geisler alleges that there is no significant moral 
difference between acts of commission and those of omission. 
This theory provides additional support for his view that 
moral conflicts exist. However, the work of more careful 
scholarship reveals a distinct contrast between these two 
acts, and indicates that, while one is responsible for 
committing an evil act, one is not culpable for actions that 
one cannot prevent due to physical or moral restrictions. 
Hence, the choice is simplified in these situations, for one 
needs to merely do that which is morally required, without 
attempting to forestall the evil actions of another person. 
Assumed Absolutes and Moral Conflicts 
As already noted in the foregoing chapter, Geisler 
rarely explains what he means by the term "moral conflict." 
Based on the numerous examples he cites as well as the few 
brief explanations he gives, it has been concluded that, in 
Geisler's understanding, a moral conflict can be defined as 
1 Kary, 332. 
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an occasion when one is faced with two moral obligations, 
only one of which it is possible to perform. 1 
Unfortunately, a similar vagueness in definition 
appears to surround the question of identifying what the 
actual moral absolutes or universal norms are that need to 
be followed. For example, on the first page of his earliest 
volume on ethics, Geisler asks in relation to universal 
norms: "If there are more than one, what ought one to do if 
they conflict? 112 Then he says: "Is it ever right to lie in 
order to save life? The question poses a conflict in 
ethical norms. 113 Here Geisler evidently believes that 
truthtelling and life-saving are both moral absolutes. This 
kind of assumption can be seen throughout much of Geisler's 
work. 4 
An illustration of this is observed in Geisler's 
evaluation of non-conflicting absolutism. In discussing 
this method's belief that there are many absolute non-
overlapping moral norms, Geisler states: 
This assumption, however, is very difficult to reconcile 
with a wholistic view of human experience. That is, it 
seems to assume (contrary to fact) that the various 
1see "Definition of Moral Conflicts," in chapter 4. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 11. 
3Ibid., 13. 
4see, for example, ibid., 94; Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 67; Geisler, Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues, 26; Norman L. Geisler, "The 
Origins and Implications of the Greater Good Ethic," 
cassette (Lynchburg, VA: Quest Productions, 1989). 
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relationships and spheres of human activity are entirely 
isolated from each other. This compartmentalization of 
the several areas of human responsibility makes a neat 
theory, but it does not accord well with the brute 
realities of life. Like many other idealistic 
positions, non-conflicting pluralistic absolutism is a 
beautiful theory which is destroyed by a brutal gang of 
facts. 1 
Clearly, for Geisler, the facts or experiences of 
life provide the evidence that absolute norms conflict. 
Yet, even though it is clear that the one who believes in 
the existence of conflicting moral norms can only do so 
based on an understanding as to what these moral absolutes 
actually are, nowhere in his works does Geisler take the 
time to exegetically establish or systematically outline 
what the fundamental moral absolutes are that are required 
of all Christians. All along he proceeds on unexpressed 
assumptions as to what these universal moral norms are. 
Consequently, based on his personal interpretation as to 
what these absolutes are, Geisler concludes that these 
obligations conflict in the real world and in the Bible. 
In view of this type of phenomenological approach to 
ethics, Helmut Thielicke says: "Many theological ethicists 
allow the development of their work to be controlled, not by 
theological enquiry, but by the law of that phenomenology of 
life. 112 Thielicke rightly acknowledges that, even the most 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 94 
(emphasis added). 
2Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, 
Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966), 461. 
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unsuspecting visual act, "even what appears to be the most 
objective and natural human understanding of that which is 
observed, is not really without its prior assumptions. 111 
Indeed, "it contains in fact an act of evaluation which 
precedes the observation, an act which itself presupposes a 
scale of values and therefore a particular view of 
things. 112 
Thielicke's astute analysis of the phenomenological 
approach to ethics exposes a fateful flaw of Geisler's 
method. Despite Geisler's repeated declarations that the 
experiences or "facts" of life prove that moral absolutes 
conflict, it is clear that these conflicts are due to his 
own interpretation of the so-called "facts." By way of 
illustration, Geisler considers the problem of lying to save 
life to be a conflict of moral absolutes. As noted above, 
this is because he considers it a moral absolute to prevent 
innocent life from being taken. However, as Gordon Olson, 
in his biblical critique of ethical hierarchicalism has 
countered, "it is an absolute not to commit murder; but it 
is not an absolute to save a life. 113 In other words, as 
David Gill has so perceptively remarked: "Geisler's dilemmas 
1Ibid., 1:462. 
2Ibid. 
301son, 12. 
226 
are often false dilemmas arising from his imposition of 
worldly definitions of truth on the Bible."1 
Ironically, it is Geisler himself who has sounded a 
warning about the dangers of interpreting the Bible based on 
personal experience. He observes: "Reevaluation of the 
Bible based on our experience often ends in reinterpreting 
the Bible by our experience, rather than interpreting our 
experience by the Bible. The Bible is our final authority, 
not our experience. 112 In addition, he cautions that "the 
critical thinker must constantly be on guard against the 
naive acceptance of a multitude of universal norms for which 
there is provided no adequate justification. 113 Then he 
adds: "Especially should one be defensive about the naive 
acceptance of so-called absolutes which conflict with each 
other. 114 It appears that, unfortunately, Geisler has not 
1oavid w. Gill, review of Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, by Norman L. Geisler, in Transformation 1 
(October/December 1984): 28. 
2Norman L. Geisler, Signs and Wonders (Wheaton, IL: 
Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1988), 110. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 94. 
4Ibid. While it is not the purpose of this research 
to deal with whether or not real moral conflicts exist, it 
should be noted-that several scholars challenge this notion. 
See, for example, Fuchs, 131; Tiessen, 200; Luck, 28; Pack, 
97; Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-Conflicting 
Absolutism," 255; Edmund N. Santurri, Perplexity in the 
Moral Life: Philosophical and Theological Considerations, 
Studies in Religion and Culture, ed. Nathan A. Scott, Jr. 
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1987), 
116, 124, 156, 202, 211. As Olson (p. 9) notes: "The 
attributes of God cannot be in conflict since he is 
perfection." 
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heeded his own counsel on these matters. Since ethical 
hierarchicalism is based partly on Geisler's assumed 
absolutes that conflict in the "facts" of human experience, 
it is an unacceptable method of moral reasoning. Rather, as 
Geisler has personally noted, "for a Christian, all of life 
must be interpreted by the final authority of the Bible. 111 
The Laws of Bature and Koral Theory 
On various occasions Geisler has ref erred to the 
laws of nature or physical phenomena to illustrate or 
support different tenets of ethical hierarchicalism. 2 For 
instance, in positing that this is a real and not an ideal 
world in which life must be lived, Geisler suggests that 
when God's perfect laws are applied here, "responsibilities 
overlap and we are torn between two absolute commands. 113 
Elucidating this concept by a law of nature, Geisler says: 
"It's God's attributes shining through the spectrum of this 
finite world that give us a whole spray of colors from top 
to bottom that overlap. 114 And it is here, in this fallen 
1Geisler, Signs and Wonders, 110. 
2In addition to these natural laws, Geisler claims 
that his concept of "exemption" functions somewhat like an 
ethical "right of way" law--when two cars simultaneously 
reach an intersection without signals or signs, the car on 
the right has the right of way; Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 89; Geisler, Christian 
Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
3Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 282. 
4Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." 
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world, that these moral conflicts occur. 1 In a more 
scientifically accurate explanation, Luck counters Geisler, 
noting that "God's love and harmonious rules pass through 
the prism of finitude and form a spectrum of laws that, like 
the colors of the spectrum, do not overlap or conflict. 112 
Plainly, the more vital illustration from the world 
of nature that Geisler utilizes relates to the claim of 
ethical hierarchicalism that a moral law can be absolute, 
yet not need to be kept. For example, Geisler posits that 
it is sometimes necessary to appear to "break" the fifth 
commandment so as to keep the first. 3 However, the one who 
does this is not really breaking the lower law; "rather, he 
is merely transcending it by his obedience to the higher 
commandment. 114 Referring to the laws of physics, Geisler 
asserts: "The law of magnetism does not destroy the law of 
gravity when a magnet picks up a nail; it merely overpowers 
it. 115 Similarly, he claims that when one obeys the first 
commandment over against the fifth commandment, "it is not a 
1Ibid. See also, Geisler, The Christian Ethic of 
Love, 76, where he says that "the pyramid of principles 
emerges as the light of God's love passes through the prism 
of human experience thereby casting a spectrum or order of 
God's laws." 
2Luck, 28 (footnote #27). 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 31-32. 
4Ibid., 32. 
5Ibid. See also, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and 
Issues, 19. 
229 
transgression but a suspension of the lower law of love for 
the higher law of love. 111 In his later works on ethics, 
Geisler notes that "just as a magnet does not break the law 
of gravity in attracting a nail, killing in self-defense 
does not violate the law of respect and preservation of 
human beings. 112 Thus, "the overriding duty to keep the 
higher law simply renders it unnecessary for us to perform 
the demands of the lesser command. 113 
In responding to this comparison, John Tape 
discerningly notes: 
The analogy with the magnet falls short because the 
point of comparison lies in the nail, not in the magnet. 
When the nail is attracted upward by a magnet the nail 
certainly is breaking or violating (i.e., failing to 
conform .to) the law of gravity. Likewise whenever God's 
laws are violated, or when man fails to conform to them, 
they are broken. 4 
William Luck argues further, that the magnet is a 
poor analogy that leads hierarchicalism astray. For, "the 
1Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 32. 
Interestingly, Thomas Aquinas, whom Geisler credits with 
having had the most influence on his life, compared the 
dispensations from natural law precepts that he claimed God 
allowed, to miracles in the physical order; John F. Dedek, 
"Intrinsically Evil Acts: An Historical Study of the Mind of 
St. Thomas," Thomist 43 (July 1979): 410. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 129. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
99. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 129. 
4John Tape, "A case for conflicting Absolutism," 
1990, TMs [photocopy], p. 6, a paper presented at the 
Evangelical Theological Society annual meeting, New Orleans, 
LA. 
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force of gravity is measurable, but moral obligation is 
not. 111 In other words, "a rule either obliges or it does 
not. There are no degrees of obligation. 112 Luck then 
charges that, even if there were such a thing as a stronger 
law conflicting with a weaker, and "if the weaker law is 
binding in the situation at all, then for it to be ignored 
is for it to have been disobeyed. 113 
Paradoxically, it is Geisler himself who provides a 
strong caution in connection with using the laws of nature 
as analogous to moral law. He maintains that "the moral law 
is not to be identified with the laws of nature because the 
latter is descriptive (simply is), not prescriptive (ought) 
as moral lawi;; are. 114 Likewise, Geisler observes that, "by 
definition, physics deals with what ~ and morality with 
what ought to be. 115 
1Luck, 23. Furthermore, as any astronaut will 
attest, the force of gravity is virtually non-existent in 
space, and is not an absolute law. Since this natural law 
is clearly limited and operable only under certain specific 
conditions, it cannot therefore legitimately be used as a 
true analogy of God's eternal absolute moral laws. 
2Luck, 23. 
3Ibid. 
4Norman L. Geisler, Knowing the Truth about 
Creation: How It Happened and What It Means for Us (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Servant Books, 1989), 77. 
5oavid Basinger, and Randall Basinger, eds., 
Predestination & Free Will (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1986), 75. In another place Geisler admonishes that 
"animal behavior is not normative for humans," since 
"animals are not rationally and morally responsible 
creatures;" Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
231 
In brief then, while Geisler has used illustrations 
from the world of nature to support some of the tenets of 
ethical hierarchicalism, some intellectuals have seriously 
questioned the validity of these analogies. It has been 
pointed out, for instance, that the magnet illustration 
actually counters Geisler's point, by showing that the law 
of gravity is violated or broken in this instance. Perhaps 
it would have been fortuitous had Geisler complied with his 
own warning against associating descriptive natural law with 
prescriptive moral law. As Luck states: "Moral obligation 
is not like the obligation of nature's laws. One cannot 
have a rule that obliges but from which one is immune. 111 
Principle of Double Effect and Teleoloqy 
It has been reiterated more than once that ethical 
hierarchicalism contends that "mere human actions as such 
are not intrinsically good or evil. 112 In an effort to 
elucidate his view concerning the nature of human actions, 
Geisler points out that hierarchicalism "does not proclaim 
.that the evil is a good thing to do, but rather that the 
267. Humans need to be concerned with moral law, not animal 
behavior, or the laws of physics. 
1Luck, 31. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
109. See also, "Conflicting Absolutism," 4. 
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highest obligation in the conflict is the good thing to 
do. 111 He explains: 
For example, in falsifying to save a life, it is not the 
falsehood that is good (a lie as such is always wrong), 
but it is the act of mercy to save a life that is good--
despite the fact that intentional falsification was 
necessary to accomplish this good. In other words, it 
is unfortunately true that what is called "evil" 
sometimes accompanies the performance of good acts. 2 
In these cases God does not consider a man culpable for 
the concomitant "evil" in view of the performance of the 
greater good.3 
Geisler claims that, in this regard, ethical 
hierarchicalism "is similar to the principle of double 
effect, which states that when two results--a good result 
and an evil result--emerge from one act, the individual is 
held responsible only for the good one he intended and not 
for the evil one which necessarily resulted from the good 
intention. 114 Elaborating further on his interpretation of 
the doctrine of double effect, Geisler says that, "when an 
action has good and bad consequences, then the action may be 
performed under the following circumstances: 115 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 126. 
2Ibid. See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 96. 
3Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
96. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 127. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 126-
127. See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 96-97; Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 
85. 
5Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 67. 
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1. The act is good or at least indifferent regarding 
the end that one directly intends. 
2. The good and evil effects follow immediately from 
the act; that is, the good effect is not obtained by 
means of the evil effect. 
3. One only intends the good effect but merely 
tolerates the bad effect, even if that bad effect 
was foreseen prior to the act. 
4. There is a proportion between the good and bad 
effects; that is, the good must be at least equal to 
the bad. 1 
While Geisler observes that this "principle of 
double effect expresses the importance of intentions and 
means to ends in moral actions, 112 it is evident, as John 
Tape concludes, that ethical hierarchicalism "uses the 
principle of double effect in an attempt to pronounce the 
Christian inculpable for breaking the lesser command. 113 
over. the years there has been much discussion and 
debate concerning the concept of "double effect. 114 The 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3Tape, 4. .see, Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial 
Ethics," 85; Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, 96-97; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 126-127. 
4see, for example, Daniel F. Montaldi, "A Defense of 
st. Thomas and the Principle of Double Effect," Journal of 
Religious Ethics 14 (Spring 1986): 296-332; Cornelius J. van 
der Poel, "The Principle of Double Effect," in Absolutes in 
Moral Theology?, ed. Charles E. curran (Washington, DC: 
Corpus Books, 1968), 186-210; John Martin Fischer, Mark 
Ravizza, and David Copp, "Quinn on Double Effect: The 
Problem of 'Closeness'," Ethics 103 (July 1993): 707-725; A. 
van den Beld, "Killing and the Principle of Double Effect," 
Scottish Journal of Theology 41 (May 1988): 93-116; Sanford 
s. Levy, "Paul Ramsey and the Rule of Double Effect," 
Journal of Religious Ethics 15 (Spring 1987): 59-71. For 
further references, see the appropriate footnote under "The 
Principle of Double Effect" in chapter 2. 
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traditional formulation of the theory of double effect has 
four parts. 1 When these four parts are compared with the 
above explanation of Geisler, it becomes apparent that, 
while the last three premises are essentially the same, the 
very first proposition differs in a significant manner. 
Geisler says simply that this first premise maintains that, 
"the act is good or at least indifferent regarding the end 
that one directly intends. 112 For him, the principle of 
double effect relates to two results that emerge from an act 
that is in itself undefined, ·but is good only in relation to 
the end it intends to bring about. 3 
This perspective, however, contradicts what the 
principle of double effect teaches. For instance, Neil 
Brown notes that "the agent was permitted to perform the 
action provided that the act itself was not classed as 
1see, for example, Neil Brown, The Worth of Persons: 
A Study in Christian Ethics (Sydney, Australia: Catholic 
Institute of Sydney, 1983), 101; Albert R. Diianni, S.M., 
"The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Morals," Thomist 41 
(July 1977): 350-351. MacNamara (p. 140) says: "It is 
important to realise that the principle [of double effect] 
is not of divine origin but is a rule of thumb thought up by 
theologians of the past to deal with complex cases where 
there seems to be a clash of values." 
2Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 67. 
3see Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
126-127; Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
96-97; Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchial Ethics," 85; 
Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: Moral 
Issues of Our Time, 67. 
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intrinsically evil."1 Other scholars concur that this 
action "is not in itself bad, 112 is itself "not morally 
evil. 113 Since this concept, that acts in themselves have 
intrinsic value, is negated by Geisler, it becomes 
manifestly plain that in a crucial manner, ethical 
hierarchicalism conflicts with the principle of double 
effect. 
Moreover, the principle as used by Geisler, can be 
seen to have additional difficulties. To begin with, while 
disregarding the nature of the action in itself, Geisler 
focuses on the results or consequences that emerge from the 
action. In this sense, he uses the principle of double 
effect in a utilitarian or teleological manner. 
Furthermore, there are numerous scholars who feel 
that the principle of double effect has limitations and 
ambiguities. 4 For example, Anthony Blasi, noting that this 
rule "seems to be faulty in several respects, 115 argues that 
1Neil Brown, The Worth of Persons: A Study in 
Christian Ethics, 101 (emphasis added). 
2John c. Dwyer, Foundations of Christian Ethics (New 
York, NY: Paulist Press, 1987), 156. 
3Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Double Effect, 
Principle of," in Westminster Dictionary of Christian 
Ethics, ed. James F. Childress, and John Macquarrie 
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1986), 162. See also, 
van den Beld, 95. 
4see, for example, Charles E. Curran, Ongoing 
Revision in Moral Theology, (Notre Dame, IN: Fides 
Publishers, Inc., 1975), 192; Dwyer, 159; Blasi, 138-139. 
5Blasi, 139. 
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"the principle is altogether ambiguous with respect to what 
is to be understood from such terms as 'serious reason,' 
'commensurate reason,' and 'proportionately grave reason. 111 
Finally, the very illustration of lying to save life 
that Geisler uses as an example of the principle of double 
effect, is called into question by Charles Fried: 
There is no way in which one's own lie can be a mere 
side effect of some other intention that is pursued. 
One can only lie intentionally--it is not possible to 
lie inadvertently or as the known but unwanted side 
effect of some other purpose. To be sure, it is 
possible to create erroneous impressions as a side 
effect or inadvertently, but then one is not lying. 
Thus the lie is always an end in itself or a means, a 
chosen means, or it is not a lie at all. 2 
In summary, the following should be noted. Though 
Geisler alleges that ethical hierarchicalism is similar to 
the principle of double effect, his modified version of this 
doctrine contradicts an essential component of the standard 
formulation of it. In reality, Geisler utilizes this rule 
in a teleological way, focusing on consequences, since he 
does not believe in the intrinsic value of human actions. 
Besides some additional problems associated with this 
ideology, it was shown how that the precise illustration 
utilized by Geisler, turns out to be an illegitimate 
interpretation of the principle of double effect. 
2charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), 55. 
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Interpretation of Vital Bi~le Passaqes1 
Since Geisler is a Christian ethicist who seeks to 
construct a biblical approach to ethics, 2 he refers to and 
discusses many narratives and texts from the Scriptures. He 
holds that "Christian ethics originates with God and is 
based on His Word. 113 For Geisler, the Bible is "an 
authority"4 which furnishes the Christian believer with "an 
inscripturated revelation. 115 Maintaining that the "written 
Word of God is love manifest in propositional form., 116 he 
declares that "the Bible provides an objectively knowable 
referent point for discovering the will of the immutably 
loving and just God. 117 Based on statements such as these, 
as well as on the manner in which he uses the Scriptures in 
his works on ethics, it becomes clear that, for Geisler, the 
Bible supplies the propositional and conceptual content for 
ethical decision making. Given Geisler's herm.eneutical 
1Unless otherwise indicated, all passages of 
Scripture will be from the New King James Version (NKJV). 
2see Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics, a; Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
13-14. 
25. 
33. 
3Geisler, Options in contemporary Christian Ethics, 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 17. 
5Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
6Ibid., 40. 
7 Ibid., 34. 
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approach, there does, however, appear to be significant 
contradictions and inconsistencies in his utilization of the 
Scriptures, a matter which will be the focus of this 
section. 1 
Naturally, it is beyond the scope of this research 
project to consider every scriptural reference Geisler has 
used. 2 Thus, only the stories and passages crucial to 
ethical hierarchicalism will be examined. 3 These passages 
have been classified under four different areas, even though 
it must be recognized that Geisler has at times used these 
texts to support more than one of these concepts. 
Therefore, as appropriate, some of these pivotal passages 
will be discussed in more than one setting. While the 
investigation of these vital biblical texts is not intended 
to provide an indepth and definitive exegesis of every 
verse, this study hopes to shed light on the meaning of 
1Note that the scholars used in this critique of 
Geisler's interpretation of vital Bible passages, ascribe to 
essentially the same hermeneutical approach to Scripture 
espoused by Geisler. 
2In Appendix III of his master's thesis, Pack (pp. 
165-166) provides a brief diagrammatic analysis of the Bible 
passages cited by Geisler in support of hierarchicalism, 
together with the principles essential to disproving 
Geisler's claims. 
3 since all the passages vital to hierarchicalism 
appear to have been interpreted in a problematic manner, 
this section includes no Bible texts supporting Geisler's 
view. 
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these passages in their specific contexts, as well as their 
practical application for ethics, as needed. 1 
Justifiable Deception to Save Life 
To elucidate his belief that there is a certain 
hierarchy of values to be used to resolve moral conflicts, 
Geisler often refers to the matter of lying to save life. 
on the one hand, he acknowledges that "deception and lying 
are repeatedly condemned in Scripture. 112 Yet, he claims 
that "the Bible indicates that there are occasions when 
intentionally falsifying (lying) is justifiable. 113 He 
draws this distinction, for he claims that, "while lying as 
such is never justified, lying to save a life is. 114 He 
posits that there are many incidents in the Scriptures where 
God "commended the faith of those involved in intentional 
deception in order to save lives. 115 Thus he declares: "In 
1At times Geisler makes rather inaccurate statements 
relating to the contents of specific passages. For example, 
in attempting to demonstrate the existence of moral 
conflicts, Geisler rhetorically asks: "If a man fears for 
the safety of his wife, should he lie to protect her? (Gen. 
20:12);" Geisler, and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 282. 
According to the biblical account, Abraham lied to save his 
own life, and not his wife's life; (Gen 20:2, 11-12). 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
Dedek (p. 407) mentions that, for Thomas Aquinas, "every lie 
is a sin no matter how good the reason might be." 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
4Ibid., 129. 
5Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. 
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view of the biblical examples one is forced to conclude that 
lying to save life is justifiable. 111 
Perhaps the most often cited case is the story of 
Rahab, as found in Joshua 2. Geisler explains at length: 
Rahab intentionally deceived to save the lives of 
Israel's spies and was immortalized in the spiritual 
"hall of fame" (Heb. 11). It should be noted that 
first, nowhere does the Bible condemn her for this 
deception; second, her falsehood was an integral part of 
the act of mercy she showed in saving the spies' lives; 
and third, the Bible says, "Rahab • • • shall be spared, 
because she hid the spies we sent" (Josh. 6:17). But 
the real concealment was accomplished by deceiving the 
authorities at her door. It seems that God blessed her 
because of it, not in spite of it. Hence, her "lie" was 
an integral part of her faith for which she was 
commended of God (Heb. 11:31; James 2:25). 2 
Each of the above points needs to be looked at 
carefully. First, while it is true that the Bible nowhere 
condemns her for this deception, it is also true, as Pack 
properly points out, that throughout the Bible "her lie is 
never commended. 113 A lack of any direct commendation or 
condemnation of actions in Scripture is no indication of the 
rightness or wrongness of the deeds performed. 4 For 
example, nowhere is there any condemnation of the rape and 
1Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 78. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
See also, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 123; 
Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 91; 
Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 78-79; Geisler, 
"Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 220; Geisler, "Any 
Chance for Morality? Part 2, 11 22. 
3 Pack, 123. 
4For instance, no comment, either positive or 
negative, is made about Rahab's practice of prostitution. 
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incest of the daughters of Lot with their father, as 
recorded in Genesis 19. Since the oldest daughter had a son 
named Moab, who became the ancestor of Ruth, and thus 
eventually of Jesus, 1 should one conclude that this 
incestuous rape was actually a good thing? Obviously, just 
as in this case, so Rahab's deception "violates a clear 
commandment of God, 112 and needs to be judged on this basis 
and not on either immediate or remote consequences. 3 
Second, does the Bible demonstrate that Rahab's 
"falsehood was an integral part of the act of mercy she 
showed in saving the spies' lives, 114 as Geisler claims? A 
reading of the biblical chronicle indicates that several 
acts and discussions took place between Rahab and the spies, 
and Rahab and the men of Jericho. To merely lump all of 
these activities together under the rubric of an "act of 
mercy," thereby justifying every action, is essentially the 
same as vindicating all of David's deeds, including adultery 
and murder, because God called him "a man after His own 
1compare Gen 19:37, Ruth 1:4, 4:13-22, and Matt 1:5, 
16. 
2Walter c. Kaiser, Jr., Hard Sayings of the Old 
Testament (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1988), 97. 
3Furthermore, Olson (p. 7), suggesting that Rahab 
was not morally culpable due to ignorance of God's moral 
law, says: "When we remember that she was at this point a 
new convert who knew nothing of the Mosaic Law just given, 
can we expect her to follow the moral standards of God's 
people Israel at this point? She did what her culture 
informed her to do." 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
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heart," 1 and one "who kept My commandments and followed me 
with all his heart. 112 Evidently, a general commendation 
does not necessarily mean endorsement of each individual 
action. As Walter Kaiser aptly notes regarding Rahab: "Her 
case is but another dramatic witness to the principle that 
divine approval of an individual in one situation is no 
guarantee of divine approval in any or all other cases. 113 
Third, while the Bible says Rahab was to be spared 
because she hid the spies, Geisler claims that Rahab's "real 
concealment was accomplished by deceiving the authorities at 
her door." 4 In other words, "the lie was the key to the 
hiding of the spies. 115 The scriptural record indicates 
otherwise. According to Joshua 2:6, prior to the arrival of 
the authorities, Rahab had taken the two spies up to the 
flat roof of her house and had hidden them under some piles 
of flax plants. It was only subsequent to this, and in a 
different action that Rahab chose to lie about the men. As 
Kaiser insightfully remarks: "Her lying was an unnecessary 
11 Sam 13:14. 
21 Kgs 14:8. 
3Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 272. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
5Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 79. 
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accoutrement, 111 to the separate act of hiding the two 
men. 2 
Geisler concludes that Rahab's lie "was an integral 
part of her faith for which she was commended of God (Heb. 
11:31; James 2:25)."3 While Hebrews 11:31 does commend 
Rahab's faith and her act of hospitality, James 2:25 
specifically states that she was "justified by works when 
she received the messengers and sent them out another way." 
Commenting on this text, Geisler insists that "only the lie 
made this possible. It would follow then that the lie was 
what enabled her to justify her faith in God. 114 Is this 
so? In examining this passage, John Murray observes: "It 
should not go unnoticed that the New Testament Scriptures 
which commend Rahab for her faith and works make allusion 
solely to the fact that she received the spies and sent them 
out another way. 115 Then Murray observes that the approval 
of these actions does not logically likewise endorse the 
specific act of deception. He concludes: "It is strange 
1Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 272. 
2If Rahab had told the truth to the king's 
messengers it cannot be merely assumed that they would 
certainly have found the Israelite men. While it is 
probable that they would have searched the roof, there is no 
guarantee that they would have discovered the men. Also, it 
must not be forgotten that the Lord God might have performed 
a miracle to protect His people, as He did at the Red Sea. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
4Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 79. 
5Murray, 138 (emphasis added). 
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theology that will insist that the approval of her faith and 
works in receiving the spies and helping them to escape must 
embrace the approval of all the actions associated with her 
praiseworthy conduct. 01 Pack similarly recognizes that, 
while James commends her work of faith, "he never even hints 
that Rahab's lie became right because of circumstantial 
difficulties. 112 
Finally, in connection with Rahab's lie, Geisler 
says: "It seems that God blessed her because of it, not in 
spite of it. 113 This statement is controverted by Geisler 
himself, where he recognizes the biblical truth that "God 
sometimes blesses us in spite of ourselves and He is able to 
bring good out of evil (Gen. 50:20; Rom. 8:28). 114 
Regarding Rahab's actions Kaiser notes: "Romans 3:8 
warns us not to say, 'Let us do evil that good may result.' 
Neither should we argue, especially from a descriptive or a 
narrative passage, that a text validates deceit under 
certain conditions. 115 He contends that to argue in favor 
of deception in this manner would be "poor exegesis and 
2Pack, 123. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
4Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 397. 
5Kaiser, Hard Sayings of the Old Testament, 96. 
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theology. 111 Then, in a rather transparent reference to 
both conflicting absolutism and ethical hierarchicalism, 
Kaiser says: 
We cannot say that protecting innocent lives is a 
greater good than the demand always to tell the truth. 
Scripture nowhere advocates or allows for such 
hierarchy. To do so would pit part of God's nature 
against other parts of his nature. To say that lying is 
a lesser evil than being involuntarily implicated in 
murder is again an artificial and subjective construct. 
We need to follow all of God's Word and that Word 
involves respect for both life and truth. 2 
Further, Kaiser admonishes that "we must not form 
our own subjective hierarchies or personal priorities in 
assigning what we believe is the greater good or lesser 
evil. 113 Rather, it must be recognized that, according to 
the written Word of God, truthtelling "is a universal 
responsibility for all times, all peoples, in all places. 114 
In addition to the story of Rahab, a second case 
frequently mentioned in Geisler's works is that of the 
Hebrew midwives, Shiphrah and Puah, as found in Exodus 1. 
Geisler declares: "In the story of the Hebrew midwives we 
have an even clearer case of divinely approved lying to save 
a life. 115 He notes that these women "lied to the king 
2Ibid., 97. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 122. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
86; Geisler, "Any Chance for Morality? Part 2, 11 22. 
246 
(Exod. 1:19) in order to save the male babies. 111 Then he 
adds: "In this case, the text says clearly and unequivocally 
that 'God blessed them and gave them families' as a result 
of what they did. 112 Geisler reasons that, since "the text 
explicitly says following their deception that 'because the 
midwives feared God, then He [God] established households 
for them, 1113 and since all things in the Old Testament 
happened as examples for us, "it seems difficult to avoid 
the conclusion tha~ these were God-approved examples of how 
He wants us to behave in similar moral conflicts. 114 
Acknowledging that these women did lie to the king, 
Kaiser queries: "But does the text give us warrant to speak 
an untruth under the proper conditions? 115 He frankly 
admits that the juxtaposition of their lie in Exodus 1:19 
with the statement that God treated them well in verse 20 
1Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. Since the text does not 
explicitly state why the midwives said what they did to the 
king, it can be debated as to whether these women lied in an 
attempt to save the baby boys or in order to try and 
preserve their own lives. Irrespective of whose lives they 
were more concerned about at this point in time, this 
passage still needs to be addressed since it does appear as 
a clear case of lying to save life. 
2Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. 
3Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical 
Hierarchicalism," 85. 
4Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. 
5Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 273. 
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might appear to endorse their deception. Looking at the 
actual passage, Kaiser then explains: "But this suspicion 
cannot be sustained in the text, for twice it attributes the 
reason for God's blessing them to the fact that they feared 
('believed') God (vv. 17 and 21). 111 Pack rightly attests 
that "nowhere in the text is their conversation with Pharaoh 
endorsed."2 Rather, as Murray articulates: "The midwives 
feared God in disobeying the king and it is because they 
feared God that the Lord blessed them. 113 Thus, contrary to 
Geisler's assertion, there is no evidence in this pericope 
of divine approbation for using deception to avert death. 
On occasion Geisler considers the story of Obadiah. 
As part of the biblical proof that lying to save life is 
right, Geisler states: "No doubt Obadiah the prophet engaged 
in some deceptive activity to save the lives of one hundred 
prophets of God (1 Kings 18:13). 114 In an effort to support 
the notion of moral conflicts, he rhetorically asks: "Should 
Obadiah have deceived the king in hiding the prophets of God 
who had been condemned to death (1 Kings 18)?"5 
Thorough investigation of the entire biblical record 
indicates that there is no evidence whatsoever that Obadiah 
1Ibid. 
2· Pack, 122. 
3Murray, 141. 
4Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 79. 
5Geisler, "Any Chance for Morality? Part 2," 22. 
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was involved in any "deceptive activity," as Geisler 
alleges. 1 The text merely reports that during the time 
that Jezebel was massacring the prophets of the Lord, 
Obadiah "'hid one hundred men of the Lord's prophets, fifty 
to a cave, and fed them with bread and water. 1112 If one is 
to assume, as does Geisler, that Obadiah doubtless engaged 
in some type of deception in order to protect the lives of 
these men, then one could also surmise that he most likely 
stole the food and water for these people, since commodities 
were certainly in short supply during the famine. But all 
of this groundless speculation beyond the textual evidence 
is a reading into the text one's own suppositions, rather 
than accepting the passage just as it reads. This type of 
eisegesis seems to be a desperate bid to find support for a 
theory vital to hierarchicalism. 
One of the incidents in the life of the prophet 
Elisha is also included by Geisler as confirmation of the 
view that there is "divine approval of falsification for 
1Moreover, there is no textual evidence that Obadiah 
was a "prophet," as Geisler states. It appears as though 
Geisler refers to Obadiah as a "prophet" in an attempt to 
further bolster his case about the supposed rightness of 
lying to save life. 
21 Kgs 18:13. While the issue considered above is 
whether or not it is ever right to lie, it must be noted 
that Obadiah's action can be seen as an act of disobedience 
to the king's order. The question of civil disobedience 
will be discussed below in the sub-section dealing with "The 
Existence of Moral Conflicts." 
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life-saving. 111 Based on his interpretation of the pericope 
in 2 Kings 6, Geisler charges that "Elisha deceived his 
would-be captors in order to save his life."2 
While on the surface it might appear that Elisha was 
involved in deception, the question must be asked as to what 
the actual text records. In brief, though the reader of the 
story knows that the Arameans had changed their plans and 
were now out to capture Elisha instead of the Israelite king 
as previously, there is no evidence that Elisha was aware of 
this. Thus, fearless of the foe, and with confidence in his 
Creator's protection, Elisha asked God to temporarily blind 
these military forces so he could take them to the capital, 
present them. to the king, and treat them with incredible 
hospitality. If the story is interpreted on the weight of 
internal evidence, Elisha stands out in this incident as a 
man of truthfulness; as one who operated non-deceptively 
within the limits and boundaries of the information at his 
disposal. There is no proof at all that Elisha deceived his 
foes in order to save his own life. 3 
1Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 417. 
2Ibid. 
3In fact, when one studies the entire story and 
realizes how close to God Elisha was and how much he trusted 
in His divine power and protection, it seems rather 
unreasonable to assume that Elisha knew the enemy were after 
him and that therefore he stooped to using deception to 
protect himself. Furthermore, Elisha showed that he 
believed in loving and doing good to his enemies (Luke 6:27, 
28). Solomon put it this way: "If your enemy is hungry, 
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In summary then, several points should be noted. 
Geisler claims that "the Bible indicates that there are 
occasions when lying is justifiable. 111 In support of this 
thesis, he has referred to the stories of Rahab, the Hebrew 
midwives, Obadiah, and Elisha when they were all caught up 
in life or death dramas. As the above textual study has 
demonstrated, there is no evidence that either Obadiah or 
·• the prophet Elisha engaged in deceit to save life. While it 
is incontrovertible that Rahab practiced deception in an 
effort to protect the spies, there is nothing either in this 
story or in other parts of the Bible that displays divine 
approval of her lying. Similarly, in connection with the 
feed him. If he is thirsty, give him a drink. Doing this 
will be like pouring burning coals on his head, and the Lord 
will reward you" (Prov 25:21, 22; New Century Version). 
However, if one insists on assuming that Elisha did know 
that the Aramean king was now after him, and that he 
therefore actually did lie, this still does not."prove" that 
deception is acceptable to God. What it would show is that, 
even after God had provided superior supernatural forces to 
protect him, and after God had miraculously blinded the 
enemy, Elisha's faith somehow faltered when facing a blinded 
and essentially conquered foe. Obviously this does not make 
much sense at all. But, if this is what happened, it must 
be remembered that no human being is to be held up as an 
example. The only example to be unquestioningly followed is 
Jesus Christ (1 Pet 2:21). Other biblical characters are to 
be emulated only as they imitated Jesus, and acted in 
faithfulness and loving loyalty to God's clearly revealed 
will in Scripture. As Paul states: "Follow my example, as I 
follow the example of Christ" (1 Cor 11:1; New Century 
Version). For those who contend that we do not know whether 
or not Elisha knew that the Arameans were now after him, the 
most that can then be concluded from this incident is 
nothing about truthtelling or deception, but rather that 
kindness is a more powerful weapon than the sword. 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
91. 
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midwives, though God blessed them because they believed in 
Him, there is no endorsement of the falsehoods they told. 
In short, none of Geisler's examples establishes that it is 
justifiable to lie to save life. Rather, the Scriptures 
teach that it is a universal absolute moral obligation to be 
truthful, irrespective of present circumstances or projected 
possible consequences. 
The Existence of Moral Conflicts 
Geisler categorically holds that "unavoidable moral 
conflicts exist in which the individual cannot obey both 
commands. 111 As part of the foundation for this concept he 
refers to several "biblical examples of genuine, unavoidable 
moral conflicts. 112 
As a "classic example of a conflict of moral 
principles, 113 Geisler argues that "the story of Abraham and 
Isaac (Gen. 22) contains a real moral conflict. 'Thou shalt 
not kill' is a divine moral command (Exod. 20:13), and yet 
God commanded Abraham to kill his son, Isaac. 114 According 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
2Ibid., 119. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 121. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 117. 
See also, Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
84-85. 
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to Geisler, here is a case in which "two laws are in genuine 
conflict. 111 
The question must be asked: Is there any evidence 
that Abraham perceived these as two conflicting commands, 
only one of which he could obey? To begin with, a brief 
look at the actual terms used sheds some light on this 
issue. It is noteworthy that, in this command by God to 
Abraham, He calls on him to 'olah ("offer" or "sacrifice") 
Isaac. 2 This word, which appears hundreds of times in the 
Old Testament, always refers to a burnt offering, which 
Isaac was called to be. Significantly, the term ratsach, 3 
which is found in the sixth commandment, is completely 
absent from this pericope. In other words, it appears that 
Abraham did not find himself faced with two conflicting 
commands; for while one command said he should not ratsach, 
the other said that he must 'olah. 4 
Furthermore, the textual evidence implies that, 
rather than being two commands in conflict, the vital issue 
1Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 118. 
2see Gen 22:2. 
3see Exod 20:13; Deut 5:17. 
4Incidentally,·Geisler himself recognizes that, 
"only God has the right to demand the sacrifice of human 
lives, for God a.lone is the Author and owner of all life;" 
Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 188. Magno 
concurs, noting: "If God is author of life and death--and 
there is certainly nothing to prevent our assuming as much--
it follows that God may give and take life sans injustice;" 
Joseph A. Magno, "How Ethical Is Abraham's 'Suspension of 
the Ethical'?" Faith and Philosophy 2 (January 1985): 59. 
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at stake here was regarding Abraham's love and loyalty. 
Abraham's great fondness for Isaac is indicated in the words 
spoken by God: "'Take now your son, your only son Isaac, 
whom you love.'"1 Isaac, the son of promise, was extremely 
precious in his father's sight. The real test therefore 
appears to have been whether Abraham loved God more than he 
loved Isaac. By his obedience Abraham showed that he had 
supreme love for God. 
Hence, since these two commands of God were distinct 
and different, Abraham did not find himself in a conflict of 
moral obligations. Rather, the issue for Abraham was 
whether or not the principal object of his affection and 
devotion was the living God, or his cherished son Isaac. 
A second account that Geisler uses to substantiate 
his belief in the existence of moral conflicts, is that of 
Samson, just prior to his death. Geisler posits that "this 
story contains a conflict of two divine commands."2 He 
explains: "Samson committed a divinely approved suicide 
(Judg. 16:30) despite the moral prohibition against killing 
a human being, including oneself."3 Concerning this case, 
Geisler states: "Both commands were divine and moral (first, 
Do not kill, and second, Take your life); yet, when there 
1Gen 22:2 (emphasis added). 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 118. 
3Ibid. 
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was a real conflict between them, God apparently approved of 
disregarding one in order to obey the other. 111 
While Geisler is correct in pointing out that, 
"since suicide is also a form of homicide, it too comes 
under the prohibition against murder, 112 the pivotal 
question is whether or not Samson's death was a suicide. A 
study of Geisler's works indicates that the major problem 
here has to do with the definition of suicide. For 
instance, in his first book on ethics he posits that "not 
all suicide is wrong. 113 Then he adds: "The real proof for 
the Christian that sacrificial suicide is morally right is 
the death of Jesus Christ. 114 Aware that some may object to 
the use of the term "suicide" in this way, Geisler responds: 
"Whatever it is called, it is a self-initiated act to save 
other lives by sacrificing one's own life. It is an 
intentional but justifiable relinquishing of one's own life. 
85. 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 165. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 239. 
4Ibid. At least until 1986 Geisler still maintained 
that Jesus' death was a suicide. He noted: "Christ chose to 
suspend the lower moral mandate, which says that we should 
not commit suicide, in order to fulfill the higher moral law 
of saving the lives of others;" Norman L. Geisler, and J. 
Yutaka Amano, The Reincarnation Sensation (Wheaton, IL: 
Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1986), 117. 
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In view of this it seems appropriate to call it a 
'sacrificial suicide. 1 nl 
More recently, Geisler has begun to carefully define 
the term "suicide." On the one hand, he declares that 
"whatever the motive, suicide is wrong because God alone is 
sovereign over human life, and he has commanded us to 
respect his authority over us and his image within us."2 
On the other hand, Geisler grants that "it is not wrong to 
give one's life for others."3 After citing a few examples 
of those willing to lay down their lives for others, Geisler 
concludes: "In each of these cases it is not suicide--the 
taking of one's life. Rather it is a loving sacrifice of 
one's life •. And 'greater love has no one than this, that 
one lay down his life for his friends. 1114 Most importantly 
for this discussion is the fact that Geisler uses Samson as 
the very first example to prove that willingly laying down 
one's life is not suicide. He says: "Samson sacrificed his 
life to avenge the Philistines (Judg. 16:28)."5 Thus, by 
Geisler's own admission, Samson's death was not a suicide. 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 240. 
2Norman L. Geisler, "Sanctity of Human Life," in 
Applying the Scriptures, Papers from ICBI Summit III, ed. 
Kenneth s. Kantzer (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1987), 147. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 148. Geisler was here quoting the New 
American standard Bible's rendering of John 15:13. 
5Geisler, "Sanctity of Human Life," 147. 
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This conclusion is consistent with the biblical data 
which indicates that Samson, who had been called by God to 
be judge and deliverer, ruled over Israel for twenty years, 
destroying more of the enemies of God's people by his self-
sacrificial death than during his life. 1 Therefore, since 
"an act of martyrdom or sacrifice for the lives of others is 
not a suicide, 112 as Geisler admits, it becomes plain that 
Samson's death was not a suicide. Hence, this narrative 
does not support the view that real moral conflicts exist. 
Geisler locates a third narrative that includes a 
clash of obligations also in the book of Judges: 
The passage detailing Jephthah's sacrifice of his 
daughter (Judg. 11) shows a real moral conflict between 
a vow to. God (which is inviolate [Eccles. 5:1-4]) and 
the command not to kill an innocent life. The usual 
answer of unqualified [or non-conflicting] absolutists, 
that one is not obligated to keep a vow that necessarily 
involves sin, will not work here. According to that 
explanation, Jephthah should not have kept his vow to 
kill his daughter. - But the Scripture appears to approve 
of Jephthah keeping the oath to kill. 3 
Unfortunately, Geisler provides no biblical 
verification for his pronouncement that "the Scripture 
appears to approve of Jephthah keeping the oath to kill. 114 
It may be that he is alluding to Hebrews 11:32, which 
includes Jephthah among the heroes of faith. However, as is 
1see Judg 13:1-16:31. 
2Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 87. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 118. 
4Ibid. 
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obvious from the context of this chapter in Hebrews, and as 
noted above, it is clear that not all the actions of all the 
characters of Scripture are to be emulated by the believer. 
Analysis of the chronicle of Jephthah provides no 
hint that his sacrifice of his daughter is approved. While 
no direct statement is made vis-a-vis this action of his, it 
must be remembered that the entire context of this book is 
summed up in the last verse: "In those days there was no 
king in Israel; everyone did what was right in his own 
eyes. 111 Instead of approval, the context implies censure. 
Moreover, by the time of these judges, it was a 
well-established regulation that only "clean animals" were 
acceptable as sacrifices, 2 and that God was against this 
type of human sacrifice. 3 Hence, since this kind of 
offering was unacceptable to God, Jephthah should have 
repented of his hasty pledge, as did David when he had made 
a similarly impulsive oath. 4 That illegitimate promises 
are not inviolate is further evidenced in Ezra's divinely-
sanctioned termination of the unlawful marriages between 
Israelites and non-believers. 5 Though not an acknowledged 
expert on this issue, Ellen White's perspective seems rather 
1Judg 21:25. 
2see, for example, Gen 8:20; Lev 27:11. 
3 see, for example, Lev 18:21; Deut 12:31. 
4see 1 Sam 25. 
5see Ezra 9-10. 
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fitting: "The obligation to which one's word is pledged--if 
it do[es] not bind him to perform a wrong act--should be 
held sacred."1 
Thus, there is no biblical support for the notion 
that this act of Jephthah's was approved by Scripture. On 
the contrary, his imprudent vow was unacceptable to God, and 
he should have repented of it since he was not bound by it. 
There is no proof here of any conflict of moral absolutes. 
For Geisler, a fourth example of the reality of 
moral conflicts can be observed in the "cases in Scripture 
in which there is a real conflict between obeying God's 
command to submit to civil government and keeping one's duty 
to some other higher moral law. 112 In illustrating this, 
Geisler refers to the story in Daniel 3 of Shadrach, 
Meshach, and Abednego, who disregarded king Nebuchadnezzar's 
command to worship the golden image, and also to the account 
of Daniel, who disobeyed the command of Darius to pray only 
to him, the king. 3 Geisler concludes: "In each case there 
was plainly no other alternative; those involved had to 
follow one or the other of the two commandments. 114 
1Ellen G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets (Mountain 
View, CA: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1913), 506. 
See also, Prov 6:1-3 (Contemporary English Version), which 
corroborates this concept. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
3Ibid. See Dan 6. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
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In the foregoing evaluation of Geisler's view 
concerning moral, civil, and ceremonial laws, 1 it was 
demonstrated that, over the years Geisler himself has 
maintained that there is a difference between these laws. 
For instance, in his earliest text on ethics in 1971, he 
notes the dissimilarity between absolute moral laws and 
civil laws. 2 A comparable distinction is evident in his 
1990 volume on ethics. 3 Similar to other scholars, Geisler 
separates these laws, claiming that the moral law is 
universally binding, whereas civil and ceremonial laws are 
not. Thus, as Geisler observes: "One should always obey 
government when it takes its rightful place under God, but 
one should never obey government when it takes the place of 
God. 114 When this biblical principle is fully recognized 
and properly understood, 5 it becomes plain that the problem 
in the above-mentioned cases from the book of Daniel does 
not involve a moral conflict, but rather an illegitimate use 
of power by governing forces. Thus, the choice is between 
1see "Moral, Civil, and Ceremonial Laws," above in 
this chapter. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 123. See 
also, Geisler, "Any Chance for Morality? Part 2, 11 20; 
Geisler, A Popular Survey of the Old Testament, 58-60. 
3Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 110. See also, Geisler, and 
Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian 
Perspective, 410. 
4Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 188. 
5see Acts 5:29. 
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complying with a civil authority which has usurped the place 
of God, and therefore has forfeited the right to obedience, 
and God's absolute moral commands. Since only one law is 
absolute in this case, no moral conflict exists here. 
As a fifth evidence for his belief in the existence 
of moral conflicts, Geisler points to the life of Christ. 1 
He poses the question: "Did Jesus really face moral dilemmas 
in which two or more commands of God came into unavoidable 
conflict? 112 Suggesting that there are many illustrations 
of this situation in the Gospels, 3 Geisler elaborates: 
"Specific examples in Jesus' life are the moral conflicts 
between obedience toward parents and God (Luke 2), Sabbath 
regulations and healing (Mark 2), and government and God 
(Matt 22). 114 Then he adds: "The greatest moral conflict 
that Jesus faced, however, was his trial and cross, where 
mercy and justice came into direct and unavoidable conflict. 
Should he speak in defense of the innocent (himself) as the 
law demanded (Lev. 5:1), or should he show mercy to the many 
(mankind)?" 5 
1see, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
109, 119, 125-126; Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 75-80, 86-87, 95-96. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 109. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 125. 
5Ibid., 109. 
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since it has just been shown that civil authority 
holds only a delegated and limited position under God, 
Geisler's suggestion, that Jesus faced a moral conflict 
between obedience to government and God, must be considered 
a moot point. The other proposed illustrations, though, 
need to be examined individually. 
Geisler states that "at age twelve Jesus faced a 
conflict between his earthly parents and his heavenly 
Father. Although he later submitted to his earthly parents, 
initially he left them in order to fulfill God's will." 1 
Geisler apparently bases this concept on "the fact that the 
Bible enjoins children to be obedient to parents in all 
things (Col •. 3:20) • 112 Yet, Geisler acknowledges that the 
parallel passage in Ephesians 6:1 adds "in the Lord," thus 
placing "filial duty on a lower level, under the duty to 
love and obey God. 113 Clearly then, analogous to the 
delegated authority of civil powers, obedience to parents is 
not a moral absolute. Since filial duty is required only 
when appropriately exercised under divine authority, there 
is no conflict of absolute moral obligations in this case. 
Geisler posits that Jesus faced a conflict "between 
showing mercy and keeping the Sabbath (Mark 2:27). 114 He 
1Ibid. 
2rbid., 121. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 90. 
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says: "Even though it was wrong for a Jew to work on the 
Sabbath, Jesus approved of working to get one's ox out of 
the ditch on the Sabbath. 111 Further, "He chose to heal a 
man on the Sabbath. When challenged He said the law of the 
Sabbath should be subordinated to man; not vice versa. 112 
Lutzer earnestly challenges Geisler, noting that "there is 
no scriptural evidence that Christ broke or 'transcended' 
any of the commandments. 113 Referring to the biblical data, 
Lutzer states: "Since Christ's own testimony was always that 
of obedience to commandments, it is difficult to suppose 
that He sometimes 'transcended' them for one reason or 
another (Jn 12:49, 15:10). 114 Olson concurs, saying, "I see 
no basis for. accusing our Lord of ever breaking the 
Sabbath. 115 Then Olson explains: "He went out of his way to 
break the traditions of the elders, but he never broke the 
Mosaic Law itself in any detail. 116 Ironically, in one of 
his self-published booklets, Geisler has expressed this very 
concept with clarity: "The law which the Pharisees accused 
Jesus of breaking was a law which already had provisions for 
1Ibid., 288. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
79. 
3Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 111. 
4Ibid. 
50lson, 10. 
6Ibid. 
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doing good on the Sabbath. Jesus was simply not following 
their false interpretation of it. 111 Thus once again, it 
can be seen that this was not a case of conflicting moral 
laws. 
As observed, Geisler suggests that "the greatest 
moral conflict that Jesus faced, however, was his trial and 
cross, where mercy and justice came into direct and 
unavoidable conflict. 112 In another place, Geisler says 
that the "two moral principles (in conflict] are that the 
innocent should not be punished for sins he never committed, 
but Christ was punished for our sins (Isa. 53; 1 Pet. 2:24; 
3:15; 2 Car. 5:21)."3 
In regard to the "mercy/justice" conflict the 
following should be noted. Neither mercy nor justice is an 
absolute moral law. These are not prescriptive commands, 
but rather descriptive attributes of God, and as such cannot 
rightly be construed as conflicting absolute obligations. 
Moreover, as Robert Rakestraw properly notes, "the character 
1Geisler, Civil Disobedience: When Is It Right? 
Should Christians Ever Break the Law?, 19. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 109. 
Geisler {ibid.) maintains that the conflict revolved around 
the "defense of the innocent (himself) as the law demanded 
(Lev. 5:1), or should he show mercy to the many {mankind)?" 
It does not appear that Lev 5:1 says that one is required to 
defend oneself. However, since the precise interpretation 
of this passage is not the issue in contention here, it will 
not be examined. Instead, the real matter of the concept of 
the conflict between mercy and justice will be discussed. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
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of God as perfect and consistent within his own moral nature 
appears to be jeopardized by any view which holds that God's 
absolutes genuinely conflict. 111 Also, Jesus voluntarily 
laid down His life for humanity, 2 and was therefore not 
forced into any unavoidable moral conflict. His death was 
the epitome of self-sacrificial love. 3 Analogously, it 
should be observed that, while the Bible indicates that it 
is morally wrong to force an innocent person to accept 
punishment for the guilty, 4 it is not unethical for someone 
to freely elect to pay someone else's debt or to assume 
another's punishment. _This is the essence of the gospel, 5 
and in no way includes a so-called conflict of moral laws. 
A sixth reason for Geisler's belief in the reality 
of moral conflicts is related to his view of James 4:17, 
which reads: "Therefore, to him who knows to do good and 
does not do it, to him it is sin." He maintains that this 
fact, that one is at times faced with either a sin of 
omission or one of commission, is weighty evidence that in 
1Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 255. 
2see John 10:15-18. 
3see John 15:13. 
4The basic thrust of passages such as Deut 24:16 and 
2 Kings 14:6 appears to be that it is wrong to coerce or 
pressure innocent people into being penalized for the sins 
of others. No prohibition is placed on those who freely 
choose to substitute for others. 
5see passages such as John 10:15-18, 15:13 and Rom 
5:6-8. 
265 
this real and fallen world, inevitable and unavoidable 
conflicts of moral obligations will occur. 1 In explaining 
this idea, Geisler states: "To permit a murder when one 
could have prevented it is morally wrong. 112 It seems that 
Geisler builds this belief on the sixth commandment, for he 
says that "the command 'You shall not murder' (Exod. 20:13) 
implies that we should help prevent the unnatural death of 
innocent people as well. 113 He elaborates: "Human life made 
in God's image has the same intrinsic value no matter which 
way one contributes to its demise. 114 Thus, since "it is 
morally unjustifiable not to resist evil, 115 "failing to 
prevent such a death is as culpable as actually causing 
it. 116 Thus once again, one is faced with a moral conflict. 
The pivotal issue here has to do with responsibility 
and culpability. Nowhere in the Ten Commmandments is it 
either directly stated or implied that these absolute moral 
laws may or should be inverted, from negative prohibitions 
1see Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 
96, 232. 
2Ibid., 232. See also, Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, 174. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 183. 
4Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical 
Hierarchicalism," 83. 
5Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 174. 
6Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 183. 
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("You shall not kill"), 1 to positive limitless obligations 
("You must prevent innocent people from being killed"). 
Logically, if "failing to prevent such a death is as 
culpable as actually causing it, 112 then not deterring those 
who, for example, choose to commit adultery, steal, or lie, 
would of necessity make one guilty of violating those 
commandments as well. _Clearly, the moral law must be read 
as given by God, and not transmuted into propositions that 
place counterfeit responsibilities on people. For, read as 
they are recorded in the Bible, these moral laws of God do 
not conflict. 
Geisler's interpretation of James 4:17 also needs to 
be considered. For him this text shows that one is at times 
faced with either a sin of omission or one of commission. 3 
1Exod 20:13 (New Jerusalem Bible). 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 183. 
3Geisler holds contradictory views on the practical 
application of this theory of "sins of omission." Consider, 
for example, his view relat~ng to the fetus, abortion, and 
civil disobedience to stop abortions. To begin with, he 
maintains that the "Scripture texts leave no doubt that an 
unborn child is just as much a person in God's image as a 
little child or an adult is. They are created in God's 
image from the very moment of conception, and their prenatal 
life is precious in God's eyes and protected by his 
prohibition against murder;" Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 148. Logically, one would therefore 
expect that Geisler's view, that a person is guilty of 
murder for not preventing the death of innocent people, 
would require him to agree with civil disobedience to 
prevent abortions. Yet, he disagrees with this view, and, 
when questioned as to whether or not this would amount to a 
sin of omission if one does not help to protect the 
innocent, he merely says that Christians ought to do all 
they can to "change the laws. But, beyond this, we must 
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However, the text says that the one "who knows to do good 
and does not do it, to him it is sin. 111 Naturally, the 
question is: What is "good"? Geisler himself recognizes 
that "good is what God wills is good. 112 Then Geisler adds: 
"But God never wills anything contrary to his unchanging 
moral character. 113 Thus, the moral absolutes that God 
gives must be recognized as the "good" that needs to be 
carried out. Clearly, James 4:17 does not place one in the 
so-called dilemma of having to choose either a sin of 
omission or commission. Rather, it merely says that it is a 
sin not to do good, i.e., not to follow the will of God. 
Finally, as further support for a belief in the 
actuality of moral conflicts, Geisler says: "There are 
several biblical illustrations in which individuals had to 
choose between lying and not helping to save a life (that 
is, not showing mercy). The Hebrew midwives (Exod. 1) and 
Rahab (Josh. 2) will suffice as examples. 114 As a clinching 
statement, Geisler then adds: "Regardless of whether they 
were right or wrong in lying, the point here is that the 
leave it in the hands of a loving, sovereign God who 
controls all things and will cause even the wrath of men to 
praise His name;" Geisler, Civil Disobedience: When Is It 
Right? Should Christians Ever Break the Law?, 21. 
1Jas 4:17 (emphasis added). 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 21. 
3Ibid., 22. 
4Ibid. , 11a. 
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conflict was genuine and both obligations were moral 
ones."1 
As indicated above, it is only when God's eternal 
moral laws are illicitly altered from what He has given in 
His Word that one ends up with the falsely assumed burden of 
having to prevent the killing of innocent people at all 
costs. Since this concept is not a moral law, the women in 
the above cases were not faced with any moral conflicts. 
By way of summary, the above study casts doubt on 
the validity of Geisler's hypothesis that genuine moral 
conflicts exist. 2 If these conclusions are valid, no need 
would exist for Geisler's hierarchical approach to ethics. 
A Hierarchy of Sins and Virtues 
One of the principal original proposals of Geisler's 
ethical hierarchicalism is the postulation that there is a 
scale of values emerging from the biblical text itself •3 
1Ibid. 
2Naturally, for the one who insists that real moral 
conflicts exist, the issues of freedom and responsibility 
are directly related to this entire question. For, only 
when one is free to choose can one be held morally culpable. 
Thus, if an individual were to be forced to choose between 
two absolutes, that person could not legitimately be held 
responsible for not keeping both requirements. However, as 
noted above, this critique of Geisler's moral methodology 
challenges the authenticity of the existence of genuine 
conflicts of divinely-established moral obligations. 
3see, for example, Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 81-84; Geisler, Cbristian Ethics: Options 
and Issues, 116-117; Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," 223, 227. 
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Geisler maintains that when moral obligations conflict, 
there is at least one principle that indicates which is the 
highest duty to follow. 1 He asserts that not all moral 
laws are of equal weight, and provides several passages of 
Scripture in support of this proposal. Geisler explains: 
Not all moral laws are of equal weight. Jesus spoke 
of the "weightier" matters of the law (Matt. 23:23) and 
of the "least" (Matt. 5:19) and the "greatest" 
commandment (Matt. 22:36). He told Pilate that Judas 
had committed the "greater sin" (John 19:11). Despite a 
rather widespread evangelical distaste for a hierarchy 
of sins (and virtues), the Bible does speak of the 
"greatest" virtue (1 Cor. 13:13) and even the "greater" 
acts of a given virtue (John 15:13). 2 
Elaborating further, Geisler says that Jesus held 
"there are at least three levels of sins with corresponding 
judgments ([Matt] 5:22). 113 Geisler notes: "In fact, there 
is one sin so great as to be unforgivable (Mark 3:29). 114 
Then, expanding on a previously mentioned biblical passage, 
he adds: "Perhaps the clearest indication of higher and 
lower moral laws comes in Jesus' answer to the lawyer's 
question about the 'greatest commandment' (Matt. 22:34-35). 
Jesus clearly affirms that the 'first' and 'greatest' is 
over the 'second,' that loving God is of supreme importance, 
and then beneath that comes loving one's neighbor. 115 
1Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 76. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 116. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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Not only does Geisler refer to these specific texts 
to prove a hierarchy of sins and virtues, but he contends 
that "the Scriptures give ample illustrations of the 
principle that higher commands take precedence over lower 
commands. 111 For example: 
Jesus said that love for God is more important than love 
for parents, even though both are commands of God (Matt. 
10:37). Peter made it clear that the command to obey 
human government was not higher than the one to preach 
the Gospel '(Acts 4). The Hebrew midwives (Exod. 1) and 
the three Hebrew children (Dan 3) were all commended for 
disobeying human government when it conflicted with a 
higher ethical command. Abraham's intent to kill Isaac 
was morally right only because it was put in 
irresolvable conflict with his direct obedience to God's 
higher command to obey Him (Gen. 22). 2 
Geisler says: "In view of all the Bible teaches on 
greater and lesser evils the myth that all sins are equal is 
untenable. 113 "We conclude that there are indeed graded 
levels of moral commands in Scripture, 114 and that "in real, 
unavoidable moral conflicts, God does not hold a person 
guilty for not keeping a lower moral law so long as he keeps 
the higher. 115 
These biblical passages need to be considered in 
order to establish if they actually do manifest such a 
227. 
84. 
1Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 
2Ibid. 
3Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 91. 
4Geisler, Options in contemporary Christian Ethics, 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
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hierarchy, as Geisler alleges. The prescriptive statements 
will be examined first. Geisler is correct that these 
passages do point out the varying degrees of sin and virtue. 
However, he has neglected to emphasize a factor integrally 
connected with all of these texts. For instance, careful 
study shows that when Jesus spoke of the "weightier matters 
of the law" as compared with the less important, He said, 
"These you ought to have done, without leaving the other 
undone. 111 While Geisler posits that texts such as these 
provide evidence of a hierarchy of laws, so that one can 
know how to keep the higher in a conflict situation, the 
biblical passages indicate that one is to keep both laws. 
As Luck puts. it: "The very same passages in Scripture that 
talk of hierarchy also-caution against the thought that the 
keeping of the lower removes obligation to the higher or 
that the keeping of the higher removes the necessity of 
following the lower. 112 Kaiser concurs: "Matt 23:23 does 
not argue that the assessment of priorities requires that we 
do the 'weightier' and leave (if necessary or if forced) the 
'lighter' and the 'least' undone. 113 
1Matt 23:23. 
2Luck, 34. 
3walter c. Kaiser, Jr., "The Weightier and Lighter 
Matters of the Law: Moses, Jesus and Paul," in Current 
Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation, studies in 
Honor of Merrill c. Tenney, Presented by His Former 
Students, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing company, 1975), 185 (footnote #32). 
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Similarly, when Jesus referred to the "greater 
sin"1 of Judas, He was implying that Pilate too was guilty 
of sin. In other words, as Geisler correctly recognizes, 
"all sin is sin."2 Lutzer agrees: "Sins remain sins and 
the virtues remain virtues. 113 After referring to Matt 
5:19, 23:23, Gal 3:10, and James 2:10, John Tape concludes 
that "these passages show that every single moral law of God 
is important, no matter how small or trivial it may appear 
to be from human perspective. 114 Then he says: "There is 
never any situation wherein the breaking of a commandment 
ceases to be a sin. 115 As Luck, alluding to Matt 5:19 and 
23:23, says: "The Scripture rejects any attempt to excuse 
non-compliance with lower rules on the basis of higher 
rules. 116 Chris Brown, who has done an exegetical study of 
the most crucial passages Geisler uses to sustain the idea 
of a hierarchy in Scripture, concludes that hierarchical 
ethics "has been shown to be wanting in Biblical support. 117 
1John 19:11. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 128. See 
also, Geisler, The Cbristian Ethic of Love, 91. 
3Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 102. 
4Tape, 10. 
5Ibid. 
6Luck, 26 (footnote #22). 
7Chris Brown, "A Brief Analysis of Geisler's 
Hierarchical Proof Texts," 1985, TMs [photocopy], p. 26, 
Center for Research and Scholarship, Liberty University, 
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He observes that "all of God's commands are to be done, not 
set aside. 11 1 
The cases from Scripture that Geisler provides in 
order to illustrate the principle that higher commands take 
precedence over lower commands also need evaluation. 
Already the stories of the Hebrew midwives, the three Hebrew 
youth, and Abraham have been considered above, and been 
shown to exclude conflicts of absolute moral obligations. 
Since the narrative of Peter deals with the limited duty to 
obey human government, this is also not a moral conflict. 
Likewise, the statement that love for God is above love for 
parents does not involve an ethical conflict. In brief, 
none of the examples given by Geisler entails a conflict of 
absolute moral laws. Rather, they all deal with times when 
delegated control is misapplied. Notice Pack's lengthy but 
apt remarks regarding the supposed suspension of lower laws: 
Since the authority of God is the foundation of 
governmental authority, the limits of any government's 
ordained representation of him are necessarily defined 
by its agreement with his will. Any reference to 
suspension of the obligation to government is not 
actually accurate. The authority is neither suspended, 
transcended, nor superceded. Delegated authority never 
exceeds the right to do that which was originally 
delegated. (For example,] the authority never existed 
for a king to limit prayer, demand idolatry, or forbid 
proclamation of God's message. Consequently, these 
servants of God were not exempted from the apparent 
responsibilities. The responsibilities never existed. 
Lynchburg, VA. 
1rbid., 21. 
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The men were faced with a challenge to their faith, not 
a conflict of their norms. 1 
Th~s, these illustrations do not promote the idea 
that higher laws take precedence over lower ones. What 
these cases appear to show is that when commissioned 
authority is misused it is to be ignored. However, when 
appointed guides or overseers are operating in strict 
accordance with the Moral Lawgiver, they ought to be obeyed, 
for then such obedience will accord with God's will. 
Guiltless Suspension of Lower Laws 
Geisler propounds that "God does not hold the 
individual responsible for personally unavoidable moral 
conflicts, provided he keeps the higher law. 112 As evidence 
of this view, he says that "the Bible includes many examples 
of persons who were praised by God for following their 
highest duty in situations of conflict. 03 As noted in the 
previous chapter, Geisler asserts that Abraham was rewarded 
and "commended of God for his willingness to sacrifice 
(kill) his son Isaac. 114 Likewise, Daniel and his three 
companions "received divine approval for their disobedience 
1Pack, 128. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 119. 
3 Ibid., 120. See also, Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 88; Geisler, and Feinberg, 
Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, 425. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
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of human government. 111 Similarly, "the Hebrew midwives who 
lied and disobeyed the king were blessed by God and given 
families as a reward. 112 Also, "David and his men who broke 
into the temple and stole the consecrated bread were 
declared guiltless by Christ. 113 In addition to these case 
studies, Geisler notes: "Neither does the Scripture hold 
guilty those who kill in self-defense (Exod. 22:2). 114 
Referring to the Scripture stories, Geisler concludes that 
"in each case there was not only no divine condemnation for 
the moral law they did not keep. There was, rather, evident 
divine approval. 115 Thus, one is guiltless, and "not 
morally culpable if he fails to keep an obligation he could 
not possibly keep without breaking a higher obligation. 116 
To begin with, a brief comment needs to be made in 
connection with Geisler's assertion that the Bible has "many 
examples" of people praised by God for following their 
highest duty in conflict situations. John Tape says that 
2Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 425. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
4Geisler, and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: 
A Christian Perspective, 425. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
see also, Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 136; 
Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral Conflicts," 227. 
6Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
88. 
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the phrase "many examples" is certainly an overstatement. 
He correctly notes that there are actually few such cases, 
and cautions that "these few examples would make a very 
precarious foundation on which to build an entire system of 
moral theology. 111 Nevertheless, these incidents ought to 
be considered. 
In the cases of Abraham, Daniel, his three 
companions, and the Hebrew midwives, the above critical 
evaluation has provided sufficient evidence to challenge 
Geisler's assertion that these accounts sustain the notion 
of a guiltless suspension of lower moral laws. The case of 
David and the consecrated bread, as well as killing in self-
defense need to be examined. 
More than once, Geisler refers to the narrative in 
which "David and his men who broke into the temple and stole 
the consecrated bread were declared guiltless by Christ 
(Matt. 12:3-4). 112 He explains: "Perhaps 'stealing' bread 
from the temple (that is, taking it without permission of 
the proper authority) is not morally wrong when starvation 
of God's servant is the other alternative. 113 The original 
story, as located in 1 Samuel 21, illuminates the brief 
1Tape, 18 (footnote #10). 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 120. 
See also, ibid., 109; Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, 78-79, 88; Geisler, "Conflicting 
Absolutism," 6. 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 107. 
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comment made by Jesus. David had been fleeing for his life 
from Saul, when he arrived at Nob. Hungry, he asked the 
priest, Ahimelech, for some food. Even though the only 
available food was the consecrated bread that was to be 
eaten by the priests exclusively, David requested this bread 
for himself and his men. Ahimelech, after receiving 
guidance from God, 1 decided to give them the bread because 
they were ceremonially clean, in that they had abstained 
from sexual relations. 
In the entire story, as recorded in both Old and New 
Testaments, there is no indication that David "broke into 
the temple," as Geisler alleges. Rather, as Jesus says, "he 
entered the house of God. 112 Moreover, according to the 
biblical account, there is no evidence that David "stole the 
consecrated bread," as Geisler accuses. Instead, he was 
given the bread by the priest who had consulted God on the 
matter. Clearly, Geisler has inaccurately cast David in the 
role of one who "broke" into God's temple to "steal" food in 
order to survive. Then, Geisler submits that this breaking 
in and stealing was "declared guiltless by Christ." The 
scriptural record does not substantiate any such data. on 
the contrary, as Chris Brown observes, this "is a ceremonial 
law which is overturned by Christ showing it is not absolute 
1see 1 Sam 22:10. 
2Matt 12:4. 
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in application. 111 As Palmer Robertson recognizes: "In the 
instance of David and his men, a ritualistic law was being 
violated for the sake of maintaining human life. These laws 
of the cultus obviously were temporal in nature. 112 Hence, 
as Lutzer concludes, "this incident cannot be used to show 
that Christ approved of breaking Old Testament laws because 
of expediency. 113 Accordingly, this incident cannot rightly 
be used to sustain the charge that so-called lower moral 
laws can be broken without any moral culpability. 
One of the texts more frequently ref erred to by 
Geisler in the Old Testament is that of Exodus 22:2. 4 
Based on his interpretation of this passage, Geisler states: 
"Killing in self-defense is not a personally culpable act 
according to the law of God. 115 In connection with the 
issue of war, the entire verse is quoted by Geisler: "'If a 
1chris Brown, 15. 
2o. Palmer Robertson, "Reflections on the New 
Testament Testimony Concerning Civil Disobedience," Journal 
of the Evangelical Theological Society 33 (September 1990): 
334. 
3Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 77. 
4see, for example, Geisler, Christian Ethics: 
Options and Issues, 109, 128, 152, 230, 231, 234; Geisler, 
Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 78; Geisler, and 
Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian 
Perspective, 425; Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 123. 
5Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 109. 
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thief is caught breaking in and is struck so that he dies, 
the defender is not guilty of bloodshed.'"1 
While it is technically correct that this verse 
provides the above data, a closer look at the context 
indicates that verse 2 is actually only the first part of a 
legal ruling that is completed in the following verse: "But 
if it happens after sunrise, he is guilty of bloodshed. 112 
The New Living Translation has captured the sense of this 
law: "If a thief is caught in the act of breaking into a 
house and is killed in the process, the person who killed 
the thief is not guilty. But if it happens in daylight, the 
one who killed the thief is guilty of murder." 
When Exodus 22:2 is studied in context, and when its 
full meaning is taken into account as expanded in verse 3, 
Geisler's interpretation of this passage becomes rather 
problematic. To begin with, if verse 2 teaches that 
"killing in self-defense is justified, 113 then how is one to 
understand verse 3, which says one "is guilty of murder" if 
one kills the same person under the same conditions in the 
same place, but just at a different time, namely, during the 
day? This interpretation would mean that killing in self-
defense is only justified at night, and not during the day. 
1Ibid., 231. 
2Exod 22:3 {New International Version--this is the 
same translation as used for verse 2, by Geisler). 
3Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 234. 
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An additional problem arises when one studies the 
law corpus in the Old Testament. Throughout the Hebrew 
legal system a distinct difference was made between property 
and people. Never was one to forfeit life for merely 
stealing property. While appropriate restitution was to be 
made, 1 no one was to be executed for being a thief •2 If, 
therefore, this were indeed a regulation permitting one to 
kill a thief guiltlessly, it would be out of harmony with 
the consistently high value that God's laws placed on life 
as over against material goods. In other words, the 
punishment would be out of proportion to the crime. 
Alan Cole seems to be closer to the true meaning of 
~ 
the text when he indicates that this death of the thief "may 
even have been accidental, in the blundering fight in the 
darkness. 113 Other scholars feel similarly that the life of 
1see, for example, Exod 22:1, 3b, 4, 7-13. 
2several commentators and others suggest that 
killing in self-defense is permitted here because of the 
thief's possibly "murderous intentions." This is merely an 
assumption, since nowhere does the text say or imply that. 
It would be circular reasoning to suggest that that is why 
self-defensive killing is permitted here. Further, it 
should be remembered that this person is called a "thief," 
and not a potential murderer. This type of reasoning, that 
suggests a thief (or potential murderer) should be killed 
contradicts the rest of the just and fair laws of Scripture. 
For, according to Old Testament law, one was to be punished 
only after a crime was committed, and that for actual evil 
deeds, not for evil intentions, and much less so for merely 
assumed evil intentions. 
3Alan R. Cole, Exodus, in Tyndale Old Testament 
Commentaries, ed. D. J. Wiseman (Downers Grove, IL: 
Intervarsity Press, 1973), 171. 
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a thief "caught in the dark is not protected by blood 
vengeance, because in this case deliberate murder cannot be 
proved. 111 This type of reasoning concurs with other 
biblical laws concerning intentional and accidental killing 
of human beings. 2 The Contemporary English Version aptly 
captures the sense of this interpretation when it renders 
Exodus 22:2, 3 as follows: "If you happen to kill a burglar 
who breaks into your home after dark, you are not guilty. 
But if you kill someone who breaks in during the day, you 
are guilty of murder. 113 Thus, instead of supporting the 
idea of killing in self-defense, and sustaining Geisler's 
theory that one can guiltlessly disregard so-called lower 
moral duties, this law is more likely an exoneration of 
accidental homicide. 4 
1Reginald c. Fuller, ed., A New Catholic Commentary 
on Holv Scripture (London, England: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 
Ltd., 1969), 219. Moreover, it is possible that the fear 
and uncertainty one may experience under cover of darkness 
could result in a stronger reaction than when one can see 
clearly what is taking place. 
2see, for example, Exod 21:12-14. 
3Emphasis added. See also, the New Living 
Translation rendering given above. 
4compare Deut 19:4-6. Interestingly, in one place 
Geisler himself expresses a concept that stands in tension 
with his belief in self-defensive killing. He basically 
argues against the legitimacy of preemptive strikes, but 
then adds: "Of course, if the first blow is known to be a 
lethal one, the situation may call for nonlethal preemptive 
action;" Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death Debate: 
Moral Issues of Our Time, 136 (emphasis added). 
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This extended appraisal of the biblical basis that 
Geisler provides for ethical hierarchicalism has raised 
serious misgivings concerning Geisler's interpretation and 
utilization of these passages. First, it was demonstrated 
that none of Geisler's examples establishes that it is 
justifiable to lie to save life. Rather, the Bible teaches 
that it is an absolute moral obligation to be truthful, 
regardless of the situation or foreseeable consequences. 
Second, since this study suggests that none of the passages 
Geisler cites as evidence for the reality of moral conflicts 
can sustain the charge, it casts considerable suspicion on 
the validity of Geisler's thesis that authentic conflicts of 
moral obligations do exist. If these findings are valid, 
there would be no need for Geisler's hierarchical approach 
to ethics. Third, none of the illustrations given by 
Geisler promotes the idea that higher moral laws take 
precedence over lower ones. What these cases do indicate is 
that only when delegated authority operates in harmony with 
eternal moral law ought they to be followed, for then such 
obedience will accord with God's will. And fourth, this 
research shows that none of the instances of so-called 
guiltless suspension of lower laws supports Geisler's view 
that God does not hold people responsible for ignoring lower 
moral laws provided they keep the higher in conflict cases. 
Therefore, as Pack suitably notes in his own critique of 
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hierarchicalism, "not even one of the Scriptures cited by 
Geisler actually demands a hierarchy of norms. 111 
Bifurcation of the Decalogue 
In discussing the concept of "loving on two levels," 
Geisler states: "Love must be manifest on two levels, the 
love for God and love for one's neighbor. 112 Geisler 
explains: "The two tables of Moses' law are divided by these 
two directions of love. The first table of the law 
expresses the vertical love for God. 113 Then he lists the 
first four commandments of the decalogue. Following this, 
Geisler says: "The second table of the law expresses one's 
love for his neighbor. 114 Then he enumerates the last six 
commandments. Referring to Jesus' statement about the two 
great commandments, Geisler concludes that "the ten 
commandments merely spell out what the two commandments 
summarize. If one loves God he will do the first four and 
to show his love for other men he must do the last six. 115 
Geisler raises the question as to "what to do when 
the two levels conflict. 116 He says that "in terms of the 
1Pack, 129. 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 26. 
3 Ibid., 27. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. I 28. 
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Ten commandments, it is sometimes necessary to appear to 
'break' the fifth commandment in order to keep the first 
commandment. 111 In other words, "love for God may 
necessitate 'disobedience' toward men. 112 Analogously, 
Martin Luther held that "obedience to the First Table of the 
Decalogue may require the breach of the Second Table. 113 
This type of division between the first four 
commandments and the last six can be seen in another more 
sensational illustration by Geisler. In expounding on the 
issue of fornication and a hierarchy of duty, Geisler 
asserts: "One may be obliged to engage in sexual intercourse 
outside of his own marriage in order to save a life. Such 
would be the greatest good in that situation. Surely the 
refusal to save a life (or lives) by way of sex would not be 
right. 114 While Geisler places a high value on preserving 
human life, this is not his ultimate value. For he notes: 
"I would not deny God if someone threatened my wife's 
life. 115 In other words, in a life or death emergency, 
1Ibid., 31-32. 
2Ibid., 32. 
3see David Wright, "The Ethical Use of the Old 
Testament in Luther and Calvin: A Comparison," Scottish 
Journal of Theology 36 (December 1983): 466. 
4Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 208. He 
adds (ibid., 208-209): "Of course, one would want to explore 
all other possible alternatives before he assumed there was 
really no other way to save a life." 
5see Pack, 159, in Appendix I. 
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Geisler feels free to disregard one of the precepts of the 
second table of the decalogue, yet he believes he must 
respect the first table even at the cost of his wife's life. 
This view, that the precepts of the first table must 
be kept while those of the second are expendable, is similar 
to the position of Thomas Aquinas. John Dedek says Aquinas 
held that "God cannot dispense from the precepts of the 
first tablet of the decalogue which order men immediately to 
God but he can dispense from the precepts of the second 
tablet which order men immediately to other men." 1 This 
dividing up of the decalogue needs further attention. 
In his tome on personal ethics, Carl Henry states 
that "the Ten Words enunciated on Sinai contain the 
essential principles of a righteousness that truly mirrors 
the pure character of the holy God. 112 He notes that these 
ten commandments "are valid for all men in all places and at 
all times. 113 Similar views are expressed by Lutzer, where 
he observes that "the moral laws of God are basically a 
reflection of His own character, 114 which "are to be kept at 
1oedek, 401. 
2carl F. H. Henry, Christian Personal Ethics (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957), 
269. 
4Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Eyangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 87. 
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all times, regardless of the circumstances. 111 Likewise, 
for Olson, the moral laws "are a reflection of God's own 
nature. 112 Recognizing this integral connection between 
God's laws and God's character, Olson says: "The attributes 
of God cannot be in conflict since he is perfection."3 
Walter Kaiser, in referring to the hypothesis of the 
hierarchical ethicist, that protecting innocent lives is a 
greater good than telling the truth, says, "Scripture 
nowhere advocates or allows for such hierarchy. 114 Then, 
obviously recognizing that divine moral laws are a 
transcript of God's character, Kaiser charges that to place 
one moral law against another in this way, would be to "pit 
part of God's nature against other parts of his nature. 115 
Rejecting this procedure, Kaiser calls on believers "to 
follow all of God's Word. 116 In a parallel fashion, Donald 
Bloesch critiques the hierarchicalist's dichotomy between 
mercy and truth, insisting, "surely there must a unity 
between God's attributes!" 7 
1Ibid., 88-89. 
2olson, 9. 
3Ibid. 
4Kaiser, Hard Sayings of the Old Testament, 97. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. 
7Bloesch, 183. 
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The sentiments of these thinkers can be applied to 
Geisler's disjunctive view of the decalogue. Rakestraw 
says: "If God has given numerous moral absolutes, some of 
which genuinely conflict at times, it appears that there is 
conflict within the mind and moral will of God. 111 He adds: 
"The character of God as perfect and consistent within his 
own moral nature appears to be jeopardized by any view that 
holds that God's absolutes genuinely conflict. 112 
In brief, even though Geisler himself agrees that 
God's moral laws, "which He designed not to conflict, 113 are 
"a reflection of His unchanging character, 114 he insists 
that the laws concerning one's relation to God must always 
be kept, while those pertaining to people can be disregarded 
in conflict situations. Bloesch's charge, that Geisler can 
"be accused of drawing a bifurcation within God, 115 is thus 
appropriate in this setting as well. 
Substantive semantic Matters 
Questions have been raised about Geisler's use of 
terminology. For instance, it has been asked: "Is not the 
1Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A Case for Non-
Conflicting Absolutism," 255. 
23. 
2rbid. 
3Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 100. 
4Geisler, Options in contemporary Christian Ethics, 
5Bloesch, 183. He was here referring to Geisler's 
dichotomy between mercy and truth. 
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alleged distinction between an exemption and an exception, 
used to support graded absolutism [or hierarchicalism], 
merely a semantical and not a real difference?" 1 As has 
already been noted, in some respects Geisler does use 
certain terms in a way different from the normal patterns. 
For example, as indicated, unlike the standard definition in 
which an absolute is applied to everyone at all times 
everywhere, Geisler holds that "not all absolutes are 
absolutely absolute. Some are only relatively absolute. 112 
Whenever any writer uses language in a manner distinct from 
the norm, careful study of the terms is necessitated. 
Evil Called Good 
Geisler acknowledges that the "Scriptures pronounce 
condemnation on those who 'call evil good, and good, evil' 
(Isa. 5:20). 113 Since ethical hierarchicalism holds that 
moral conflicts exist, the question has been asked: "How can 
a lesser evil ever be the good thing to do? Is this nothing 
more than pronouncing evil good? 114 Geisler responds: "The 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
97-98. This statement is one of a number of objections 
raised by others in connection with hierarchicalism. 
Without citing the sources, Geisler mentions several 
criticisms and then responds to them. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
3Norman L. Geisler, "God, Evil and Dispensations," 
in Walvoord: A Tribute, ed. Donald K. Campbell (Chicago, IL: 
Moody Press, 1982), 111 (footnote #7). 
4Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
96. 
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hierarchicalist does not proclaim that the evil is a good 
thing to do, but asserts that the highest obligation in the 
conflict is the good thing to do. 111 In illustrating this 
point, Geisler notes that in the case of lying to save a 
life, "it is not the lie that is good (a lie as such is 
always wrong), but it is the intent and action to save a 
life that is good--despite the fact that intentional 
falsification was necessary to accomplish this good. 112 
Geisler mentions that "what is called 'evil' sometimes 
accompanies the performance of good acts. 113 
It is true that Geisler frequently expresses himself 
in language that gives the impression that hierarchicalism 
is an absolutism in the standard definition of the term. 
For instance, Geisler posits that hierarchicalism "stands 
firm on moral principles based in the absolute, unchanging 
character of. God. 114 He maintains that these moral 
principles "are objective, propositional, and substantive in 
content. 115 As concrete examples, Geisler says that the 
universal commands of Scripture, "such as the prohibitions 
against blasphemy, idolatry, adultery, murder, lying, and so 
forth, are absolutely binding on all men at all times and 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 131. 
5Ibid. 
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all places. 111 However, Geisler frankly admits that in 
ethical hierarchicalism "mere human actions as such are not 
intrinsically good or evil. 112 He propounds that an act 
"changes its moral value (from evil to good) when used for a 
good purpose or in a good context. 113 
In a nutshell, for Geisler there is no such thing as 
an intrinsically or inherently evil act. This can be 
observed in his discussion of the differing degrees of sins 
and virtues. As part of the conclusions from his study 
about good and evil, Geisler says: "Good and evil are ranked 
in a pyramid with the best at the top and worst at the 
bottom and varying degrees of good and evil in between. 114 
Thus, for Geisler, both good and evil are in the same 
pyramidal structure; there is no clear demarcation between 
them. Therefore, "the lesser good is really an evil," and 
"the lesser evil equals the greatest good. 115 
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
93. See also, Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and 
Issues, 123. 
109. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
3Ibid., 113. 
4Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 92. 
5Geisler, "The Origins and Implications of the 
Greater Good Ethic." Quoting Aristotle approvingly, Geisler 
notes that for him, "the so-called lesser evil is really the 
greater good;" Moreland, and Geisler, The Life and Death 
Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time, 153. 
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In contradistinction to Geisler's view, a study of 
Scripture indicates that absolute moral norms are clearly 
separated into two distinct groups, good and evil. 1 Pack 
observes that biblically "there is an absolute, intrinsic, 
and unchangeable difference between good and evil. 112 As 
Lutzer notes concerning the scriptural perception of evil 
and good: "The sins remain sins and the virtues remain 
virtues. 113 Because there is a distinct and immutable 
disparity between good and evil, Geisler's assertion, that 
an act "changes its moral value (from evil to good) when 
used for a good purpose or in a good context, 114 would 
therefore appear to come under the condemnation of Isaiah 
5:20: "Woe to those who call evil good, and good evil." 
Since Geisler holds that no acts have any intrinsic 
value, hierarchicalism is subject to criticisms akin to that 
of situationism. 5 For instance, John Warwick Montgomery's 
comment that, "in situationism lesser evils are transmuted 
from being in the class of evils and placed into the class 
1see, for example, Isa 5:20; Ezek 44:23; Gal 5:19-
23. 
2Pack, 140. 
3Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 102. 
4Ibid., 113. 
5see, for example, Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An 
Evangelical Response to Situation Ethics, 58-59. 
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of goods, is also relevant to hierarchicalism. 111 In fact, 
a similar such conclusion could be drawn from Geisler's own 
words. In a published debate, Geisler spoke of the 
necessity of the law of noncontradiction. After quoting 
Isaiah 5:20, he stated: "Unless one begins with the premise 
that A is not non-A (all that is good is not nongood), how 
could he ever be anything but a total ethical relativist? 
If logic does not apply to all ethical statements, then when 
the Bible commands 'love' it could mean 'hate. 1112 This is 
precisely where ethical hierarchicalism ends up since it 
holds that an act "changes its moral value (from evil to 
good) when used for a good purpose. 113 Realizing this, Pack 
indicts ethical hierarchicalism as a "chameleon morality," 
since it has the potential to change in every situation. 4 
Geisler himself warns that "no absolutes are possible if the 
law of noncontradiction does not apply. For then if logic 
does not hold, any moral command could mean its exact 
opposite. 115 This statement certainly applies to Geisler's 
approach, for in its actual outworking, hierarchicalism at 
1see Tape, 20 (footnote #24). 
2Norman L. Geisler, "'Avoid .•• Contradictions'" 
(1 Timothy 6:20): A Reply to John Dahms," Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 22 (March 1979): 61. 
3Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
113. 
4Pack, 144. 
5Geisler, "'Avoid .•• Contradictions"' (1 Timothy 
6:20): A Reply to John Dahms," 64. 
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times requires the performance of specific acts such as 
lying or adultery, which are prohibited by God in the Bible. 
In Geisler's words, "if we give up logic in the area of 
ethics, then anything goes. Total antinomianism follows. 111 
Exemptions or Exceptions 
Due to its position that absolute laws can at times 
be ignored, the following question has been raised regarding 
ethical hierarchicalism: "How can a norm such as truth-
telling be unbreakable if it is sometimes to be broken in 
order to save a life? 112 Recognizing that "unbreakable 
norms which can be broken" is a contradiction in terms, 
Geisler explains: 
When one obeys a higher norm in favor of a lower and 
opposing one, he is not really breaking the lower one 
but transcending it. He is not making an exception to 
the lower norm but getting an exemption from it in view 
of a superior obligation. And even when it is 
transcended, the lower norm remains intact as a 
universal. • • • When a lower principle or norm is 
1Ibid. This unintentional self-criticism of ethical 
hierarchicalism is confirmed by what Geisler says in 
relation to Nietzsche, whom Geisler terms an antinomianist. 
Geisler notes that the title of Nietzsche's book, "Beyond 
Good and Evil," could also be rendered "'on the other side 
of good and evil,'" indicating that "good and evil are on 
the same side of morality;" Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives 
and Issues, 32 (footnote #20). Thus, while Nietzsche places 
good and evil on the same side of morality, Geisler places 
good and evil in the same pyramid. In both hierarchicalism 
and antinomianism there is no separation between good and 
evil. 
2Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 130. 
This is one of the questions Geisler addresses in a section 
called, "Hierarchicalism Criticized." Without citing any 
source for this objection, Geisler simply poses the question 
and then responds to it. 
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suspended, it is not really broken. The higher 
dethrones the lower but it does not destroy it. • • • 
one is exempt if and only if there is a higher, 
overriding responsibility which temporarily excuses him 
from his lower duty. The lower duty is still there, and 
there are no exceptions to it. 1 
Elaborating further, Geisler says that ethical 
hierarchicalism "does not believe there are any exceptions 
to absolute laws, only exemptions. 112 He maintains that the 
difference is more than verbal. "An exception would violate 
the universality and absoluteness of a moral law, whereas an 
exemption does not. 113 For when an exemption is made, the 
law is still binding. 4 Thus, even though an exemption does 
not make the action right in the conflict situation, 5 it 
"eliminates the individual's culpability in not performing 
the demands of that lower law."6 
A look at Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of 
the ethical" reveals that there is some similarity between 
his concept and hierarchicalism. 7 Geisler states, however, 
that Kierkegaard's view that the religious transcends the 
1Ibid., 130-131. See also, Geisler, The Christian 
Ethic Of Love, 32. 
2Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, 127. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., 128. 
7see S~ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. 
Alastair Hannay (London, England: Penguin Books, 1985); 
Geisler, Ethics:' Alternatives and Issues, 121-122. 
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ethical is unacceptable to evangelicals. 1 He charges that, 
besides incorrectly separating between the Lawgiver and His 
law, Kierkegaard's view "wrongly assumes that there can be a 
non-propositional, personal revelation to the individual 
which transcends all universal, rational, and propositional 
categories. 112 Despite Geisler's sharp critique of 
Kierkegaard's ethical perspective, Stanley Grenz posits that 
"Geisler is in fundamental agreement with Kierkegaard, 
insofar as he admits that at times certain ethical norms 
must be suspended for the sake of a higher goal. 113 since 
in Geisler's thinking the single norm which must stand at 
the top of his hierarchy is obedience to God, in this "he is 
in fundamental agreement with Kierkegaard." 4 Grenz notes 
that, since Kierkegaard accepts the Kantian understanding 
that norms are universally binding, Geisler parts company 
with him in this, because hierarchical ethics holds that 
absolutes are merely relative. 5 
Deliberating on this relativizing of absolutes, 
Grenz observes: "In defining ethical terms in this non-
1Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
84 (footnote #6); Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 
121-122. 
2Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, 
84 (footnote #6). 
3Grenz, 157. 
4Ibid., 158. 
5Ibid., 157. 
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traditional way Geisler appears to be playing a semantic 
game in which universals are not universally applicable and 
absolutes are relative. 111 Grenz recognizes that "this game 
continues as he seeks to differentiate between an exception 
to a norm (which is always disallowed) and an exemption from 
a lower norm (which is granted each time a higher norm is 
obeyed at the cost of a lower one). 112 John Tape points out 
that this attempt at distinguishing between exceptions and 
exemptions does not solve the problem concerning the 
absolute nature of the moral law. 3 For, "whether one 
allows a moral law to be suspended by an exception or an 
exemption, it is still suspended and such allowance is 
contradictory to the absolute nature of God's laws. 114 As 
Luck expresses it: "Exemption and exception are two sides of 
the same coin. 115 
1Ibid. Moreover, as noted in chapter 1 of this 
research study, Barber suggests that Geisler, by merely 
changing the terminology, is actually trying to make 
situation ethics acceptable to evangelicals; cyril J. 
Barber, The Minister's Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 1974), 233-234. 
2Grenz, 157. 
3Tape, 6. 
4Ibid. 
5Luck, 25. Other scholars similarly hold that there 
is no real difference between an exemption and an exception. 
See, for example, Rakestraw, "Ethical Choices: A case for 
Non-Conflicting Absolutism," 249; Lutzer, The Morality Gap: 
An Evangelical Response to Situation Ethics, 103; Kurt 
Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics, 
Contemporary Philosophy Series, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1958), 192, 193. Using these 
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In considering the term "exemption" and the other 
words Geisler uses to describe the occasion when a lower law 
is disregarded, Lutzer comments that "to substitute one set 
of terms for another hardly solves the problem. 111 Lutzer 
correctly contends that "if one is guilty of violating a 
universal norm, we must conclude that he has broken the 
universal and has not ~erely been exempted from it. 112 For 
to merely substitute ."exemption" for "exception" and then to 
claim that the law is still absolutely binding, even though 
it does not need to be kept in the conflict situation, is to 
play a semantic game. 3 As Grenz suitably concludes: "This 
relativising of absolutes calls hierarchicalism into 
question as an ethical system. 114 
SU1DDULry and conclusions 
This chapter began with a comparison of the 
essential features of theistic morality, as defined by 
Geisler, with his own method of ethical hierarchicalism. In 
this study it was shown that, similar to theistic morality, 
hierarchicalism claims to subscribe to objective moral 
terms interchangeably, Baier (p. 192) refers to a policeman 
who "is not granting exemption to (making an exception in 
favor of)" a motorist. 
1Lutzer, The Morality Gap: An Evangelical Response 
to Situation Ethics, 103. 
2Ibid. 
3Grenz, 157-158. 
4 Ibid., 158. 
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standards which are based on a divine origin. However, 
while theistic morality holds to an absolutist, normative 
approach, hierarchicalism turns out to be a relativistic 
ethical scheme that operates in a utilitarian way. As such 
it contradicts some of the criteria that Geisler has himself 
established for an authentic moral methodology. 
Following this, a comparison was made between 
ethical hierarchicalism and Christian ethics as described by 
Geisler. It was demonstrated that both approaches are based 
on natural law and on the Bible, with an emphasis on the 
latter. Likewise, both hold that ethics is best exemplified 
in the life of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, a comparative 
investigation of five additional vital characteristics of 
Christian ethics with ethical hierarchicalism revealed some 
major points of tension. These include the basis of the 
ethic as well as its motivating factor. Since, hierarchical 
ethics includes a descriptive approach, a teleological 
focus, and a non-absolutistic perspective, it fails to 
measure up to the standard that Geisler has delineated for a 
genuine Christian approach to ethics. 
The following section of this chapter dealt with 
conflicting concepts within hierarchical ethics itself. It 
was revealed that, while ethical hierarchicalism claims to 
believe in many substantive moral absolutes, in its actual 
application it ends up with only one contentless "absolute," 
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which is really no absolute at all. Therefore, in the final 
analysis hierarchicalism reduces to antinomianism. 
This study indicated that, for hierarchicalism, 
there is no real difference between an intention and an 
"end." Thus, if as Geisler holds, all actions in and of 
themselves are morally neutral, then it becomes clear that 
his moral methodology does in reality promote the belief 
that "the end justifies the means." As Geisler himself 
notes in connection with this thinking: "Such reasoning is 
humanistic and situational, not Christian and biblical. 111 
This research has disclosed that Geisler holds two 
mutually exclusive views on the unity of or differentiation 
between the civil, ceremonial, and moral laws. While the 
concept of the unity of these codes is indispensable to 
Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism, he himself separates 
them, claiming that the moral law is universally binding, 
whereas civil and ceremonial laws are not. Thus, when norms 
are properly divided into absolute laws and limited duties, 
it can be seen that no hierarchical method is necessitated. 
It was manifested that, on the one hand, Geisler 
recognizes the fact that biblical morality is not determined 
by what people do. Yet, it was observed that he bases some 
tenets fundamental to hierarchicalism on his personal 
interpretation of Bible stories. Thus, Geisler's ethical 
hierarchicalism denies the rudimentary principles that he 
1Geisler, "A Biblical View of Government," 12. 
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himself lays down concerning how to correctly discern and 
interpret the biblical accounts. 
The next major portion of this chapter dealt with 
additional problematic issues in ethical hierarchicalism. 
Concerning acts of omission and commission it was seen that 
for Geisler there is no significant moral difference between 
them. This theory gives supplementary support to his view 
that moral conflicts exist. However, careful scholarship 
reveals a distinct dissimilarity between these two acts, and 
indicates that, while one is responsible for committing an 
evil act, one is not culpable for actions that one cannot 
prevent. Thus, the individual is freed from falsely assumed 
obligations and responsibilities incorrectly foisted on one. 
In connection with the issue of assumed absolutes, 
it was noticed that, unfortunately, Geisler has not heeded 
his own counsel regarding the importance of interpreting 
one's experience by the Bible rather than reevaluating the 
Bible on the basis of personal experience. Since ethical 
hierarchicalism is based partly on Geisler's individually 
perceived "facts" of human experience instead of on the 
final authority of the Scriptures, it is an unacceptable 
method of moral reasoning. 
Time was spent examining Geisler's illustrations 
from the world of nature that were used to support some of 
the tenets of ethical hierarchicalism. It would have been 
advantageous had Geisler followed his own admonition against 
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connecting natural law with moral law. For, as observed, 
while the former merely describes a situation, the latter 
prescribes how things ought to be. Thus, it appears 
illegitimate to use nature's laws to establish morality. 
It was noted that, though Geisler alleges that 
ethical hierarchicalism is similar to the principle of 
double effect, his modified interpretation of this doctrine 
contradicts an integral component of the conventional 
formulation of it. In reality, Geisler operates this rule 
in a teleological way, focusing on consequences, since he 
does not believe in the intrinsic value of human actions. 
The prolonged evaluation of the vital biblical basis 
that Geisler provides for ethical hierarchicalism raised 
serious misgivings concerning Geisler's interpretation and 
use of various passages. First, it was shown that none of 
Geisler's examples substantiates that it is justifiable to 
lie to save life. Second, since this study suggests that 
none of the passages Geisler cites as evidence for the 
actuality of moral conflicts can sustain the charge, it 
casts ample suspicion on the validity of Geisler's thesis 
that real conflicts of moral obligations do exist. Third, 
it was seen that none of the illustrations given by Geisler 
promotes the idea that higher moral laws take precedence 
over lower ones. And fourth, this research has demonstrated 
that none of the instances of so-called guiltless suspension 
of lower laws, supports Geisler's view that God does not 
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hold people responsible for ignoring lower moral laws 
provided they keep the higher in conflict cases. Therefore, 
as Pack notes, "not even one of the Scriptures cited by 
Geisler actually demands a hierarchy of norms. 111 
The analysis done above showed that; even though 
Geisler himself agrees that God's moral laws, which He 
designed not to conflict, are a reflection of His unchanging 
character, he insists that these laws do conflict. In this 
situation, the laws concerning one's relation to God must 
always be kept, while those pertaining to people can be 
disregarded. Thus, ethical hierarchicalism holds to a 
dichotomy in the law of God, and by extension this 
methodology implies that there is a "bifurcation within 
God. 112 
Finally, this appraisal considered two crucial 
semantic issues. On the matter of calling evil good, it was 
observed that Geisler places both good and evil in the same 
pyramid, with no clear differentiation between them. Since 
hierarchicalism holds that, depending on the context or 
purpose, actions change their moral value from evil to good, 
this ethical strategy comes under biblical condemnation. 
Furthermore, Geisler posits that his methodology does not 
grant any exceptions to moral absolutes, but does permit 
exemptions from lower norms when there is a conflict. 
1Pack, 129. 
2Bloesch, 183. 
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However, as has been shown, regardless of the terms used, to 
disregard an absolute moral law is to break it. 
In a paper presented at an evangelical conference on 
ethics, Geisler personally confronted the subject of the use 
of semantics by biblical scholars. 1 In referring to what 
was then "the current resurrection debate," he noted: "New 
definitions of terms are being invented that bluff the 
reader into thinking they are the real ones. The net 
effect, of course, is bewildering. It entices the readers 
into thinking that an unorthodox view is really orthodox. 112 
Geisler then accused another theologian of a "world-class 
semantical somersault," due to the fact that his "arbitrary 
redefinition of the word 'essential' to mean 'customary' 
gives it virtually the opposite meaning. 113 
This admonition seems applicable to the very manner 
in which Geisler has used language in promoting ethical 
hierarchicalism. Take, for example, Geisler's statements 
which appear midway through his first volume on ethics. 
Here, contrary to the standard dictionary definition of 
these terms, he claims that some "universals" are "only 
1see Norman L. Geisler, "Bible Balderdash: The Games 
Exegetes Play," 1990, TMs [photocopy], a paper presented at 
the Evangelical Theological Society annual meeting, New 
Orleans, LA. 
2Ibid., 1. 
3Ibid., 5. 
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locally universal, 111 and "not all absolutes are absolutely 
absolute," since "some are only relatively absolute. 112 The 
same type of "semantic game113 is seen throughout Geisler's 
elaboration of his ethical strategy. For, while he claims 
that hierarchicalism is an absolutist ethic, it is clearly 
relativistic; while he asserts that his scheme is normative, 
it is indeed utilitarian; while he maintains his method is 
prescriptive, it actually includes descriptive perspectives; 
while he alleges it is deontological, in practice it proves 
to be teleological; while he professes it to be biblically 
based, it turns out to be naturalistic; while he argues that 
it promotes good deeds, it ends up justifying evil acts; and 
while he insists that ethical hierarchicalism champions a 
plurality of substantive absolute moral norms, it concludes 
with only one contentless norm. 
Geisler's critique of those who redefine terms in 
order to "make their views sound as orthodox as possible, 114 
therefore appears applicable to his own method of ethical 
hierarchicalism. He is absolutely correct in noting that 
"meanings have ranges and scopes, but they are not putty. 115 
1Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
2Ibid. 
3Grenz (p. 157) uses this term to describe Geisler's 
misuse of words. 
4Geisler, "Bible Balderdash: The Games Exegetes 
Play," 13. 
5Ibid., 7. 
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Therefore, as he appropriately concludes, "an author has an 
ethical obligation to use words in the customary way. 111 
For, "language is not a private affair. It is a medium of 
public communication, and an author has a moral obligation 
to use words in the ordinary sense in which his intended 
audience will understand them. 112 Indeed, "inventing one's 
own meanings for terms," is "simply unacceptable."3 
The preceding critical analysis of Norman Geisler's 
ethical hierarchicalism does not purport to cover every 
aspect of his approach to moral decision-making. Moreover, 
this appraisal does not claim to be an exhaustive evaluation 
of Geisler's ethical strategy. However, it is anticipated 
that this assessment has elucidated certain crucial elements 
and yielded definitive insights that will be of benefit in 
the search for a more consistent and coherent procedure for 
addressing the difficult decisions of daily life. By noting 
the positive contributions of ethical hierarchicalism, and 
by providing a synopsis of the entire research project, the 
final chapter will attempt to contribute to that end. 
1 Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., 15. 
CHAPTER VI 
EVALUATION ANO CONCLUSIONS 
Now that a critical analysis of ethical 
hierarchicalism has been conducted, it must be noted that 
there are also some beneficial attributes of this approach 
to ethics. These points are briefly outlined below. 
Following that, a short synopsis of the whole research 
project is provided. Recognizing that not every issue 
pertaining to ethical hierarchicalism has been addressed in 
this study, .several recommendations for further research are 
then proposed. Finally, to end the chapter, a short, yet 
definitive conclusion is made. 
Positive Aspects of Ethical Bierarchicalism 
Michael Andrus, in his 1973 review of Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues, offered high praise for the way in 
which Geisler had broken the near-total evangelical silence 
on the urgent ethical concerns of the current century. 1 
Andrus also expressed his pleasure at Geisler for attempting 
something more than merely quoting "pious platitudes" and 
1Michael P. Andrus, review of Ethics: Alternatives 
and Issues, by Norman L. Geisler, in Calvary Review (Summer 
1973). 
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giving "nineteenth century answers. 111 He noted that, even 
if one rejects the answers given by Geisler, "he cannot help 
but admit that the author has grappled with the issues in an 
original, relevant, and challenging manner. 112 
In his assessment of Geisler's hierarchical ethics, 
William Luck observed that the hierarchy of love's laws "may 
well make one more sensitive to those weightier matters of 
the law (the inward moral virtues) that· need constant 
attention lest mere outward obedience of the ceremonial 
elements crowd them out. 113 Luck notes that "there is also 
a need to consider the hierarchy of sins--that some actions 
are worse than others--in order that one may exercise 
special care not to practice that which is abominable to 
God. 114 Echoing a similar appreciation, Gordon Olson says 
that "we should note that his [i.e., Geisler's] proofs, 
supporting the contention that not all sins are equal, are 
solid and helpful. 115 Olson continues: "Although it is 
3William F. Luck, "Moral Conflicts and Evangelical 
Ethics: A Second Look at the Salvaging Operations," Grace 
Theological Journal 8 (Spring 1987): 33. 
4Ibid., 34. However, Luck (ibid.) adds that a 
"hierarchy does not imply conflicts. [For,] the very same 
passages in Scripture that talk of hierarchy also caution 
against the thought that the keeping of the lower removes 
the obligation to the higher or that the keeping of the 
higher removes the necessity of following the lower." 
5c. Gordon Olson, "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical 
Ethics Revisited," Evangelical Journal 4 (Spring 1986): 4. 
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widely held by naive Christians that all sins are equal, it 
is important to relieve them of this potentially harmful 
notion. 111 With regard to the concept of a hierarchy, Luck 
recognizes one more positive value. He says: "Evangelicals 
need to think on the hierarchy of good consequences so that 
within the bounds of the (deontological) rules they may 
strive to produce the greatest amount of good for the 
greatest number of neighbors. 112 
Robert Rakestraw enumerates additional strengths 
that can be observed in Geisler's work. To begin with, 
Rakestraw notes that one ought to appreciate Geisler's 
"devotion to the scriptures, 113 and his "attempts to be 
biblically based. 114 He adds: "Also admirable is his 
sincere attempt to relate Christian faith to the rather 
harsh realities of everyday life. 115 Rakestraw says 
"another strength is the stressing of individual 
2Luck, 34. 
3Robert v. Rakestraw, "Graded Absolutism: An 
Analysis of Norman Geisler's Ethics," 1983, TMs (photocopy], 
p. 14, a paper presented at the eastern regional meeting of 
the Evangelical Theological Society, Langhorne, PA. 
4Robert v. Rakestraw, "The Hierarchical Christian 
Ethics of Norman L. Geisler," 1980, TMs (photocopy], p. 45, 
a paper presented for the class Basic Motifs in Christian 
Ethics, Drew University; available from the author, Bethel 
Theological Seminary, St. Paul, MN. 
5Rakestraw, "Graded Absolutism: An Analysis of 
Norman Geisler's Ethics," 14. 
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responsibility in one's life and decision-making. 111 The 
Christian is expected to do some thinking, and then to turn 
that thought into action. The individual believer needs to 
study the Bible and the life of Jesus so that the will of 
God may be determined and performed. 2 Moreover, ethical 
hierarchicalism "emphasizes the value of personhood. 113 
That is, persons, more than utilitarian ends, are to be 
respected as beings created in God's image. 4 Finally, 
ethical hierarchicalism "offers release from the false guilt 
that often plagues the sincere Christian. 115 Geisler 
explains that "guilt is a major problem for the human 
psyche. 116 Thus, in cases such as unavoidable divorce, the 
Christian is not blamed and called a sinner. 7 In this 
manner, hierarchicalism helps to relieve one from the 
erroneous guilt that sometimes plagues the believer. 8 
1Rakestraw, "The Hierarchical Christian Ethics of 
Norman L. Geisler," 45. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. I 45-46. 
5Ibid. I 46. 
6Norman L. Geisler, Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 
107. 
7Rakestraw, "The Hierarchical Christian Ethics of 
Norman L. Geisler," 46. 
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synopsis of the Research Project 
In chapter 1 it was demonstrated that, at least from 
the time of Augustine, reflective Christians have been 
cogitating on the matter of moral conflicts. Since the mid-
1960s this issue of conflicting moral obligations has become 
the focus of attention for several Christian scholars, as 
they have attempted to formulate and develop a theory of 
ethics that would be adequate to deal with not just the 
ordinary concerns of daily life but also the problem cases, 
such as those arising in times of life or death emergencies. 
One of these thinkers is Norman L. Geisler, who originated 
and devised ethical hierarchicalism, a strategy that 
promotes doing the greatest good in conflict situations. 
Since Geisler has been the most articulate and prolific 
proponent of this ethical methodology, and since his works 
are taken seriously by numerous influential Christians, his 
approach to ethics was selected as the focus of this 
research. 
In order to provide the necessary foundation and 
background for a detailed examination of Geisler's ethical 
position, chapter 2 covered a broad outline of different 
techniques and methodologies related to ethical dilemmas. 
The brief survey of the contrasting ways in which prominent 
early Christians, Reformation leaders, post-Reformation 
thinkers, and twentieth-century scholars dealt with 
conflicts of moral obligations revealed that, while some 
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held firmly to non-conflicting moral absolutes, others 
believed that exceptions from ethical universals are at 
times permissible. Following this, the relativistic 
theories of utilitarianism and situationism, and the 
absolutistic views of non-conflicting absolutism, 
conflicting absolutism, and hierarchicalism, other than that 
of Geisler, were looked at to observe their respective 
approaches to moral conflicts. In connection with the non-
relativistic methods it was shown that, while non-
conflicting absolutism maintains that no universal 
scriptural moral absolutes can ever conflict, the other two 
strategies assert that these conflicts do occur, in which 
~ 
case conflicting absolutism constrains one to sin and then 
seek for forgiveness for doing the lesser evil, whereas 
hierarchicalism calls for the performance of the guiltless 
greater good. Finally, research into the principle of 
double effect indicated that, in the event of a conflict of 
obligations, this procedure allows one to perform a morally 
good or neutral action, with an indirect and unintentional, 
yet adequately justifiable, evil side effect. 
To furnish a framework for a clearer understanding 
and a better appreciation of Geisler's hierarchical approach 
to ethics, chapter 3 traced his philosophical, theological, 
and ethical development over the years. It was noted that, 
though raised in a non-Christian family, Norman Geisler felt 
called to the ministry after making a personal commitment to 
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Christ in his late teens. As a conservative scholar, who 
was trained in both Catholic and Protestant educational 
systems, he has pastored, lectured, and administered for 
many years at various Christian institutions. While he 
considers it the greatest compliment to be labeled a 
"Thomist, 11 after Thomas Aquinas who has had the most 
influence on his life, Geisler denies that Aquinas' thinking 
has had any conscious influence on his own ethical method. 
A productive author on a vast variety of topics, Geisler has 
attached immense importance to his ethical hierarchicalism. 
He asserts that this procedure is comprehensive, consistent, 
and biblical--the only true ethical method for Christians. 
Chapter 4 outlined and explained the teachings of 
ethical hierarchicalism, as described in Geisler's works. 
It was shown that for Geisler, theistic morality consists of 
an objective standard, an absolute basis, a normative 
approach, and a divine origin. Furthermore, he views 
Christian ethics, which builds on this groundwork, as a 
prescriptive, absolute, deontological strategy, with the 
Bible as its basis, God's character as its source, Christ's 
life as its best manifestation, and Christ's love as its 
motivating power. While Geisler recognizes some valuable 
insights in other ethical theories, he expends considerable 
effort to explain and defend his own viewpoint. First, 
natural law and the Bible are the two sources of ethical 
hierarchicalism. second, as a qualified absolutism, this 
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theory declares that its moral laws are absolute in their 
source, their sphere, and their sequence of priority. 
Third, it is a duty-centered ethic of obedience to God's 
commands, including the hierarchy for conflict situations. 
Fourth, it posits that Scripture stories prove the existence 
of moral conflicts as well as the priority of values with 
which to solve these dilemmas. And fifth, based on its 
allegation that human actions have no intrinsic value, it 
contends that morality must be measured by the motives and 
intentions of those doing the acts. In addition to these 
five basic traits, it was demonstrated that hierarchicalism 
claims that the Bible itself supplies one with a scale of 
values by which to resolve moral conflicts. The one who 
does the greatest good in conflict situations, should not 
feel guilty for keeping the higher law, even though the 
action taken might leave cause for regret. Lastly, ethical 
hierarchicalism holds that, in times of crisis, decision-
making can be facilitated from a biblical perspective by 
maintaining a love for God over people, obedience to God 
over the government, and by putting mercy above veracity. 
Based partially on Geisler's own views of theistic 
morality, Christian ethics, and ethical hierarchicalism, and 
partly on the views of other scholars, chapter 5 critically 
analyzed ethical hierarchicalism. On the one hand, it was 
demonstrated that this approach of Geisler's maintained a 
belief in divinely-derived objective moral norms, as based 
314 
on natural law and the Bible, and as best manifested in the 
life of Christ. However, since ethical hierarchicalism was 
shown to embrace relativistic, utilitarian, descriptive, and 
teleological components, it can be seen to contradict many 
of the essential characteristics of theistic morality in 
general and Christian ethics in particular as specified by 
Geisler himself. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that, 
since this scheme ends up with one contentless "absolute," 
it is really an antinomianism. Because for Geisler, the end 
truly does justify the means, hierarchicalism reduces to 
situationism. Moreover, ethical hierarchicalism denies the 
rudimentary principles that Geisler lays down concerning how 
to correctly interpret the scriptural accounts. Rather than 
being based on a biblical foundation, it was revealed that 
many of the so-called moral conflicts arise as a result of 
falsely assumed responsibilities, inaccurately specified 
absolutes, and naturalistic definitions. Additionally, none 
of the scriptural passages that Geisler appeals to supports 
his perspective that lying to save life is justifiable, that 
real moral conflicts exist, that higher laws take precedence 
over lower ones, and that one can guiltlessly ignore lower 
laws. Also, Geisler holds to a dichotomy in the law of God, 
and by extension a disjunction within God Himself. Finally, 
this chapter showed that Geisler uses unacceptable semantic 
strategies in order to promote his method. For all of the 
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above reasons ethical hierarchicalism must be rejected as an 
authentic Christian approach to moral decision-making. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Norman Geisler has been a remarkably prolific 
writer, especially in the areas of ethical theory and moral 
issues. Obviously, this research project has addressed only 
some of the questions and concerns relevant to hierarchical 
ethics. Several matters need further investigation. 
The relationship between the use of natural law in 
Aquinas' thought and Geisler's hierarchicalism deserves 
attention. This study would need to take into account the 
way in which Geisler's hierarchicalism is related to his 
views concerning christology, revelation and inspiration, 
the doctrine of God, the doctrine of the nature of humanity, 
and the problem of determinism, freedom and evil. 
In addition, the connection between Geisler's 
ethical approach, his exegetical methodology, his 
theological beliefs, and his philosophical presuppositions 
should be determined in order to better understand and 
evaluate the soundness of ethical hierarchicalism from a 
biblical perspective. Specifically, the Bible passages 
analyzed in the previous chapter, which Geisler utilizes in 
support of his method could undergo further and deeper 
analysis. Also, texts not addressed here may be examined. 
Furthermore, since the real evidence of the true 
value of any ethical strategy is its practical workability, 
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indepth research needs to be done to ascertain whether or 
not ethical hierarchicalism is actually able to provide 
sound and suitable solutions to the dilemmas of daily life. 
Pinal Conclusion 
Even though Geisler's ethical hierarchicalism has 
made some positive contributions in the realm of moral 
reasoning, this technique of ethical decision-making must be 
considered an unacceptable method for ethics because it is 
individualistic, naturalistic, humanistic, situational, 1 
relativistic, utilitarian, and antinomian. Since Geisler's 
method is incoherent, 2 inconsistent, self-contradictory, 3 
and unscriptural, 4 it fails to satisfy the basic criteria 
1Luck (p. 19) concurs that Geisler's method shows a 
"failure to avoid situationalism." Similarly, Pack says it 
"entails a contextual or situational approach to ethics;" 
Rolland W. Pack, "An Examination of Norman L. Geisler's 
Ethic of Hierarchy" (M.A. thesis, Harding College, 1979), v. 
Likewise, Andrus notes it "appears to be little more than a 
conservative situationism." McQuilkin agrees that it "has 
some similarities to situationism in method and outcome;" 
Robertson McQuilkin, An Introduction to Biblical Ethics 
(Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1989), 162. 
2In basic agreement, Luck (p. 19) refers to 
Geisler's method as one of the "incoherent ethical systems." 
3Likewise, referring to ethical hierarchicalism, 
Luck (p. 26) says that "the system is self-contradictory." 
4This conclusion conflicts with Geisler's ambitions 
for his ethical method: "My hope is that evangelicals will 
increasingly see the value of graded absolutism [i.e., 
hierarchicalism]. It is not only consistent with biblical 
Christianity, but also provides a viable answer to many 
problems in both Scripture and society;" Geisler, Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics, 114. 
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for a valid ethical methodology for Bible believers. 1 
Christians seeking for a more Christ-centered, dependable, 
biblical strategy will need to look elsewhere. 2 
1similarly, in reviewing Options in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics, Gill notes that Geisler's "own approach 
falls short of satisfying the three criteria he affirms, 
i.e., 'biblical, comprehensive, and consistent';" David W. 
Gill, review of Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics, by 
Norman L. Geisler, in Transformation 1 (October/December 
1984): 27. 
2Geisler admits his limitations, noting that "God 
will reveal other areas where finitude has failed us;" 
Norman L. Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of 
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4 (Fall 1986): 
86. 
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